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Open to the sports pages of your local newspaper today and you
are likely to find that discussions of the economic aspects of sports
occupy as much space as do the results of the games.  As Americans’
discretionary incomes have risen, so has their demand for sports, as
both participants and spectators.  As a consequence of this increase in
demand, we are now witness to professional athletes commanding
long-term contracts of over $100 million.  Cities are bidding against
one another to acquire professional sports franchises with offers of new
stadiums costing upwards of $500 million.  Spectators are willing to
pay “street prices” as high as $3,200 for tickets to the Super Bowl and
$4,000 for tickets to college basketball’s “Final Four.”  And profes-
sional sports owners and players’ unions perennially talk about the
possibility of strikes to resolve their differences over dividing up the
multibillion dollar sports revenue pie.  Clearly, sports has become “big
business.” 
 As the sports industry has grown, it has attracted the attention of
economists, and sports economics is now a growing subfield within the
economics profession.  The organization of the sports leagues has been
fertile ground for economists interested in industrial organization ques-
tions.  The labor markets for professional athletes have been of interest
to labor economists, given the abundance of statistics related to player
performance and productivity and the unique features of these labor
markets such as the National Basketball Association’s (NBA) salary
cap.  The development of free agency in sports, the behavior of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association in regulating collegiate sports,
and the growing use of “personal seat licenses” by National Football
League (NFL) teams have provided additional opportunities to observe
and measure the effects of monopsony power, the behavior of cartels,




Sports economics is also finding its way into the college class-
room.  Economists have found that sports is a useful medium for teach-
ing economics, given the natural interest of many students in sports
issues.  The use of economic principles to help students understand the
economic issues in sports provides evidence to students that learning
economics can be both useful and fun.  Thus, a small but growing num-
ber of colleges and universities now offer courses on the economics of
sports.
The papers presented in this volume examine a number of contem-
porary economic issues in the world of sports.  The lecture series that
produced these papers was held at Western Michigan University during
the 1998–1999 school year.  The theme of the lecture series and this
volume—“Economics of Sports: Winners and Losers”—is, of course, a
play on words because it describes not only the results for the players
of the game, but also the issues that we hoped the papers would
explore.  Though economists stress the desirability of outcomes that
will improve the position of everyone, we are also aware that is not
always the case.  Indeed, many sports fans feel that they increasingly
have come out losers as ticket prices have risen and they feel alienated
from players who seem more interested in the money than the game.
Cities that are vying to attract or retain sports franchises believe they
will be winners in the game of urban development and job creation, but
is that really the case?  In the aftermath of the recent labor management
struggles that have taken place in baseball and basketball, one wonders
whether either side won!  
The volume begins with a paper by Rodney Fort on the conse-
quences of monopoly in professional sports.  He argues that much of
what sports fans complain about in pro sports—high ticket prices, high
player salaries, and public subsidies for stadium construction—are pre-
dictable consequences of the monopoly power wielded by professional
sports leagues.  The monopoly power of sports leagues, he says, stems
from the special legal treatment which sports leagues have been
granted.  The consequence of their special legal status is that leagues
can restrict the supply of sports franchises, manage themselves as car-
tels, and stifle competition from competing sports leagues.  The answer
to this problem, Fort argues, is to apply a dose of competition to pro-
fessional sports.  He endorses a remedy for sports monopolies first
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offered by Ira Horowitz and Roger Noll—breaking up pro sports
leagues into competing leagues.   
One of the most hotly debated contemporary sports issues is the
use of tax dollars by cities attempting to attract and retain professional
sports franchises.  Fort’s paper reveals that this practice is a conse-
quence of the monopoly power wielded by sports leagues, whose sup-
ply of franchises is limited relative to cities’ demands.  Thus, cities find
that a new stadium, paid for with tax dollars, is the price to retain or
attract a pro sports team.  The stadium building boom also results from
the belief that sports franchises are “hotbeds” of urban development
that will generate jobs and growth.  But is that really the case?       
 Professor Robert Baade is a pioneer in determining the impact of
sports teams and stadiums on regional economies.  In previous studies,
Baade and others have found that the impact on regional growth and
employment was negligible at best.  In the paper presented here, Baade
investigates the impact of sports facilities on neighborhood economies
as well as their urban renewal strategy.  Cities are building stadiums in
the core city in an attempt to bring economic activity back to areas
abandoned during the last several decades as population and economic
activity have migrated to the suburbs.  This has been a strategy fol-
lowed by Cleveland, Atlanta, and Nashville where recently constructed
stadiums were placed near the central business district, and in Detroit,
where a new stadium for the Detroit Tigers was recently completed.
As a case study, Baade uses Seattle, which is constructing two new
stadiums for the Mariners and Seahawks in close proximity to its
former stadium, the Kingdome.  Baade estimates the economic impact
that the Kingdome’s presence has had on the surrounding neighbor-
hood, known as Pioneer Square.  
If sports teams and new facilities generate negligible net increases
in regional economic activity, and if, as Baade contends, they also do
little to invigorate central business districts, then who are the primary
beneficiaries of the public subsidies to sports franchises?  This issue is
addressed in the paper by John Siegfried and Timothy Peterson.  They
point out that in discussing stadium construction and team relocation,
the public has focused on financing issues while economists have
largely focused on efficiency issues. However, the equity issue remains
largely unexamined.  Siegfried and Peterson note that although some




ing playgrounds for the rich,” there is little objective evidence about
the income distribution effects of these projects.  They propose to rem-
edy this by considering who bears the burden of the costs of new sta-
dium construction and who receives the benefits.  
 The underlying theme of both Richard Sheehan’s and Andrew
Zimbalist’s papers is the difficulty of maintaining competitive balance
in sports. Although fans’ enthusiasm is a function of the competitive-
ness of the leagues, gross mismatches in talent create dull contests
which are not in the long-run interest of the leagues.  However, success
on the playing field is largely a result of a team’s ability to acquire the
most talented players and management’s ability to provide the best
facilities.  Success is a function of the economic resources available to
the individual teams, and these resources are often grossly unequal.
Zimbalist points out that some teams in professional sports are located
in cities that are eight times larger than other cities in the league.
Major League Baseball is an obvious example of this problem.  Small-
market cities are finding it almost impossible to compete for talent with
teams located in large markets.        
Richard Sheehan’s paper demonstrates that competitive balance is
an issue in collegiate sports.  He shows that, in contrast to the popular
view of major collegiate sports, most college sports programs are not
profitable.  He considers the connection between the abilities of sports
teams to generate revenues and their on-field success: in other words,
is it possible to buy victories?  And, will winning more make a school’s
sports programs more profitable?  Sheehan argues that athletic finances
and athletic success are intimately related.  The ability to generate
large revenues raises the likelihood of winning.  However, increased
winning often translates into small revenue gains.  Sheehan thus argues
that the “have nots” of college athletics are not likely to join the
“haves” by investing in their college sports programs.  A relatively
small number of sports programs generate large sums of money and
those programs perennially enjoy the bulk of on-field success.    
Andrew Zimbalist’s paper discusses the economic issues involved
in the 1998–1999 NBA lockout.  Zimbalist, who was a consultant to
the NBA Player’s Association during the negotiations, argues that there
are several strategies that leagues might employ to preserve competi-
tive balance.  These include revenue sharing, skewing the reverse order
of drafting of players to give poorer teams greater access to talent, arti-
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ficially restricting the growth of players’ salaries, and compelling
league divestiture to engender competition.  
The NBA owners claimed that the salary-cap restrictions they
wished to impose were necessary to restore competitive balance by
ensuring the survival of financially weak teams, but Zimbalist argues
that this was mere rhetoric.  Few, if any, teams were actually losing
money, and those that were would soon have new arenas and more rev-
enue from television.  In addition, the owners attempted in both 1995
and 1998 to eliminate the Larry Bird exception, which was a device
that helped to maintain competitive balance.  The owners’ argument,
he concludes, was just cover for their attempt to raise profits by hold-
ing down the growth of salaries. 
Zimbalist suggests that if the NBA owners are truly serious about
the competitive balance problem, they should pursue the NFL’s strat-
egy of revenue sharing, but that faces serious obstacles in both basket-
ball and baseball.  The best solution, he argues, is one also suggested
by Fort: foster competition by breaking up the existing leagues and
creating new ones.  With two leagues in each sport, large-market teams
would have to share their market with teams from the competing
leagues, and cities would not have to compete against one another by
offering new stadiums to attract teams.
The volume concludes with a paper by Lawrence Kahn surveying
the literature on the incidence of racial discrimination in pro sports
with respect to salaries, hiring, retention, positional segregation, and
customer prejudice.  As Kahn points out, the world of sports has been a
particularly rich environment in which to study discrimination because
of the abundance of information related to player race, compensation,
and productivity.  Kahn’s survey of the literature demonstrates that
although the extent of discrimination appears to have declined over
time, some evidence that discrimination in hiring, positional discrimi-
nation, and retention stemming from racial preferences of sports fans
still lingers.
The six essays presented here offer a wide perspective on current
issues in the field of sports economics from a group of scholars who
have made significant contributions to this emerging field.  They
should certainly be worthwhile reading for anyone interested in the
impact of sports teams and stadiums on urban development and in the




competitive balance.  We can only hope that some of the insights
offered here will ultimately come to bear upon the decisions that the













Many Americans are completely carried away with sports.  During
the last baseball strike in 1994, Henry Aaron of the Brookings Institu-
tion (yes, there really is an economist with that famous baseball name)
tried to put sports into perspective during his testimony before Con-
gress.  He pointed out that while the Major League Baseball (MLB) as
an industry was just under $2 billion a year, the envelope industry
topped the $2 billion mark.  In a slightly broader view, the cardboard
box industry generated well over triple that amount annually.  He pro-
ceeded to lightly scold the subcommittee for spending its scarce and
valuable time on such small potatoes.
Watching this testimony on C-SPAN, I was (very briefly) ashamed.
After all, the importance with which I view sports is neatly summa-
rized in one of my favorite Far Side cartoons.  Artist Gary Larson
shows a group of primordial sea-dwellers just off shore.  One of the
group holds a bat, and their baseball lies on the beach, just out of reach.
The caption reads, “Great Moments in Evolution.”  The clear implica-
tion is that baseball is the reason we waddled out of the ooze in the first
place.  And here before Congress was an economist of no small renown
pointing out that this inflated enthusiasm is over an industry that is
dwarfed by only a small share of the paper products industry.
But my shame faded when I remembered that there is no cardboard
box page in the daily paper.  And it never has been the case that mas-
sive public subsidies for cardboard box companies have been on a ref-
erendum ballot.  Sports really are different than cardboard boxes.
Many of us enjoy benefits from sports that are vastly beyond what we
spend on them.  Whole other media industries thrive on its output, and
it can be a consuming passion, this love of sports shared by so many.  I




This depth of feeling generates the concern of so many fans over
the current state of pro sports.  Talk to any sports fan and you will get
at least one of the following opinions.  Rising ticket prices threaten to
slam the door on the average fan.  Growing revenue imbalance leaves
most teams out of contention before the season even starts.  Strato-
spheric player salaries make it impossible to identify with players and
introduces skepticism about whether or not they really lay it on the line
every play.  And do not even get a fan started about labor-management
relations!  MLB fans have recently lost their play-offs and a World
Series because of them, and National Basketball Association (NBA)
fans just lost half a season to labor unrest.
All of these outcomes are for the fans lucky enough to have a team.
Many other fans have spent what seems an eternity waiting for an
expansion team to arrive in their area.  Others have seen their existing
team threaten relocation at the drop of a hat.  Team owners put all-or-
nothing demands on their host cities and balk at every hint of intrusion
into the power they wield over their sport.  No other industry in the
United States has such control over 1) exclusive geographical franchise
rights over the entire industry, 2) team movement and location, 3) gate
and TV revenue sharing, 4) TV contracts as a joint venture, and 5)
entering talent through rookie drafts.
In the midst of all this unrest, you’ll find economists nosing




 (1999), James Quirk and I organize the
questions surrounding this fan frustration into a few chapters.  Are the
media and big TV money to blame?  Is it player unions?  Owners?
Sports leagues?  State and local politicians?  Or what?  As you can
probably guess, we point our finger at “or what,” which we define as
market power.
Almost all economists see the ultimate culprit as market power,
which derives from the special legal treatment of leagues.  The out-
comes are exclusive franchise rights for teams, management of sports
leagues as cartels, and a complete stifling of any competing leagues,
precisely those indicated by the basic economic theory of market
power.  In what follows, I will run through this logic and suggest what
can be done about these outcomes.
Not much of what I am presenting here is new.  Many of the issues




 decision of 1922, MLB’s so-
called antitrust exemption, enjoying its 75th anniversary this year.
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Since that time, nearly all of these issues have been raised repeatedly in
Congressional hearings that date back to 1951 and that represent at
least 49 years of Congressional scrutiny.  The ameliorative device pro-
posed here also is not new.  I found it first voiced in Congressional tes-
timony by Ira Horowitz and Roger Noll in 1976.  The problem is long-
standing and one can only marvel that the current market power struc-
ture of sports leagues has withstood this scrutiny for so many years.
 
MARKET POWER PROBLEMS IN PRO SPORTS
 
Before proceeding to the heart of the matter—namely, market
power—let us examine the more well-publicized culprits.  Many claim
that the media and big TV money cause most of the economic prob-
lems in sports.  But the media are nothing more than a pipeline for
advertising revenues, transporting them from advertisers, through
broadcasters, and on to sports leagues and teams.  There can be little
doubt that the game on the field or floor is different because of televi-
sion; there wouldn’t be much point to on-field celebrations or taunting
without an audience.  But to networks, sports are just another type of
programming that reaches particular demographic groups of interest to
their advertisers.  And, given that leagues can confront a small number
of bidders with a chance at the rights to these important properties, it
should come as no surprise that the bulk of the proceeds moves to the
leagues and their teams.  And this happens because leagues are allowed
to act jointly in the sale of their TV rights, a practice that surely would
be outlawed in any other industry.
Sportswriters are especially fond of making unions one of the
major culprits in pro sports.  Unions have no doubt changed the face of
professional sports by removing nearly all of the mechanisms that
owners previously used to restrict the free movement of players
between teams.  The result is that players now receive salaries much
closer to the value of their contribution to team revenues.  Some fans
might begrudge players their huge salaries, but the money that fans
spend on sports will not go away.  If players don’t get the money, then
owners will keep it.  In no small way, salaries are large because leagues




earned by leagues that is up for grabs in player–owner negotiations.
Because players are free to move between teams without this profit,
there wouldn’t be much for a union to negotiate except minimum sala-
ries and benefit packages.  In summary, unions have not created the
fabulous wealth available to athletes; they have just been proficient at
moving that wealth from owners to players.
What about the players, themselves?  Is their insatiable greed at
least partly to blame for rising ticket prices?  There is both a contradic-
tion and a fundamental economic misunderstanding behind this view.
First, for the interesting contradiction, why do fans think that players
are any greedier than anybody else, including themselves?  How many
fans would be willing to take less than they could possibly make?  Sec-
ond, for the economic misunderstanding, sports salaries simply reflect
the value that fans place on player talent.  Player salaries are not the
cause of high ticket prices or the rise of pay-per-view televised games.
Instead, it is the willingness of fans to pay ever more for sports that
raises player salaries and encourages owners to seek new avenues of
collection like pay-per-view.  Players are no more to blame for the high
price of sports than movie stars are to blame for the rising price of
movie tickets.  According to economic theory, it is demand that drives
the result.  Besides, if players didn’t take their share, would anybody
reasonably suggest that owners would rebate the balance to fans?
So, it is not the media, or unions, or players who are responsible
for market power problems.  However, the source of the problem
plaguing pro sports comes to light when we examine owners and their
behavior together as a sports league.  At the most basic economic level,
owners possess the rights to a very valuable monopoly.  That monopoly
is granted by pro sports leagues, in plain view for all to see.  Because
leagues are allowed to behave like cartels in controlling inputs and out-
puts, individual teams in these leagues confront no current or future
competition from rivals.  The result for fans in this setting has been
clear since the time of Adam Smith-restricted output, prices greater
than marginal cost, and profits greater than the normal rate of return.
Thus, it is not the personalities of owners that cause the economic
problems in pro sports; it is in fact the leagues, which operate as one of
the most successful monopolies in history.
That leaves politicians.  Typically, when market power runs wild,
we hope for political intervention to protect consumers, but, if any-
 
The Economics of Sports 11
 
thing, politicians have facilitated sports monopolies.  First, despite the





Congress has never intervened to define the antitrust status of MLB.
Second, pro sports league mergers have been encouraged by Congress
rather than denied.  Finally, specific laws enacted by Congress, from
local black-out laws to joint venture sale of TV rights, have served to
cement the monopoly power of leagues.  And it doesn’t get any better
at the local level.  Witness the stadium mess plaguing so many current
pro sports team hosts.
So, there you have it.  Ticket prices are high because there are no
competing teams in the same geographic market to push prices to mar-
ginal cost.  Competitive balance is lacking because leagues restrict the
number of teams in large revenue markets to the advantage of all
league members.  Salaries are higher than they would be under compe-
tition because some of the rents from market power accrue to players in
a labor market that is carefully managed by unions.  Strikes and lock-
outs occur as owners and players lock horns over the division of
monopoly profits.  Because leagues carefully manage the number of
teams, output is restricted and prices rise, and some cities are pur-
posely held open to solidify threats of relocation against current host
cities.  On the other hand, host cities are confronted with these all-or-
nothing propositions because the careful management of alternatives
by pro sports leagues has resulted in a lack of substitutes for profes-
sional sports teams.  All this has occurred because market power has
been allowed to dominate in pro sports.
Make no mistake about it.  The value of market power in pro sports
is high.  When an owner buys a team, the price includes rights that are
valuable beyond control of capital and a player roster.  The new owner
buys a monopoly right to provide the only game in a specific location as
a member of the league.  This right yields 1) gate, stadium, and local TV
revenues; 2) any revenues that can be extracted from players; 3) special
tax treatment; 4) a share of league-wide, national TV contract revenues;
5) a share of league earnings from expansion fees; and 6) spill-over ben-
efits to other business enterprises of the team owner.  In Los Angeles, the
value of these rights recently was revealed at around $300 million dur-
ing the sale of the Dodgers in 1998.  In Cleveland, it was $530 million
for the Browns in 1998.  Abroad, it was nearly a $1 billion offer for the




There isn’t any mystery about the remedy: a stiff dose of competi-
tion.  However, this kind of economic competition is repulsive to own-
ers and league personnel.  National Football  League (NFL)





, September 16, 1996), “Free market economics is the process of
driving enterprises out of business.  Sports league economics is the
process of keeping enterprises in business.”  Quite aside from inventing




, the self-serving nature of
the statement is only barely veiled.  Before proceeding to a prescription
for what ails pro sports, let us examine just what we would expect from
a good stiff dose of competition.
 
ECONOMICALLY COMPETITIVE SPORTS LEAGUES
 
As Walter Neale (1964) pointed out long ago, the economics of
sports indeed is peculiar.  Cooperation is essential for the survival of
sports leagues.  They must cooperate in order to determine a schedule
and a common set of rules and their enforcement.  Appeals are essen-
tial, so some sort of cooperative central decisions are necessary.  And,
finally, leagues may need to cooperate to determine championship for-
mats.  But no one expects this cooperation to result in a restriction of
output and prices exceeding marginal cost.  That sort of cooperation is
no more justified in pro sports than it is in any other economic
endeavor.
Economic competition would tip the economic scales away from
owners and players and toward fans and taxpayers.  First, think about
TV.  Competition among leagues would eliminate monopoly profits
from national TV contracts.  Because a monopoly league can maxi-
mize TV revenues by restricting the number of games shown, introduc-
ing competition would result in more televised games.  This would
reduce the value of game broadcasts to advertisers because competition
acts to bid away the profits earned from market power.  Similarly, local
TV revenue would decrease.  Local broadcasters would go with the
cheapest team of equal quality in their area.  And the same argument
applies to gate receipts.  If fans could find substitute teams of equal
quality, they would go with the one that charged least.
 
The Economics of Sports 13
 
The impact of competition on player salaries is more difficult to
determine.  Players would no longer contribute to an economic activity
that earned more than a normal return; therefore, players would be
worth less.  A further decline in player salaries would be expected from
competition.  Charles Finley, former owner of the Oakland Athletics,
knew this well.  He responded to player demands for free agency in the
mid 1970s with a hoot.  He suggested that MLB embrace this idea
whole-heartedly because competition would kill the rising union tide
and, along with it, salary arbitration and other artificial mechanisms
propping up salaries.  If competition removed sports unions from the
picture, wages would fall even further.  But there would be an impor-
tant, off-setting factor.  If leagues became truly and legally competi-
tive, other restrictions on player earnings would not be expected to
survive.  For example, a rookie draft would wither away with the intro-
duction of competition; this sort of restriction would not stand up to
raiding by rival leagues.  Thus, players in a competitive situation would
be worth less than they had been under monopoly; and if their ability to
organize were dealt a death blow as well, then their salaries might
decrease further.  But, this decline would be partly offset when other
restrictions on earnings withered away under competition.
And while we are on the topic, most labor-management strife
would disappear with competition because the major source of strife,
monopoly profits, would be gone.  Unions might still try raising pay
for some players, which, in a competitive environment, would only
increase owner costs and reduce overall player employment, but this
behavior would be up to the union members themselves.  The union
focus might shift to pensions and other fringe benefits.  And the
already contentious issue of income distribution between superstars
and journeyman players would increase.
Perhaps the most dramatic impacts of competition would occur in
expansion and relocation.  Under competition, all financially viable
locations would have a team from one league or another.  This would
probably increase the number of teams in megalopolis markets and
fans in these locations would enjoy more professional sports; but there
would be a downside for other fans.  Because gate and TV revenues
would be lower, current marginal locations might become unprofitable.




tional consequences.  Here, the trade-off would appear to be between
the fans of marginal teams in a few cities and fans in larger areas.
State and local taxpayers also would feel the impact of competition
on expansion and relocation.  Because all viable locations would have
a team, team owners would not be able to make threats about leaving
their current host cities.  In fact, the tables would take a dramatic turn:
teams actually would compete for financially viable locations.  If one
team pushed its host too far, another team would be waiting in the
wings for a lower subsidy.  Competition should reduce subsidies to
teams and possibly even put a market rental rate on existing and future
publicly owned stadiums.
So, in a competitive economic environment, there would be more
teams in big cities and a team in all economically viable locations.  Cit-
ies would provide much lower subsidies, if any, in the form of extrava-
gant stadiums and sweetheart stadium deals.  The stadium mess would
be alleviated.  There would be more games on television, lower reve-
nue to teams from television contracts, and lower ticket prices.  Player
salaries could either fall or rise, depending on the relative impacts of a
few obvious labor market factors.  Team profits would fall and fran-
chise values along with them.  In effect, power would be shifted from
players and owners to fans and taxpayers.  Some fans would enjoy
more sports, while others would lose their team if it was just hanging
on in the first place.
But economic competition has its limits, which must be considered
when prescribing a remedy to the problem of market power in pro
sports.  First, there have been competitive leagues in the past, but the
tendency has always been back toward a single, monopoly league.
Economic competition has not been self-sustaining in pro sports, his-
torically.  Owners in rival leagues would ultimately see the value in re-
forming another monopoly; therefore, something more than just setting
the wheels of competition in motion would be required to create
change.
Another nuance to pro sports leagues also dictates caution in the
prescription for market power.  Existing leagues have already estab-
lished their reputations and created a strong sense of fan identification.
These teams suffered low or negative profits during their early years of
growth and have paid public relations expenditures since that time.
The returns on such an investment are the monopoly profits earned by
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these sports teams under their current league structures, and these
returns have been earned for quite some time.  A rival league planning
to compete with existing leagues would have to make the same kind of
investment, in addition to competing for talent to demonstrate that they
really were an enduring, big-league alternative.  This effort would be
required in order to encourage fans and the media to commit their loy-
alties to their new league.  But, if competition were enforced from the
very outset for the new rival, the league would not be able to recover
these costs.  So, competition would not sustain itself, and it must be
sustained externally in a very careful manner in order to nurture a rival.
In addition to the economic circumstances described so far, politics
also impede economic competition in pro sports.  As even the most
casual student of government and the sports business knows, choices
by elected officials often facilitate, rather than ameliorate, market
power.  Congress has failed to respond to the MLB antitrust court deci-
sion of 1922.  In 1962, it exempted league-wide TV contracts in all
sports from antitrust laws.  Congress exempted the American Football
League (AFL)–NFL merger from antitrust laws in 1966 and brought
pressure to bear on the NBA to merge with the American Basketball
Association (ABA) in the mid 1970s.  Congress also has allowed other
leagues to exercise veto power over the location of their teams.  Now,
leagues put teams where they want them and carefully control the most
lucrative markets. Thus, despite repeated investigation, Congressional
action has consistently enhanced monopoly power in sports, and state
and local government outcomes have given us the stadium mess con-
fronting so many current and prospective host cities.
 
CREATING ECONOMICALLY COMPETITIVE 
SPORTS LEAGUES
 
In summary, competition stands a better than decent chance of
eliminating the ills in pro sports.  But competition will not be self-sus-
taining, and in sustaining competition, one must exercise caution.
Generating fan loyalty and staying power would be an expensive prop-
osition for any new, competing league.  Some long-term return would




would mean that special antitrust accommodations would be required
because overzealous enforcement of competition would kill that return
and the hope for competitive leagues.  Finally, there is no reason to
expect that federal, state, or local politicians would embrace a more
economically competitive setting for pro sports.  Politicians pursue
reelection.  Currently, that pursuit appears to favor the current market
power status of leagues and we should not expect any change until
politically potent opposition appears.  A few voices crying in the wil-
derness is not enough.
For all but its political limitations, one plan would work.  Suppose
an existing league were simply broken up into competing leagues.  The
foundation is there already.  The American and National leagues in
baseball would be economically competitive if they were not under
unified, cartel management by MLB.  Indeed, prior to 1901, the two
were, by and large, economic competitors!  Essentially the same thing
is true of the NFL.  The American Football Conference (AFC) and the
National Football Conference (NFC), with only a few cross-over
teams, are precisely the most recent version of the AFL and the earlier
NFL prior to the merger in 1969.  The same would be true of the NBA
and the National Hockey League (NHL).  A breakup could restore
much of the same competition that existed prior to their mergers with
the ABA and the World Hockey Association (WHA), respectively.
Therefore, a breakup of existing leagues could potentially create com-
peting leagues.
But, again, one would not expect this situation to last on its own.
Enforcement of these breakups under existing antitrust laws would be
required for competition to flourish.  If leagues tried to regroup and
merge, antitrust enforcement should preclude their forming new car-
tels.  Perhaps the most important element of a breakup/antitrust
enforcement approach is that it would allow the resulting, competing
leagues to retain the fan loyalty and media ties that they had cultivated
over the years.  The new leagues already are “major” in every sense of
the word.  And they wouldn’t lose the fan identification that they have
cultivated over the years.  Interestingly though, one would expect that
expenditures aimed at maintaining this loyalty would fall over time.
The reason?  The return on such investments would be falling under a
competitive structure.
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Of course, any movement away from monopoly would affect the
welfare of leagues, players, fans, and taxpayers.  Owners and players
could be characterized as losers because their welfare will fall.  Over-
all, fans would be winners because they would enjoy sports at lower
prices, and taxpayers would win because subsidies would be reduced.
However, some fans at locations with marginal teams might lose
because competition would drive marginal teams out of business or to
other locations.
One of the usual questions posed at this point is “What would be
the quality of competition on the field with increased economic compe-
tition?”  A long-standing “invariance principle,” attributable to Simon
Rottenberg (1956), suggests that quality will stay at its current level.
After all, all of the earnings over and above the competitive rate were
pure economic rents.  Because the changes projected here would occur
league-wide, players and coaches would face diminished opportunities
wherever they turned in their sport.  And their nonsport alternative
would not have gotten any better.  Would players play for less and
coaches coach for less, rather than leave their sport?  Almost certainly.
Although the level of competition, while probably still unbalanced
across a given league, would not be expected to decline.
Perhaps the minor leagues (baseball, basketball, and hockey) and
college football, which operate at the same time and often in the same
vicinity as major league teams, might prove instructive on the quality
issue.  Because economic competition would yield a different number
and mix of teams of major league caliber, with more of them located in
the largest cities, perhaps there would be a more continuous quality
gradient between the current minor leagues and college conferences
and the major leagues.  Among the minor leagues and college teams,
size and drawing power are similar to the determinants that would
drive a competitive pro league structure.
But the nagging question is just how in the world will this ever
happen.  This idea of breaking up the major leagues dates back to Con-
gressional testimony in 1976 by Ira Horowitz and Roger Noll, and still
there has been no political action.  This inaction is cause for pessimism
among those interested in fixing the problems of market power con-
fronting sports fans.  However, market power and its consequences in
pro sports must be good for politicians because it has been the norm for




The environmental movement offers instructive lessons in chang-
ing the political status quo.  When a problem becomes important
enough to voters, they become politically mobilized.  It is an expensive
and laborious process.  Those bent on such change must successfully
accomplish an overwhelming educational mission.  They must also
overcome the high costs and free-riding behavior associated with orga-
nizing a politically potent group.  After all of that, they face the dog-
eat-dog world of advocate politics.  Small wonder that market power
has ruled in pro sports given the obstacles to bringing it down.
But maybe the times are changing.  On the Internet, many fan
advocate and alternative ownership arrangement pages have begun to
appear; and the Internet dramatically reduces the costs of forming
organizations.  Further, while Major League Baseball appears to be
rebounding from the strike of 1994, it could well be an illusory return
driven mostly by the “Mark and Sammy Home Run Show.”  Dramatic
revenue dispersion remains a source of tension between owners, and
any additional interruption of play could bring down the wrath of fans.
This wrath, however, might be a prerequisite to forming a politically
potent interest group aimed at eliminating the market power in pro
sports.  Perhaps this organization might begin with the NBA, which is
in turmoil.  Their fans just lost half a season and are getting a weak
imitation of the usual level of NBA play.  If NBA fan interest groups
rise to change the current local reelection margin, they may remedy the
problem.  For that is surely the only real solution.  I hope I have made it
clear that the culprit is market power.  The rest is up to the fans, who,
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Among the noteworthy twentieth century trends identified for the
United States has been the movement of people and economic activity
from urban centers to the suburbs.  Business has followed the migra-
tion of its labor force, and as a consequence most American city cen-
ters have deteriorated economically and socially in the latter years of
this century.  This urban economic malaise was further exacerbated in
the 1980s by President Ronald Reagan’s vision of a nation less depen-
dent on a federal government.  One manifestation of Reagan’s empha-
sis on greater state autonomy was reduced federal revenue sharing.  A
less generous federal government translated into more parsimonious
state governments, and, following the dollar food chain, less financial
support for local governments.  The erosion of the urban economic
base compelled new economic strategies for cities, and mayors have
responded by devising policies that emphasize the urban core as a cul-
tural destination.  Mayors hope that their cultural entrepreneurship will
reverse the decades-old flow of people and money from city centers
and serve to reestablish them as the hubs of American life.  One aspect
of this strategy has been the aggressive attempt by the mayors of many
large cities to relocate professional sports stadiums from the suburbs to
the central business districts (CBDs).  The purpose of this study is to
use the city of Seattle as a case study through which to analyze the
prospects for improving economic performance in city centers by relo-




In addressing this issue, it is important to establish first the inci-
dence of stadium migration from the suburbs back to the city center
and to discuss the reasons for this development.  In the next section of
this study, the hypothesized microeconomic impact is contrasted with
the macroeconomic or metropolitan impact.  Scholars have studied the
macroeconomic impact sufficiently so that reliable evidence is avail-
able on the influence professional sports have exerted on metropolitan
areas.  There are reasons, however, to expect that in terms of both mag-
nitude and pattern, economic development at the local level may differ
from that characterizing the metropolis.  The next portion of the paper
is devoted to discussing Seattle’s use as a representative sample for
exploring the likely economic impact of CBD relocation.  Essential to
this task is a brief discussion of Seattle’s recent stadium history from
the construction of the Kingdome to the present.  The economic effect
the Kingdome has had on the Pioneer Square Neighborhood, that por-
tion of Seattle that borders the Kingdome on the West and North, is
portrayed in the paper’s next section.  Critical to this analysis is a busi-
ness survey largely conducted at the end of June 1998.  Conclusions
and policy implications are offered in the paper’s final part.
 
STADIUM MIGRATION—BACK TO THE FUTURE
 
Earlier in the 20th century, stadiums were woven into dense urban
fabrics.  Rather than the stadium defining and shaping an area, the sta-
dium was viewed as subordinate to a larger urban design and function.
The existing city grid established the shape and location of many urban
ballparks lending an idiosyncratic character to many of them.  For
example the Baker Bowl, home to the Major League Baseball’s Phila-
delphia Phillies until 1938, was also known as “Hump” because it was
built on an elevated piece of ground to accommodate a railroad tunnel
running under centerfield (Lowry 1992).  Today only Fenway Park in
Boston (1912) with its legendary “Green Monster” and Wrigley Field
in Chicago (1914) stand as representative monuments to past urban
imperatives.  Tiger Stadium in Detroit (1912) was recently replaced by
a new ballpark, and discussions are under way to replace both Fenway
Park and Wrigley Field.  
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In the post–World War II era, a rapidly expanding economy
increased the personal incomes of most Americans to a point where
former luxuries such as automobiles and houses outside crowded cities
could be purchased by a majority of the population.  As areas on the
city’s periphery were settled, businesses followed in part to capitalize
on emerging markets for consumer goods and to gain proximity to the
labor force.  In keeping with this suburban trend, stadiums followed the
fans.  Expressways were built to accommodate the automobile, and
suburban stadiums were located in close proximity to expressways to
facilitate fan travel to the ballpark.   Automobiles required space, and
the typical suburban ballpark was surrounded by a sea of asphalt.  The
homes of most fans in the post–World War II era were connected to the
ballpark by a seamless stream of concrete.
Accommodating the automobile came at a price from the perspec-
tive of the neighborhood in which the stadium was located.  Easing
entry and egress to the stadium mitigated the spillover of pedestrian
traffic and economic activity into the environs where the ballpark was
located.  On the way from the stadium to their automobiles, fans
encountered car windows not store windows.  Once in their cars, the
strong current of the expressways did not allow easy contact with com-
mercial entities along the way.  Any commerce that did occur in con-
junction with sports spectating likely did so within the confines of the
ballpark unless excursions into the neighborhood or elsewhere were
planned.
Professional sports has been undergoing an economic revolution
inspired by a confluence of circumstances both inside and outside the
professional sports industry.  These changes have affected both the
supply and demand for professional sports, which, in turn, have had
implications for where and how professional sporting events are pack-
aged and presented.  Nowhere are these changes more apparent than in
the design and location of stadiums and arenas.  Financial imperatives
have worked to all but eliminate the multipurpose, circular stadium
(the “ashtrays”) built a few decades ago in cities such as Cincinnati,
Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia to host both football and baseball.  In
addition, financial forces have reversed the trend toward locating ball-
parks in suburban areas with vast tracts of land suitable for inexpensive
parking.  Stadiums and arenas are coming back to the cities with prom-




neighborhoods through which fans flow to reach transportation centers
or remote parking lots.  
Cities have used this promise of increased economic activity to
persuade citizens to lend financial support to an aggressive city strat-
egy to remake their centers into cultural destinations.  For example, to
lure people back to the downtown, Cleveland has developed the Gate-
way complex, which serves as a home to the Major League Baseball
(MLB) Indians (Jacobs Field) and the National Basketball Association
(NBA) Cavaliers (Gund Arena) along with the Rock and Roll Hall of
Fame.  Atlanta, Baltimore, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, and Nashville,
to name but a few, are other cities that have opted for placing stadiums
in or near the central business district (CBD) in an effort to help revi-
talize them.  Stadium construction in the National Football League
(NFL) symbolizes the return to downtown or near downtown locations.
Barring unforeseen construction delays, 13 new stadiums will have
been built in the 1990s.  Of those, only facilities in Jacksonville (the
renovation was of a scope sufficient to warrant it new), San Francisco,
Tampa Bay, and Maryland (Washington Redskins) are located outside
of what could be considered the CBD or CBD fringe.  Approximately
60 percent of the NFL stadiums were located in or near CBDs prior to
the 1990s, or about 16 percent less than characterize current construc-
tion trends.  If the events conducted at the stadiums attract people from
beyond the metropolitan areas in which they are located, then those
who support public subsidies for these facilities promise that metropol-
itan, state, and regional economies will benefit from such investments.
Do metropolitan economies derive a boost from professional sports
and their stadiums?  If they do, then surely the neighborhood in which
the stadium is located is the recipient of those benefits.  In the next por-
tion of the paper, an assessment of the benefits accruing to the metrop-
olis from professional sports teams and stadiums is analyzed.      
 
TEAMS, STADIUMS, AND METROPOLITAN 
ECONOMIC IMPACT
 
The experience of a cross-section of cities across the United States
over the past few decades strongly disputes the claim that professional
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sports teams and stadiums provide an economic boost for metropolises.
Baade (1996) found no correlation between the real growth differential
in real per capita personal income for a city experiencing some change
in its professional sports industry and cities experiencing no such
change or having no professional sports presence.  Baade’s analysis
included all cities hosting a team in one of the four major professional
sports (baseball, basketball, football, and hockey), and covered more
than three decades of observations beginning in 1958.  All else equal,
one would expect a professional sports host city to expand economi-
cally if sports does attract more than local interest and dollars.  The fact
that evidence fails to support such a contention requires an explanation
and several come immediately to mind.  
First, the professional sports team may simply be too small to
influence in any meaningful way a large, diverse metropolitan econ-
omy.  For example, in litigation regarding the constitutionality of using
several hundred million dollars of public funds for subsidizing a new
stadium for the NFL’s Tampa Bay Buccaneers to replace a 20-year-old
facility, the author testified as an expert representing those opposed to
public subventions that the team’s revenues ranked below more than 70
other enterprises in that city.  In using an academic context to provide
perspective, Noll and Zimbalist (1997, p. 57) observed that the top ten
universities in the United States received $2.8 billion in federal grant
money in 1994, which was more than the combined revenue of the
NFL and National Hockey League (NHL) or the combined revenue of
MLB and the NBA for that year.  
Second, and perhaps more important, consonant with elementary
budget constraints, spending on professional sports spectating substi-
tutes for time and money that could be spent on other goods or ser-
vices.  To the extent that the fan base is largely indigenous to the
metropolitan area, net spending in the metropolitan area may increase,
decrease, or stay constant even though gross spending on sports
increases significantly.  The distinction between gross and net spending
changes is pivotal in precisely estimating the impact of professional
sports.  Some economic impact studies supporting stadium subsidies
use a gross measure of spending that occurs in conjunction with pro-





   A measure of net spending changes, of




ing and accounts in part for the use of estimates of gross spending to
defend stadium subsidies.  Given the paucity of data and the complex
web of financial inflows and outflows that occur as a consequence of
hosting a professional sports team, a reasonable estimate of the team’s
economic contribution likely can be rendered only through comparing
the metropolitan economic landscape before and after the team or sta-
dium.  This after-the-fact audit in estimating the economic impact of
professional sports has been favored by some economists (Noll and
Zimbalist 1997; Baade and Sanderson 1997; Hamilton and Kahn 1997;
Austrian and Rosentraub 1997).    
Estimates on gross and net new spending differ substantially.  For
example, in a report estimating the economic impact of the Seattle
Mariners on the city of Seattle, King County, and the state of Washing-
ton prepared by Dick Conway & Associates for King County in 1994,
net direct spending as a percentage of gross direct spending was identi-
fied as 44.3 percent for the city and county ($40.4 million/$114.0 mil-
lion for both the city and the state) and 32 percent ($29.1 million/
$114.0) for the state (Conway and Byers 1994).  The difference
between gross and net total direct economic impact are more pro-
nounced because multipliers will compound differences in gross and
net measures of direct economic impacts.  Total net economic impact
as a percentage of total gross economic impact as calculated by Con-
way & Associates was 23.9 percent ($42.9 million/$179.7 million),
38.5 percent ($53.3 million/$138.8 million), and 40.1 percent ($47.7
million/$119.1 million) for the state, county, and city, respectively.  
In relative terms, gross economic impact is likely to be most pro-
nounced in the neighborhood in which the stadium is located.  In mea-
suring the impact professional sports has on economies, a circle could
be drawn from the point where the event actually occurs, and it could
be argued reasonably that the magnitude of the impact, in relative
terms at least, varies inversely with the size of the circle.  Stated some-
what differently, the economic effect is thought to be most pronounced
at “ground-zero,” the exact location of the event.  As the circumference
of the circle expands, the net impact diminishes as the dollars spent on
the sporting event are more completely offset by reduced spending
elsewhere.  Following this budgetary logic as it relates to leisure spend-
ing, the global impact of even the largest sporting events such as the
Summer Olympics approximates zero if an increase in global net
 
The Economics of Sports 27
 
spending is not induced by the event itself.  This is true because even
those who come from great distances spend time and money at the
Olympics in lieu of time and money they would have spent elsewhere.
The impact locally, therefore, depends on the extent to which spending
and respending occurs by those residing outside the environs where the
event is held, or by local citizens who spend money on the sports event
as opposed to spending discretionary income outside their neighbor-
hood.  Theoretically, a local government might decide to subsidize
sports if the audience is distinctly nonlocal.  In the case of Seattle, Pio-
neer Square (the neighborhood in which the Kingdome is located)
might be given an economic boost if those who view the professional
sports events hosted by the stadium are either living outside the com-
munity or are residents who would spend discretionary dollars outside
Pioneer Square.  Within the neighborhood, there are outflows associ-
ated with team and stadium activities, and so even at the local level,
professional sports might fail to provide much of an economic boost.
Later in this chapter, I assess the economic impact the Kingdome has
had on Pioneer Square.  First, however, it is appropriate to identify why




Seattle typifies the contemporary economic relationship that U.S.
cities hosting major league sports have with their teams, particularly as
it relates to stadiums.  In less than two decades after its construction,
owners of the NFL Seahawks and the MLB Mariners declared the
Kingdome economically obsolete.  In their opinion, the Kingdome
could not compete financially with the new breed of stadiums being
built across the country.  In citing a general shortcoming of multipur-
pose stadiums, the Kingdome’s critics argued that it failed to provide
an environment that encouraged fans to return because it compromised
sight lines for individual sports and otherwise reduced the ambiance
associated with single-sport structures, e.g., Wrigley Field in Chicago.  
Most important, however, was the relative paucity of luxury seat-
ing and other revenue-generating amenities that the owners argued




pete financially limited their ability to compete for free-agent talent
and all but assured mediocrity on the playing field, which would fur-
ther erode the team’s financial standing. Echoing this well-rehearsed
line, the owners contended that Seattle’s parsimony gave them no
choice but to consider the offers of other suitor cities throughout the
United States.  The price to Washingtonians to keep the teams would
be steep: separate stadiums for the Seahawks and Mariners outfitted
with state-of-the-art amenities, including a retractable dome for the
Mariners’ facility.  Even though a majority of the citizens of Seattle
voted “no” in a referendum to build a stadium for the Mariners, new
stadiums are now under construction for the Mariners and Seahawks.
The cost for both facilities will likely eclipse $700 million. 
The apparatus of persuasion employed in trying to convince the
people of Seattle that this was not an egregious example of corporate
welfare included the claim that the stadiums should be considered
investments.  As such, boosters noted that the facilities did not force
painful civic tradeoffs such as financial neglect of schools, streets, and
sewers but would instead generate a stream of revenues that could be
invested in many forms of public infrastructure.  Owners, players, and
fans would not be the only winners, apologists for the stadiums
claimed, citizens of the metropolis and state would benefit as well.
The economic impact studies commissioned by new stadium propo-
nents typically identify thousands of new jobs, more than $100 million
of economic impact, and substantial increases in tax revenues at all lev-
els of government as the outcome of spending on a professional sports
team (Conway and Byers 1994).  In opposition to these data, and as
noted in the previous section, other scholarly studies have debunked
the myth of sports serving as significant catalysts for metropolitan eco-
nomic development.  However, the claim that substantial local or
neighborhood economic development occurs endures.  What has been
the experience of the neighborhood in which the Kingdome is located?
What are the magnitude and pattern of local economic development
inspired by the Kingdome, and what will the new stadiums do for the
environs in which they are located?  The next portion of the paper
addresses these questions.
 
The Economics of Sports 29
 
THE KINGDOME AND LOCAL ECONOMIC IMPACT
 
The now-razed Kingdome and site for the two new stadiums is bor-
dered on the north and west by Pioneer Square, a neighborhood of his-
torical significance and of a mixed commercial and residential
character.  Pioneer Square covers a 90-acre area roughly demarcated
by Cherry and Marion Streets on the north, 2nd and 3rd Streets on the
East, the Alaskan Way and the waterfront on the west, and Royal
Brougham Street on the south.   Figures 1 and 2 show the location of
Pioneer Square, including the Kingdome.  Because the stadiums that
will replace the Kingdome are under construction just south of it, this
map can be used to provide a reference for placing the new stadiums in
Seattle.
 Pioneer Square exhibits significant diversity with respect to its
inhabitants and business enterprises.  Missions for the homeless and
condominiums for city officials exist within blocks of one another.
There are 849 housing units in Pioneer Square and roughly 1,200 full-
time residents.  This low ratio of residents to housing units is explained
in part by the high number of units that are identified as single room
occupancy (SROs).  In addition to this low income housing, there are
737 shelter beds, but those who occupy them are not considered full-
time residents.  There are 600 businesses in the business improvement
area (BIA) of Pioneer Square.  Sports bars and jazz clubs share street
space with art galleries and a store that has provided leather goods for
more than a century for people who use horses for more than entertain-
ment.  Fifteen surface parking lots and six parking garages provide for
the parking needs of residents, workers, and visitors to the neighbor-
hood.  The skeletal structures of the new stadiums are rising in what
used to be the far southern parking lot serving the Kingdome.  Prior to
the construction of the new stadiums, the Kingdome parking lots pro-




  The Kingdome seated
66,400 people for football, and even at the conservative ratio of one
parking space for every four fans, when the stadium was filled to
capacity, 16,600 parking spaces were required.  This stadium parking
shortfall had substantial implications for the neighborhood.  Parking
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The decision to raze the Kingdome was based in large part on the need
to provide parking for the patrons of the new stadiums.  
The Kingdome originally cost $69 million.  It underwent two reno-
vations in the 1990s.  One of the renovations centered on structural
problems relating to falling ceiling tiles, and the other concentrated on
shoring up a foundation that ostensibly made the facility vulnerable to
earthquakes.  The cost of these two corrective projects exceeded the
$69 million spent to build the Kingdome.  The price for the new stadi-
ums has not been determined because cost overruns are already materi-
alizing.  As mentioned previously, the price for both of them will very
likely exceed $700 million.  Boosters justify these substantial invest-
ments in stadium infrastructure to residents of the Pioneer Square
neighborhood, the city of Seattle, King County, and the state of Wash-
ington.  They note how the substantial amount of economic activity
directly and indirectly related to the Kingdome will benefit all Wash-
ingtonians.  As noted previously, ample empirical evidence negates the
notion that these sizeable investments will positively affect the Seattle
metropolitan and state of Washington economies.  The question
remains, however, did the Pioneer Square neighborhood benefit on bal-
ance from having the Kingdome in its backyard?   And what does the
answer imply about the impact of the new stadiums?
Based on the demographic characteristics,  Pioneer Square has rel-
atively few full-time residents with the financial wherewithal to buy
tickets to professional sporting events.  It follows that the sports events
hosted by the Kingdome attracted the majority of their fans from out-
side Pioneer Square.  If the spending that occurred in conjunction with
sports remained in the Pioneer Square economy, the local financial
boost provided by the stadium would have been substantial.  The key,
of course, is the extent to which the money spent by nonlocal fans was
locally retained and spent again and again in the neighborhood.  Those
who assert that the Kingdome provided a substantial economic boost
for Pioneer Square likely focused their attention on the financial
inflows only.  Casual empiricism supports the assertion that the King-
dome represented a boon to Pioneer Square.  On event days, fans
streamed into the stadium and the environs and spent large amounts of
money.  A precise rendering of the economic impact, however, requires
not only an accurate measure of the dollars spent on sports spectating
and related activities, but a thorough identification of the money out-
 
The Economics of Sports 33
 
flows that occurred as a consequence of Kingdome events as well.  The
financial leakages from the neighborhood economy may well have
been substantial, and can be broadly categorized as 1) earnings repatri-
ated by owners, players, and other team and stadium personnel to their
residences; 2) the costs incurred to operate the stadium to include the
opportunity costs; and 3) business losses incurred locally as a conse-
quence of peak usage of local resources on game day. Stated somewhat
differently, local business activity may have been crowded out. 
The Pioneer Square neighborhood, to be sure, experienced signifi-
cantly more economic transactions as a consequence of the Kingdome.
Assume for the moment that we think of Pioneer Square as a business





  From this business, capital stock income flowed
when tickets, baseball paraphernalia, and hot dogs were sold.  The eco-
nomic impact, however, was not equal to gross spending changes any
more than revenues are equal to business profits.  Explicit and implicit
costs arose as a consequence of conducting events at the Kingdome,
and the economic contribution that the Kingdome made to Pioneer
Square was not consonant with gross financial inflows but rather with
net financial inflows to the neighborhood.  Two facts may well serve to
vitiate the economic impact the operation of the Kingdome would at
first blush appear to provide.  First, the stadium may have served as lit-
tle more than an economic conduit through which spending on King-
dome events passed from one set of nonresident hands to another.
Second, the level and urgency of game day activities may have well
strained local resources by crowding out local, normal business activ-
ity.  If either of these effects were pronounced, the neighborhood in
which the stadium was located would have derived far less stimulation
than that suggested by the direct spending that occurred within the sta-
dium’s walls.  
The first point can be illustrated through tracing player salaries. A
stadium does not resemble the corner grocery where the owners live
above the store.  Rather the stadium owners and the stadium employ-
ees, who receive most of the event revenues, are in all probability not
neighborhood residents.  Thus even if fans are not residents and their
spending represents an infusion of funds, the boost provided is short
lived because the nonresident owners and players appropriate that




in professional sports as they relate to stadium construction may well
be making the transfer of funds from one group of nonresidents to
another more complete.  In negotiations with their host cities, teams
have more aggressively and thoroughly exploited the advantage
imparted by an excess demand for teams.  The new breed of stadiums
have evolved into small walled cities that more completely compete
with and capture the economic activity that used to spill out into the
neighborhood.  This stadium/mall concept has been encouraged by the
leagues to help level the financial playing fields of league members.
Furthermore, in their anxiety to attract or retain their teams, cities have
been agreeing to more generous leases that allow teams to appropriate
virtually all of the revenues from ticket sales, concessions, the sale of
sports paraphernalia, parking, stadium advertising, and naming rights.
The quid pro quo for these “sweetheart” leases is that the team dedicate
one revenue source or another to satisfy public demands for a team
“equity” stake in the ballpark project.  Teams readily agree because the
present value of increased stadium earnings exceeds by a significant
amount the present value of the dedicated revenue stream(s).  
Owners have argued that stadiums are necessary to satisfy player
demands for higher salaries.  Suppose for the moment that this owner
rationale is true.  Today for the NBA and NFL, the two sports leagues
that first instituted salary caps, the share of league gross revenues to
which players as a group are entitled by agreement is 57.5 and 63 per-
cent of league gross revenues, respectively.  It follows, therefore, that
significantly more than half of the spending that occurs at the ballpark
finds its way into the pockets of players.  If players do not live in the
community or otherwise do not spend on community goods and ser-
vices, then more than one-half of the revenue that finds its way into the
stadium on game day leaks from the neighborhood.  In the case of
Seattle, it is a virtual certainty that few, if any, of the Seattle Seahawks’
owners and players live in Pioneer Square.  In fact, the market for play-
ers is national, many of them do not establish their primary residences
in the cities in which they play.  Players invest their earnings interna-
tionally and are taxed nationally, therefore, much of what they earn
leaves not only the Pioneer Square economy but the metropolitan econ-
omy as well.  
The point made through tracing player salaries applies to taxes
imposed by nonlocal government.  Ignoring for the moment “home
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rule,” how much of the sales tax on sports clothing or excise taxes on
game tickets is retained by the local government?  Much of it becomes
a part of general revenues for the State, County, or City government
imposing the tax, and the extent to which it is returned to the local gov-
ernment depends on institutional arrangement.  The local governments
which provide space for the stadium need to have a hand in shaping
revenue sharing to ensure that their costs for providing stadium space
are covered.  They also must understand the extent to which the sta-
dium and team activities affect general tax revenues at higher the levels
of government from which they derive a share.  Such an analysis is
hardly trivial, but it must be undertaken if the neighborhood is to make
wise decisions with regard to the use of its scarce land resource. 
Opportunity and operating costs, as well as the likelihood that sta-
dium activity will “crowd out” local economic activity, depend on the
character of the neighborhood economy.  Is there a natural synergy
between the stadium and neighborhood, or will expenses mount and
displacement and inactivity occur on a scale that ensures the cost of
hosting the stadium exceeds the expected benefit?  Stadiums require
large tracts of land not only for structures but also for parking if the sta-
dium site or the institutional character of the metropolis or region
makes it accessible primarily by automobile.  Stadiums are not like
shopping malls where economic activity occurs throughout the course
of a day every day.  Stadiums, particularly open-air football stadiums,
spend more time waiting than working.  How the community handles
the “dead time” in the stadium and its attendant areas is critical to its
ability to use the facility to its economic advantage.  Did the Pioneer
Square neighborhood and the Kingdome enjoy a synergistic relation-
ship?  If not, could the lack of synergy have been anticipated by ana-
lyzing the community’s economic character?  To help establish the fit
between the neighborhood and the stadium, a survey was conducted to
assess the impact of the Kingdome on local businesses.  The survey is
appended to the paper, and the results of it are discussed in the next




SURVEY RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
 
Compared with other districts in Seattle, the Pioneer Square dis-
trict is more commercially diverse.  Although retail businesses are most
prevalent within the Business Improvement Area (BIA) of the district,
constituting 20.3 percent of all businesses, there are significantly fewer
than in other districts such as Broadway and Roosevelt, which exhibit
retail percentages of 56 and 54 percent, respectively.   Professional ser-
vices, legal services, and art galleries account for 17.6, 13.1, and 9.2
percent, respectively, of all businesses within the Pioneer Square BIA
(krs services, inc. 1998).  Figures 3 and 4 define the Pioneer Square
urban village footprint and the Pioneer Square BIA boundaries, respec-
tively (krs services, inc. 1998). 
  In comparing the character of the businesses in Pioneer Square
with businesses in other districts in Seattle, several attributes distin-
guish the enterprises of Pioneer Square.  The businesses in the King-
dome neighborhood tend to have had shorter histories, are more labor
intensive, exhibit a greater tendency to rent their commercial spaces,
and are smaller.  To wit, 86 percent of the businesses within the BIA
gross less than $1 million per year (krs services, inc. 1998).  All of this
indicates that the businesses of Pioneer Square are more fragile in gen-
eral than enterprises in other districts in Seattle.  Where controversial
urban projects are concerned, this is not inconsonant with national
trends.  Districts that are successful in preventing the development (air-
ports, incinerators, and stadiums) from occurring in their neighborhood
(“not in my backyard”) are generally populated by commercial inter-
ests that are big, established, wealthy, and politically connected.
Downtown stadiums are generally constructed in warehouse or old
railroad yards where land is relatively cheap and political resistance is
relatively feeble.  These fringe downtown areas, however, are often in
the incipient stages of development or have clear alternative uses.  The
concern of residents and local entrepreneurs in such areas is that the
stadium may channel development in directions that are not compatible
with the emerging pattern of growth.  The survey results indicated that
the activities at the Kingdome frustrated rather than contributed to
many business activities in Pioneer Square.  The reason cited in every
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SOURCE: The Pioneer Square Business Improvement Area; used with permission.
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instance of business disruption had to do with parking and general con-
gestion created by events at the Kingdome.  
Table 1 provides the result of the survey conducted in Pioneer
Square June 26 through June 30, 1998.
 
Table 1 Reported Percentage Changes in Revenues for Businesses in 
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If the results for the Mariners and Seahawks differed, the convention used was to
report the baseball result for two reasons.  First, many businesses were not open on
Sundays when the Seahawks normally play.  Second, the baseball Mariners had 81
home dates compared to eight regular season games for the Mariners.  There were 10
cases in which businesses were open on Sunday and reported different impacts




Percentage changes are reported to insure autonomy for the businesses that partici-




In general, the eating and drinking establishments closest to the Kingdome benefited














Several conclusions can be drawn based on the survey and inter-
views of businesses in the Pioneer Square BIA.  First, bars that have a
sports theme and a location adjacent to the Kingdome derived substan-
tial benefits.  Sports bars/restaurants in the immediate vicinity of the
Kingdome reported as much as an 800 percent increase in revenues
from Mariners’ games on weekdays and an increase in business by
1700 percent from weekend Mariners games.  Second, the increase in
the bar/restaurant business generally was inversely related to the estab-
lishment’s distance from the Kingdome.  Unless the bar had a particu-
larly compelling sports identity, three or four blocks walking distance
from the stadium was sufficient to eliminate most of the positive eco-
nomic impact cited by bars a block or less away.  Proximity, however,
is no guarantee of success.  If the bar/restaurant was not on a pedestrian
thoroughfare, the impact was also muted.  To cite an example, one bar/
restaurant a block and one-half from the stadium, but removed from
the constellation of bars frequented by fans after a game, attempted to
build a clientele with sports promotions and themes with no success.
The bar has changed hands four times in the past few years due to a
lack of business.  Third, the success of the sports bar/restaurant is
highly sensitive to the success of the teams.  Not only does a winning
team attract more fans to the stadium, but apparently fans supporting
mediocre or losing teams are in no mood to celebrate.  Several sports
bars that gushed about the positive impact of the Mariners and Sea-
hawks sounded a much more sober note in describing the Mariners
impact on business in 1998 and other years in which the teams did not
compete for a championship.
Other businesses did not share the enthusiasm or the success of the
sports bar entrepreneurs for the Kingdome and its teams.  Ethnic res-
taurants, art galleries, professional services, legal services, and most
retail outlets reported a decline in business generally in the neighbor-
hood of 25 percent or less.  Some professional service establishments,
including law offices, have considered changing their location because
of the difficulties they encounter meeting clients on game days.  The





  As noted previously, the Kingdome parking lots were
insufficient to meet the peak traffic flow during stadium events.  Auto-
mobiles spilled into the neighborhood crowding out normal business
activity by using scarce parking spaces.  If local spending that occurs
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in conjunction with the stadium events equaled or exceeded local
spending that would occur in the absence of the stadium events, then
on balance the local economy would gain.  The means for measuring
the net spending change are inadequate, but it is clear that the stadium
activity did channel business into certain realms and away from others
and did create the need for additional parking.  
The demand for parking for peak neighborhood activity connected
with stadium events creates a dilemma for the community.  On one
hand, building more parking structures or surface lots minimized the
economic disruption caused by the excess demand for parking.  On the
other hand, using scarce land to accommodate peak parking demand
for a few hours of approximately one hundred days would change the
character of the neighborhood.  Also, providing for more parking
would likely create negative externalities and “public goods” issues
that would be esthetic as well as economic in nature.  Parking lots are
strictly utilitarian.  They are not attractive structures and have no par-
ticular architectural character.   
A second option is to price the parking to discourage the quantity
of it demanded.  One of the bitterest complaints relating to the Pioneer
Square parking problems is the increase in parking prices on game day.
Participants in the survey reported that lot parking rates double on
game or event days and that “meter maids” get more aggressive, thus
raising the implicit parking price.  The parking problem could be exac-
erbated further because two stadiums will replace the Kingdome.  No
agreement has been reached to prohibit the use of the two stadiums on
the same day.  If events are held on the same day and are highly
attended, then the parking problem could escalate dramatically.
Despite what is now the north parking lot will be used for housing,
government has promised that the number of parking spaces in the Pio-
neer Square area will be increased through the construction of at least
one new tiered parking lot.  Of course, tiered parking structures are far
more expensive than surface lots, and egress from them is slower.
The parking problem can be mitigated if the public opts for using
the area public transit.  Union Station (rail) and the International Dis-
trict Station for the International Transit Tunnel (bus) are a few blocks
northeast of the dome.  The Pioneer Square Station of the Downtown
Transit Tunnel is only a few blocks further away from the Kingdome.




is designed, in part, to encourage transportation to the stadium using
some means other than automobiles.  It should be noted that the use of
public transportation requires a significant cultural modification.  It is
arguable that people in the western part of the United States are unusu-
ally partial to automobile transit and display a reluctance to use public
transportation.  How much inconvenience or additional expense will be
required to motivate them to opt for alternative transportation?  That
question is being debated by people not only in Seattle but throughout
the West and the entire United States.  Because 50 percent of the busi-
nesses inside the BIA and 90 percent of the businesses ringing the BIA
indicated that transportation was critical to their business (krs services,
inc., 1998), the automobile transportation problem as it relates to Pio-
neer Square has to be resolved.  Parking validation programs for resi-
dents and business customers, shuttle buses for neighborhood
employees, and park and ride (satellite parking) programs are being
seriously considered.
In summary, the results of our survey indicated that less than one-
third of the businesses located in Pioneer Square reported revenue
increases attributable to the Kingdome.  Aside from the parking lot
business, bars and restaurants with a sports identity benefited, as did
Pioneer Square hotels. In general, however, most businesses located in
Pioneer Square (retail, professional services, legal services, and art gal-
leries) reported that their revenues either remained constant or suffered
as a consequence of the Kingdome.  This finding echoes results
reported in the recent survey conducted by krs services, inc.  On page
13 of their July 24, 1998 study, the firm reported:
 
It is interesting to note that lack of dependence by the
majority of Pioneer Square businesses on tourists,
spectators at sporting/Kingdome events and participants in
the First Thursday or gallery activities . . .
It is also interesting that, according to those who
participated in the survey, there appears to be as much
business reliance on customers attending First Thursday or
patronizing art galleries as there are spectators attending
sporting events or other activities at the Kingdome.
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Reportedly, the Kingdome adversely affects certain businesses in
Pioneer Square because of its peak use of key community resources,
most notably parking, during stadium events.  In general, the stadium’s
overall economic impact on the neighborhood was uncertain.  There-
fore, with any new urban stadium, overall economic activity could
increase, remain constant, or decrease.  What is clear is that city gov-
ernments cannot assume that the influx of spectators into a neighbor-
hood for a stadium event will translate into increased economic activity
to a degree commensurate with the number of visitors.  Indeed, in iden-
tifying the reasons why a stadium may not induce an expansion of the
metropolitan economy, one may not have to look any further than the
neighborhood in which the stadium is located.  In the neighborhood,
the substitution effects, which negate the impact of fan spending in
conjunction with the sporting events, are most apparent.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
 
There appears to be growing agreement that professional sports
teams and stadiums have little if any economic impact on their host cit-
ies.  The lack of economic impact is explained by simple budgetary
realities.  If the fans attending the sporting events are indigenous to the
city hosting the event, then the time and money they spend spectating
at sporting events is vitiated by reduced spending elsewhere within the
metropolitan area.  The impact on the local or neighborhood economy
in which the stadium is located is less clear.  The influx of nonresidents
on game or event day suggests substantial economic impact.  Does
more careful empirical analysis confirm casual observation?  Does the
downtown benefit from the construction of a sports stadium?  
The evidence from Seattle is decidedly mixed.  Clearly the stadium
channels economic activity in the direction of businesses that have a
connection to sports.  Stadium bars and restaurants and retail outlets
selling sports paraphernalia benefit.  Many other businesses, particu-
larly those that do not appeal to sports fans, lose business.  This occurs
as a consequence of peak use of shared community resources on event
day; parking and sidewalk space are the most obvious examples.  Cus-




day because the cost and inconvenience of doing so increases.  Routine
or normal business, therefore, is crowded out on a scale that may well
offset any neighborhood gains.  Unless the excess demand for key local
resources is somehow mitigated, many other commercial activities in
the neighborhood are destined to decline.
The policy implications are clear.  Whether the stadium contributes
meaningfully to the local economy depends on the nature of that econ-
omy and its ability to minimize the disruption caused by peak stadium
traffic.  This requires careful planning and a willingness on the part of
professional sports teams to be good citizens.  The political power that
professional sports teams currently wield forces neighborhood busi-
nesses and residents to shoulder a disproportionate share of the risks
and inconvenience associated with the influx of fans on game days.
Local residents, business employees, and other business patrons have
to be given parking priorities.  Remote parking and an emphasis on
public transportation are essential to maintaining neighborhood eco-
nomic vitality.    
In addition to parking concessions, owners of professional sports
teams need to share the commerce associated with sports spectating.
The modern stadium doubles as a shopping mall complete with food
courts whose operation serves to minimize the neighborhood economic
impact.  The fact that souvenir venders are prohibited from operating
too close to some new stadiums in the U.S. is one overt manifestation
of excessive team influence and a lack of citizenship.
Legislators have been sensitive to the demise of urban America for
a variety of reasons, and, as a consequence, initiatives designed to reju-
venate downtowns have enjoyed some support at the state and federal
levels.  There are what economists would identify as externality issues
associated with urban blight, and it could be argued that revitalizing
downtowns generates benefits that spill beyond the urban core.  If this
is so, nonlocal public subsidies for downtown redevelopment may have
merit. Before stadiums can be used to rejuvenate the downtown, it
must be determined that they represent the best use of that land.  Park-
ing and the nature of economic development that sports fosters are fac-
tors that have to be weighed in those land-use decisions.  Professional
sports leagues operate as unregulated monopolies, and until that issue
is addressed, poor decisions with regard to the location and operation
of stadiums will continue to occur.  The most important policy implica-
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tion is to revamp the structure of professional sports leagues to ensure




1. Direct expenditures are “multiplied” by a number that represents the respending
of dollars spent as a consequence of the sports event.  For example, the waiters at
a restaurant that attracts fans after the game receives tips that are in turn spent by
the waiter on goods and services provided by the local economy.  For an example
of an analysis that uses gross expenditures see Shils (1989).
2. With the construction of the baseball stadium, approximately 1,200 of those park-
ing spots have been eliminated in the south parking lot.  For an event that attracts
a capacity crowd, the 2,400 available stadium parking spaces implies there are 27
fans for each parking space.  Given the use of automobiles by fans, the industry
standard has been three or four fans for each parking space.
3. Representing the neighborhood as a business admittedly captures only a portion
of a community’s character and quality of life, but such a representation provides
some useful insights.
4. In the July 24, 1998 survey conducted by krs services, inc., businesses gave park-
ing the highest priority in improving Pioneer Square.  Parking, however, is not a
problem unique to Pioneer Square.  In six other recently surveyed Seattle business








 Survey of the Effects the Kingdome
 on Commercial Activity in Seattle
 
Note to the participant: 
 
Your responses to this survey will be kept strictly
confidential.  Individual responses will not be reported separately.  The data a
business provides will be reported only as part of an overall result in which
variables such as the change in revenues will be represented as percent chang-
es. 
1. Business or firm name_________________________________________
2. Location of business __________________________________________ 
3. Proximity to Kingdome__________walking minutes____________miles
4. Type of business ____________________________________________ 
(Office use only: SIC code =         ).
5. Business structure: ___ Corporate ___Franchise ___ Sole proprietorship
___ Locally owned ___ Nationally owned
6.  On-street parking ___Yes ___No
Parking on street is metered ___Yes ___No
___ Distance to nearest parking garage/lot 
___ Proximity to public transportation.
7. Revenue generated by your business on game day/night for the Mariners
___ increases by more than 25% ___ increases by less than 25%
___ decreases by more than 25% ___ decreases by less than 25%
___ stays the same
8. Revenue generated by your business on game day/night for the Seahawks
 ___ increases by more than 25% ___ increases by less than 25%
___ decreases by more than 25% ___ decreases by less than 25%




9. If revenue decreases on game day it is because of (rank on a scale of 0–5,
where 0 represents no effect and 5 represents a significant effect):
___ inadequate parking ___ competition from stadium amenities
___ general stadium congestion ___  behavior of those who attend games.
10. Revenue Data:
Typical revenue from the business: ___ Weekday ___Weekend
Typical revenue from the business during a Mariners’ game:
___ Weekday ___  Weekend
Typical revenue from the business during a Seahawks’ game:
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Who is Sitting in the Stands?
The Income Levels of Sports Fans
 




About a decade ago, an unprecedented  professional sports stadium
and arena construction boom emerged in the United States as profes-
sional sports team owners began to recognize their ability to play
image-conscious metropolitan areas off against each other.  New stadi-
ums and arenas were attractive to these team owners not because their
games could not be played in existing facilities—most of the existing
stadiums and arenas were less than thirty years old and many were far
from sold out—but rather because revenue prospects began to depend
on new stadium configurations.  Architects of the 1960s and 1970s who
built the old-style arenas and stadiums did not anticipate how many
wealthy individuals and corporations would be willing to pay for the
status, exclusivity, and amenities of club seats and luxury boxes.  How-
ever, rapid economic growth, rising income inequality, and the increas-
ing popularity of relative status have combined to create an enormous
demand for high-end sports services in the 1990s.  When team owners
report that their stadium is “inadequate,” they mean that it is inade-
quate to produce the revenues that the team owner would prefer to col-
lect. 
Revenue enhancement alone, however, is not necessarily worth-
while to team owners.  Prospective incremental revenues must be
weighed against the additional costs required to attract them.  That is
where a taxpayer-financed stadium fits into a team’s income statement.
Stadiums that provide exclusive seating in luxury boxes and club seats
are expensive to build.  Costs are always lower, of course, if the owner
can get someone else to foot the construction bill and then pay them a
trivial rental rate for use of the facility, as characterizes many recently
 
52 Siegfried and Peterson
 




  Furthermore, without the
sunk costs of stadium ownership to tie him down, the owner increases
his ability to extract further concessions from the local population by
periodically threatening to move the team.  If the team receives reve-
nues from nonsports uses of the facility throughout the year, a contract
provision that is fashionable in modern stadium and arena leases, the
owners’ revenues can be expanded further.
 The vast majority of premier league professional sports stadiums
constructed in the 1990s have been financed partly by taxpayers,
including federal, state, and local (Noll and Zimbalist 1998, appendix
to chapter 1).  About 25 state and local governments have provided at
least $100 million each in subsidies to professional sports teams
(Rosentraub 1997, pp. 16).  Even the few new stadiums that have been
privately financed usually have benefited from a substantial public
underwriting for access roads and utilities infrastructure.   
Federal taxpayers contribute to these stadiums and arenas prima-
rily by means of the federal government forgoing tax revenue on inter-
est paid to holders of tax exempt municipal bonds used to finance
construction (Zimmerman 1998).  These forgone tax revenues must
either be made up elsewhere or public services reduced accordingly.
State and local tax support is more direct, often involving direct outlays
of property tax receipts, or the earmarking of either sales tax revenues
collected on tickets to the events held in the facility or revenues from a
lottery.  Unless all of the facility’s patrons are from outside the local
area, at least some, and usually a large proportion of these earmarked
tax revenues would have been collected by the state or local tax author-
ity anyway as local consumers purchased other taxable items as part of
their established expenditure pattern.
In spite of the often emotional public debate about the equity con-
sequences of public policy, the controversy surrounding stadiums and
arenas has focused largely on local economic development prospects
and opportunities to enhance a metropolitan area’s public image.
Unfortunately, the debates usually center on the financing of stadiums
and arenas rather than on net economic effects.  Financial transfers are
treated as costs to those who provide the financing and benefits to those
who receive it regardless of the expansion or contraction of real eco-
nomic activity.  The focus on financial implications of public subsidies
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for sports facilities leaves both the efficiency and equity consequences




In the 1960s economists adopted a taxonomy for evaluating public
projects.  This taxonomy involved two parts: efficiency and equity
effects (Okun 1975).  A literature developed to assist in measuring eco-
nomic benefits and costs and especially in identifying easy to overlook
opportunity costs.  Methodological contributions focused on properly
weighing benefits against costs.   
In recent years economists have begun to apply this taxonomy to
the public provision of sports facilities.   Robert Baade (1987, 1994,
1996) stimulated more careful analysis of the claims of stadium propo-
nents through a series of studies assessing the economic impact of new
teams and/or facilities on local economies.  Roger Noll and Andrew
Zimbalist’s (1997) recently published 
 
Sports, Jobs, and Taxes
 
 orga-
nizes much of what is now known about the efficiency consequences of
publicly provided stadiums and arenas and helps to distinguish real





To date, however, there seems to have been little interest in the
equity consequences of public policy relating to sports facilities.  Some
groups that oppose political referendums on public subsidies for sports
stadiums or arenas assert that the poor are buying playgrounds for the
rich, but there is little objective evidence available about the income
redistribution consequences that arise when communities allocate pub-





The distributional consequences of public projects are complicated
because many direct burdens and benefits are passed along to taxpayers
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or beneficiaries who do not attract attention.  The extent to which bene-
fits and/or costs are passed along depends on the magnitude of various
elasticities of supply and demand that are extremely difficult to evalu-
ate.  For example, a common method of financing new venues is to ear-
mark either sales taxes collected on tickets sold to events in the facility,
on restaurants, on rental cars, or on hotel and motel use.  Even if one
assumes that none of these taxes would have been collected by the tax-
ing authority were those who buy tickets to have purchased alternative
items, the ultimate incidence of such ad valorem sales or hotel taxes
depends on the elasticities of supply and demand.  As thousands of
introductory economics students show on problem sets and exams each
year, if demand is inelastic and supply is elastic, the consumers bear
relatively more of the burden.  On the other hand, if demand is elastic,
and supply is inelastic, the suppliers bear most of the burden.  The
challenge, of course, is measuring the relevant elasticities.
 
WHO PAYS THE SUBSIDY?
 
A careful accounting of the distributional effects of publicly subsi-
dized stadium or arena projects requires an assessment of the sources
of revenue as well as the beneficiaries of the services provided and the
recipients of the revenues. Identifying who pays for stadium subsidies
is complicated because there are usually multiple revenue sources, and
the ultimate incidence of different taxes varies.  Local taxes are raised
primarily via levies on retail sales, property, and hotel and motel use.
Because the marginal propensity to consume is less than one, general
sales taxes are usually considered regressive, especially if the tax base
includes food and clothing.  Property taxes, at least in intermediate
ranges, are thought by some economists (Pechman 1985) to be propor-
tional; at the higher ranges they may be progressive (O’Sullivan 1996).
The incidence of hotel and motel taxes is difficult to assess because
such taxes are paid primarily by myriad businesses that, in competitive
markets, would pass them along to their customers.   Incidence would
ultimately depend on the affluence of those customers.  In an analysis
that tried to trace such specific taxes through the economy to the indi-
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viduals who ultimately pay them,  Siegfried, McElroy, and Sweeney
(1982) found hotel and motel taxes to be progressive.
State revenues to subsidize sports facilities are raised primarily from
general sales taxes, personal and corporate income taxes, lotteries, or a
“sin tax” on alcohol.  Both federal, and state or local personal income
taxes are modestly progressive (Clotfelter and Cook 1989, p. 227).  The
incidence of corporate income taxes is complex and remains controver-
sial.  Lotteries are regressive, although they may be less objectionable
because they are a “voluntary tax”  (Clotfelter and Cook 1989, p. 223).
Siegfried and colleagues found taxes on alcohol to be mildly progres-
sive; Clotfelter and Cook (p. 227) report evidence that taxes on alcohol
are regressive.
Finally, the federal government’s revenue sources are so diverse
that it would be virtually impossible to predict which taxes would be
higher because of federal subsidies to sports facilities.  Because feder-
ally tax exempt municipal bonds are attractive only to those lenders in
relatively high marginal income tax brackets, however, we can be sure
that some of the benefits accrue to relatively high income individuals.
The costs are borne either by those who would have benefited from the
alternative public projects that would have been funded in the absence
of the tax break for municipal bonds used to finance sports facilities or
by those who pay the marginal taxes.
 
WHO BENEFITS DIRECTLY FROM THE SUBSIDY?
 
The incidence of taxation is a subject for another day, however.
Here we want to learn about the income characteristics of the benefi-
ciaries of publicly provided sports facilities.  This is but a simple first
step toward assessing the distributional impact of public subsidies for
professional sports facilities.  To address this question, it is useful first
to categorize the primary beneficiaries of subsidies for new sports sta-
diums or arenas.
The most obvious beneficiaries are claimants on team revenues.
New sports stadiums are desired by teams because they enhance team
revenues through opportunities to lease luxury boxes, sell club seating
tickets at premium prices, increase concession revenues, and expand
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advertising revenues, e.g., signs in the stadium and/or stadium “naming
rights.”  To the extent that new playing facilities increase the demand
for tickets, owners of teams in other league cities benefit too through
revenue sharing in Major League Baseball (MLB) and in the National
Football League (NFL).  Net revenues also climb as a team’s facility
costs disappear.  Players and team owners carve up most of profes-
sional sports teams’ revenues.  Both groups are comprised of very high
income individuals.  There is little doubt that to the extent that public
subsidies of sports stadiums and arenas allow teams to increase net rev-
enues by expanding revenue opportunities and reducing team costs, the
lion’s share of those revenues go to individuals in the top one-tenth of
one percent of the national income distribution.
Of the 115 major league men’s professional sports teams operating
in 1998, the controlling interest in at least 28 was owned by an individ-




 magazine list of the wealthiest 400 Americans
(Gorham, Kafka, and Neelakantan 1998).  If the 50 wealthiest family
groups and minority interests in sports teams are added to the number





  Public subsidies to stadiums or arenas constitute a subsidy pro-
gram for some of the wealthiest people in the country, each of whom
has net assets exceeding half a billion dollars.
Players are not nearly as wealthy as owners.  The average income
of players in the National Basketball Association (NBA), National
Hockey League (NHL), NFL, and MLB in 1998 was $2.6, $1.2, $0.8,
and $1.3 million, respectively; minimum salaries in the leagues were
$242,000, $125,000, $158,000, and $170,000, respectively.  While not
in the stratosphere of the average team owner’s wealth, even those pre-
mier league professional athletes earning the “minimum wage” earn
numerous standard deviations of income more than typical Americans.
Those athletes who are paid the average for their league earn more in a
single year than an average American might expect to earn in a life-
time.
Team owners and players receive most of a team’s incremental rev-
enues because they own the ultimate scarce resources.  Team owners
possess the scarce rights to participate in the premier league in their
sport.  They limit entry into the league to preserve this scarcity value.
Absent scarcity of franchises, there would be little reason for anyone to
pay much of anything in excess of the market value of future player
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contracts (the relatively small extent to which the value of the players’
services exceeds their contractual salaries) and equipment for an exist-
ing franchise when they could simply secure a new one.  Since expan-
sion franchises have no player contracts or equipment, they would be
free.   The actual price of franchises reflects monopoly power and little
else.  Owners clearly have title to a scarce resource—access to the pre-
mier league championship.
Players also possess monopoly rights, since they (and especially
“star” players) own the scarce resources necessary to produce profes-
sional sporting events.  Fans would not be willing to pay to see Tim
Peterson and John Siegfried replace Michael Jordan and Scottie Pippen
on the NBA champion Chicago Bulls.  In fact, fans would not be will-
ing to pay as much to see top NBA “lottery” draft picks replace Jordan
and Pippen.  Star players control a differentiated product for which
there are often no good substitutes in the eyes of the fans—their ath-
letic talent and personalities.  Under such circumstances economic the-
ory predicts that at least some portion of net revenues made available
by a public subsidy that expands gross revenues and reduces facility




 These net revenues are virtually
all economic rent.
In addition to the revenues divided between players and owners,
there may be direct benefits that accrue to consumers.  Only in that rare
case when a consumer is completely indifferent to the choice between
purchasing a good or service or not is no consumer’s surplus created.
In recent years, sports teams have successfully designed price discrim-
ination schemes to extract some of this consumer’s surplus.   However,
because few people agonize over the decisions either to buy a ticket or
to watch a game on television, there is no question that some surplus
remains for almost every purchaser of tickets or viewer of games on
television.
The direct demand for professional sporting events is manifested
primarily through the demand for tickets to live professional sporting
events and the demand for viewing games on television.  Although
there is no way to determine the magnitude of consumer surplus
enjoyed by those who buy tickets or view games on television, we can
be sure that most of the fans receive some consumer surplus.  It is of
more than passing interest to identify these individuals because they
are the local consumers who will enjoy increased utility from a subsidy
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to a stadium or arena that either prevents a team from moving else-




  Because there is little question
that the owners and players are relatively affluent, the only prospective
direct beneficiaries of public sports facility subsidies who are not




The objective of this essay is to identify the income distribution
position of the direct consumers of sports.  In addition to direct private
benefits manifested in consumer’s surplus, some indirect “public con-
sumption” benefit is likely to be provided by sports stadiums or arenas.
Such external benefits may arise from increased self-esteem enjoyed
by residents who believe that they are better off living in a “big league
city,” or who at least believe that their lives are enhanced if others view
their community as a “major league place” (Rosentraub 1997, pp. 25–
26).   The fact that virtually all well- conducted studies of the economic
development effects of professional sports teams and/or new stadiums
or arenas find no impact whatsoever (an exception being a recent study
by Coats and Humphreys [1999], who found a negative effect) does not
undermine the possibility of external benefits, although it casts doubt
on their magnitude.  Trickle-down economic impacts are not the only
source of external benefits.  So long as the local residents believe that
they are better off with an enhanced public image and we respect con-
sumer sovereignty, then they benefit from the team, stadium, or arena
whether the basis for their belief is valid or not.
External benefits can also arise from the personal consumption of
following a team’s fortunes, discussing the team’s success around the
water cooler, or as a rallying point that brings a community together.
Of course external costs may also arise from depression caused by a
team that chronically loses, increased traffic congestion on game days,
domestic conflict generated by the home team’s game being televised
during Thanksgiving dinner, or time diverted from work effort as
employees congregate around the water cooler more frequently than
their supervisor would like.  
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It is difficult to determine how such external benefits might be dis-
tributed across individuals at different points along the income distribu-
tion.  Before we even worry about their distribution, however, we need
to document the existence and magnitude of external benefits.  While
doing so, we should also catalog any external costs associated with the
presence of a professional sports team.  Zimmerman (1998, p. 122) sug-
gests that these benefits might be valued equally by all individuals or
that fans (particularly those fans who purchase tickets to games) are
likely to value them more than others.  If such external benefits are dis-
tributed in proportion to fan purchases of tickets, then our efforts to
understand the income position of those who purchase tickets and view
games on television will simultaneously reveal the distribution of the
external benefits.  On the other hand, the distribution of these external
benefits may differ from the distribution of benefits that accrue to buy-
ers of tickets and viewers of televised game broadcasts.  
 
WHO BUYS THE TICKETS TO SPORTING EVENTS?
 
The individuals who purchase tickets for professional sporting
events are the people who enjoy the consumers’ surplus from the direct
consumption of sporting event services.  Thus, it is of interest to learn
precisely who are the people who enjoy benefits in excess of the price
they pay for tickets to the games.  It is these people who secure direct
benefits from the presence of a professional sporting team and/or sta-
dium or arena.  To the extent that a publicly subsidized stadium or
arena attracts a team to a community or prevents an incumbent fran-
chise from moving elsewhere, it is those who buy tickets to the games
or who receive more enjoyment from watching games on television
that involve their hometown team rather than teams from other cities
who are direct beneficiaries of the public subsidy.
Our argument that fans benefit from a publicly subsidized stadium
is not a claim that ticket prices are lower because of the public subsidy.
Indeed, as a reduction in fixed costs, a rent subsidy imbedded in a 25-
or 30-year lease is unlikely to affect ticket prices at all.  Rather it is a
balancing of marginal costs against marginal revenues that identifies
the profit maximizing ticket price level.  Our interest in the affluence of
 
60 Siegfried and Peterson
 
sports ticket purchasers instead hinges on the belief that the very exist-
ence of the opportunity to purchase tickets and attend games in one’s
hometown depends on the public subsidy because of the artificial scar-
city of premier league teams created by the monopoly leagues.  The
public subsidy creates some amount of consumer surplus for the fans
who purchase tickets by means of its responsibility for the team’s pres-
ence.  Each fan who purchases tickets must be better off than he or she
would have been in the absence of the team, otherwise they would sim-





As part of its Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), the Bureau of
Labor Statistics interviews a continuous rotating panel of households
in the U.S. to collect data for calculating the Consumer Price Index.
This nationally representative recall survey provides information on





  It is constructed so that each quarter can be
treated as an independent sample; thus four quarters of data furnishes a
sample of about 20,000 U.S. households.
We use two types of information from the 1994 CES samples: pre-
tax family income and itemized expenditures for: “admission fees to
sporting events,” and “admission fees to sporting events on out-of-town
trips.”  Admission fees include both single-game and season tickets.
All of the sporting event tickets documented in the CES were pur-
chased by individuals; we have no information on tickets purchased by
businesses or who enjoys the use of those tickets.  It is likely that this
omission biases downward the reported income levels of those who
attend sporting events.
Sporting events are all inclusive.  They range from auto and horse
racing to professional golf and tennis, or whatever survey respondents
consider “sporting events.”  Minor league baseball as well as college
sporting events are included.  A large fraction of the money spent on
tickets, however, is accounted for by the four major men’s professional
team sports—baseball, basketball, football, and ice hockey, each of
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Data from the 1972–1973 CES, revealed that the typical purchas-
ers of season tickets to sporting events had median incomes 58 percent
above the average (McElroy, Siegfried, and Sweeney 1982).  Those
purchasers of single-game tickets had median incomes about 10 per-
cent above the overall average.  In the early 1970s, sports teams had
not yet discovered the lucrative personal seat license (PSL) system of
extracting payments in excess of the face value of tickets from more-
rabid fans.  The price of PSLs makes it unlikely that a stadium crowd in
2000 consists of many people holding minimum wage jobs, aside from
the ushers and concession workers serving those in the club seats and
luxury boxes.  If anything, the disparity between the income level of
those attending professional sporting events and the average “Joe Six-
pack” has widened over time.
By 1994 the CES no longer separated season tickets from single-
game tickets.  It did, however, distinguish tickets purchased while at
home from those purchased while traveling out-of-town.  We combine





Our analysis is based on four quarters of data from 1994.  Tickets
to sporting events were purchased by an average of 5.6 percent of the
consumer units each quarter (totaling 1,147 consumer units for the
year).  Thus, up to (but more likely a lot less than) 22 percent of con-
sumer units might purchase tickets during a full year.
 
INCOME LEVELS OF SPORTS TICKET PURCHASERS
 
Table 1 reports measures of central tendency for income levels of
consumers who do and do not purchase sporting event tickets.  The
unweighted mean personal income level of consumers who bought
sporting event tickets shows that they enjoy average incomes 59 per-




   The
weighted mean weights the income levels of households that bought
tickets by their expenditures on tickets and is a more accurate reflection
of the personal income levels of those who typically use the tickets.
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Not surprisingly, the weighted mean shows a larger income gap (85
percent) between consumers who do and do not purchase tickets to
sporting events.  We also report median income levels because mean
income levels can be affected by extremely high incomes of a few con-
sumers and by the 1994 CES practice of “topcoding” all incomes




  Using medians, the difference
between the two groups is 92 percent.  
Depending on the measure of central tendency, sporting event con-
sumers have incomes from 59 to 92 percent above the levels of con-
sumers who do not buy sporting event tickets.  When consumers who
buy sporting event tickets are mixed with those who do not, the 1994
median income level is $23,194.  Thus, the median income level of
consumers of sporting event tickets is 84 percent above the overall
median income level.  This number is in contrast to the 58 percent dif-
ferential for season tickets and 10 percent differential for single-game
tickets in 1972–1973.  Because only a small fraction of the consumer
units purchase tickets, the reported averages for those who buy no tick-
ets at all are always close to the overall U.S. average income.
In computing weighted means, those consumers purchasing a dis-
proportionate share of tickets to sporting events have a greater effect on
the average income level.  The small sample size of 1,147 consumer
units that purchased sporting event tickets risks placing undue reliance
on the consumption patterns of relatively few consumers.  To assess the
sensitivity of our results to this possibility, we eliminate households
 
















B. Consumers who do not purchase 













Incomes are in nominal 1994 dollars.
 
The Economics of Sports 63
 
that individually account for over 5 percent of the total expenditures
for sporting event tickets in a quarter.  This criterion eliminates seven
households (two low-income and five high-income), after which the
weighted-mean income of consumers of sporting event tickets drops
from $56,124 to $55,883.  This still exceeds the mean income of con-
sumers who did not purchase any sporting event tickets by 84 percent.
To maintain individual respondent confidentiality, the CES top-
coded income at $300,000 in 1994.  Four percent of households that
purchased sporting event tickets were topcoded in contrast to 1.6 per-
cent of households that did not purchase sporting event tickets.  Top-
coding causes a greater downward bias in the income level of
consumers of sporting event tickets than in the income levels of con-
sumers who do not buy sporting event tickets.  It thus causes our calcu-
lations to understate the differences in income levels between sports
consumers and others.  Topcoding also reveals that sporting event tick-
ets are more than twice as likely to be purchased by consumers with
income exceeding $300,000 as are other goods and services.
The conclusion is clear.  Incomes of consumers who purchase
sporting event tickets are significantly greater than incomes of consum-
ers who do not buy tickets to sporting events.  If we were able to
include in the analysis individuals who enjoy access to tickets pur-
chased by small businesses and corporations and those who have
leased luxury boxes, the difference surely would be even greater.
Ticket prices to minor league contests and college games are substan-
tially lower than ticket prices to premier league professional games.
Because our analysis combines all of these types of events, it undoubt-
edly understates the income gap between those who attend major
league professional sporting events and the general public.  As more
new stadiums with relatively more luxury boxes and club seats are
completed, the gap will continue to grow.
 
INDIRECT EVIDENCE FROM TARGETED ADVERTISING
 
Consumer Expenditure Survey data do not identify the particular
sports events for which tickets are purchased.  To explore differences in
income levels among the fans of different sports and to assess the rea-
 
64 Siegfried and Peterson
 
sonableness of our CES-based estimates, we collected information
about advertising in event programs, in stadiums and arenas, and on
televised broadcasts of games.  Advertising in event programs is
directed at individuals who attend the events.  Advertising on televised
broadcasts is directed at people who watch the games on television.
Advertising in the facility is directed at both groups, as those who
attend the games see signage in the stadium or arena, and those who
watch on television may see the signage too.
Advertising in event programs thus provides information that
should match the information we collected from the CES.  Our analy-
sis of income levels of consumers based on advertising assumes that
advertisers direct their messages at people who are most likely to pur-
chase their products.  We expect to find that the products purchased fre-
quently by sports fans who buy tickets are advertised in event
programs.  Products that are likely to be purchased by sports fans who
view games on television are likely to be advertised during television
commercials.  By looking at the income levels of the consumers of
these products, we can infer the income levels of those who attend




To assess the income levels of the consumers of the various goods
and services targeted by each advertising type, we first classify the spe-
cific product advertised and then identify the median income of all
consumers of that product from the CES.  If an advertiser sells prod-
ucts in various CES categories, we assign the advertisement to all of
those categories and average the median incomes of consumers of
products in the various categories to create a representative income
level for the target audience of the advertisement.  We aggregate the
income levels across the various products advertised via a particular
medium (e.g., event program or signage or television) for each of the
four professional team sports by calculating the median of the median
incomes of consumers of the various advertised products.  The proce-
dure is illustrated in Table 2, which reports the advertisers in a ran-
domly selected Baltimore Orioles baseball game program and the
respective median income levels of the consumers of the products sold
by the advertisers.
Our research assignment consisted of reviewing many spectator
programs, advertisements on stadium walls and scoreboards, and view-
ing over 30 televised games.  The latter was accomplished by videotap-
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Table 2 Baltimore Orioles Program Advertisements with 
Corresponding Median Income Level of Consumers 
of the Products or Services Advertised
 
Products or services advertised
Median income levels of consumers of 
product or service based on CES
($)
Bacardi rum 23,480






Old El Paso (food) 25,000
Sprint (telephone service) 25.781
Coca-Cola 27,979
Milk 27,979
Powerade (sports drink) 27,979
Deer Park (bottled water) 27,979
Rawlings Sporting Goods 28,110
Energizer batteries 29,820
Value City Furniture 31,213
Bravo Card (ATM card) 31,425
Matrix (hair care) 33,801
State Farm Insurance 34,000
NationsBank 34,125
First Union Bank 34,125
First National Bank 34,125
J.C. Penney (department store) 37,000
Montgomery Ward (department store) 37,000
St. Agnes Healthcare 37,850
Sheraton Inner Harbor Hotel 37,895
Motorola (electronics) 41,091
Adventure World (amusement park) 41,161
 




Products or services advertised
Median income levels of consumers of 








Trane air conditioning 49,313
Office Depot 50,175
Tuxedo House (tuxedo rental) 52,215
Cellular One 67,018
Median of the median incomes of 
consumers of products advertised 37,063
 




  The peculiar twist to our
research is that we fast-forwarded through the games and watched the
advertisements at normal speed!  
There are some inherent weaknesses in this approach.  First, prod-
ucts often are differentiated to appeal to people of different means.  The
CES does not distinguish product categories in terms of the income of
the target audiences, however.  There is no separation of  “restaurants
for high-income people” from “restaurants for low-income people.”
Premium brands of imported beer are lumped in with local generic
beers.  Because we group together differentiated products targeted at
low- and high-income consumers, our advertising-based method of
estimating consumer income levels should reveal less divergence
between the income levels of sports consumers and the income levels of
nonsports consumers than actually exists.
A second problem is securing sufficient data.  In several cases, our
sample sizes are sufficiently small that the evidence is anecdotal rather
than systematic. We are missing signage information for basketball and

































Baseball 31,898 10 1.43 33,391 9 1.50 36,277 20 1.63




n/a n/a 40,711 8 1.83
Football 38,189 6 1.72 29,682 3 1.33 n/a n/a n/a
Ice hockey 40,255 2 1.81 37,642 6 1.69 37,065 4 1.66
Mean of medians across 
all sports
37,326 33,572 38,016
Median income of 
households that do not 
purchase tickets to 
sporting events
22,258 22,258 22,258












n/a indicates that no data were collected.
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avoid distortions caused by topcoding incomes. Although the adver-
tisements were run in 1997, the median income levels we assign to the
products are from the 1994 CES. Thus the income data are in 1994
nominal dollars. All of the estimates based on the targets of advertising




We assembled randomly selected game programs from 10 major
league baseball teams, seven professional football teams, two profes-
sional basketball franchises, and two professional ice hockey teams.
The median of the median income levels of consumers of the various
products advertised in baseball programs ranged from $27,980 at Phil-
adelphia Phillies games to $38,500 for those of the Chicago White Sox
games.  The mean over 10 sampled baseball teams was $31,898.  
The corresponding median income level targeted for fans of the
seven football teams ranged from $35,000 for Seattle Seahawks fans to
$40,225 for those of the Chicago Bears.  In basketball, the Indiana Pac-
ers had a targeted median income level of $37,895; the Minnesota Tim-
berwolves,  $40,255.  Both ice hockey teams in the sample (the Detroit
Red Wings and the Tampa Bay Lightning) had identical median
incomes of consumers of products advertised in their program of
$40,255.
The ratio of the estimated income levels of consumers of products
advertised in game programs to the income levels of consumers who
do not purchase tickets to sporting events (from the CES) is also
reported in Table 3.  It ranges from 1.43 for baseball to 1.81 for ice
hockey.  The ratios for basketball, football, and ice hockey, ranging
from 1.72 to 1.81, are relatively close to the comparable ratio of 1.92
based on the CES data on sports event ticket purchases.  This is espe-
cially so in light of our expectation that the advertising-based estimates





  The ratio for baseball is noticeably lower than for
the other three sports.  Perhaps this is because the lowest-priced tickets
for baseball games are substantially below the lowest-priced tickets for
the other three sports thereby attracting a different clientele to games.
 
The Economics of Sports 69
 
STADIUM OR ARENA SIGNS
 
Stadium signs are directed both at people who attend the live
events and at the television audience.  A similar procedure was used to
compute median incomes for the targeted consumers of stadium or
arena advertisements for each team in our sample.  These incomes
were then averaged over the teams and are reported in Table 3.
The median income of the consumers targeted by signage ranges
from $28,010 at Los Angeles Dodgers games to $38,500 at Florida
Marlins games.  For the eight baseball teams common to the sample,
the simple correlation between the estimated income levels of advertis-
ing targets of event programs and those using stadium signage is +0.36.
The medians for the three football teams range from $26,808 for the
Buffalo Bills to $34,126 for the Oakland Raiders; and for the six ice
hockey teams from $35,000 for the Detroit Red Wings to $39,000 for
the Colorado Avalanche.
In contrast to event programs, which are targeted only at people
who attend games, football stadium and ice hockey arena signs appear
to target lower-income consumers who may be viewing televised
broadcasts.  The income levels of those targeted for baseball signage,
however, do not differ much from those targeted by baseball event pro-
gram advertising.  This inconsistency may reflect the inaccessibility of
football and ice hockey event tickets to lower income consumers who,
therefore, substitute television viewing for live attendance.  However,
the income levels of fans who attend baseball games and those who
watch them on television diverge less, perhaps because baseball con-




Because television commercials are directed at those who are not
attending the events in person, we might expect to observe a continua-
tion of the income-level trends that became apparent as we moved
from event programs to facility signage.  To assess these income levels,
we recorded all of the advertisements on 32 nationally broadcast
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games.  The sample includes 20 baseball games, eight basketball
games, and four ice hockey games.  Because the teams varied and the
games were broadcast nationally, we do not distinguish income levels
by teams.
Only ice hockey advertising follows the expected trend of targeting
lower-income fans for products advertised on televised games than for




We find little difference between the median income of the consumers
targeted in televised basketball advertising and that of consumers tar-
geted in basketball game programs.  In baseball, the median income of
targeted consumers of products touted on televised broadcasts actually
exceeds the median income of consumers targeted in game programs.
If anything is to be learned from the differences, it is that fans of foot-
ball and ice hockey are split by income level, with the more affluent
viewing games in person.  For baseball, the opposite appears to be true;
and for basketball, there is no discernible difference in income levels of
fans sitting in the arena and those sitting on the couch watching televi-
sion.  The median income level of consumer units targeted on all sports
television broadcasts is similar, ranging from 63 percent to 83 percent
above the income levels of consumers who do not purchase tickets to
sporting events.  Thus it appears that television viewers of sporting
events have incomes modestly below those fans who attend the games
but are still relatively affluent.
Patterns of household access to televised sporting events undoubt-
edly contribute to the affluence level of television viewers.  The per-
centage of individuals who watch some television does not vary much
by household income level (ranging from 91 percent for households
with income levels less than $10,000 annually to 92 percent for house-
holds with income levels between $20,000 and $30,000 to 89 percent
for households with income levels exceeding $50,000 in 1996).  How-
ever, the percentage of individuals who view cable television does vary
substantially by household income level, from 42 percent for house-
holds with income levels less than $10,000 annually to 58 percent for
households with income levels between $20,000 and $30,000, to 74
percent for households with income levels exceeding $50,000 in 1996
(
 
Statistical Abstract of the United States
 
 1996, p. 561).  A considerable
proportion of televised sporting events is distributed exclusively on
cable television, including, but not limited to, ESPN and ESPN2.
 




Consumers of sporting event tickets enjoy incomes substantially
above the average.  Although consumers who watch games on televi-
sion appear to have lower incomes, they too are affluent in comparison
with the nation’s overall average income. 
A careful documentation of the redistributional effects of public
subsidies for sports facilities requires an accounting of the distribution
of the subsidies to the teams (which are generally divided between
players and owners, almost all individuals in both groups being very
affluent), an assessment of the incidence of indirect benefits such as
community image enhancement or the enjoyment of “following the
local team,” and an evaluation of the incidence of the funding mecha-
nisms (taxes and lotteries) used to raise the revenue.  One portion of
the redistribution—the consumers’ surplus flowing to fans—seems to
favor relatively more affluent individuals.  The remaining aspects of
the redistribution are easier to assess intuitively and support specula-
tion that the public funding of sports facilities redistributes wealth from
individuals with lower and middle incomes to those with much higher
incomes.  Whether this redistribution is desirable or not, depends on
one’s views about its fairness and about the assessment of other eco-




Siegfried is Professor of Economics at Vanderbilt University.  Peterson earned Honors
in Economics and graduated with a B.A. from Vanderbilt University in 1998.  T. Ald-
rich Finegan, Malcolm Getz, Allen Sanderson, and Andrew Zimbalist provided helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1. The desired size and amenities of a stadium are also affected by its financing.  As
the team’s share of incremental construction cost declines, it will elect a larger
and better outfitted facility.
2. A notable exception is Zimmerman’s (1998) analysis of the distributional conse-
quences of the federal tax exemption for municipal bonds.
3. This count does not include indirect team ownership such as Rupert Murdoch’s
News Corporation’s ownership of the Los Angeles Dodgers.
4. In several of the sports leagues (e.g., NFL, NBA) players share added revenues
with owners on the basis of formulas instituted in conjunction with payroll ceil-
ings that were negotiated between owners and the players’ union.
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5. The relevant net gain to sports ticket buyers is the difference between the consum-
ers’ surplus they enjoy from the opportunity to purchase tickets and what they
would have received from buying the goods and services that would have been
purchased by them were the sporting event tickets not available.
6. About one-fifth of the sample is replaced by new households each quarter so that
after five quarters the entire sample has turned over.
7. Ticket revenues for the four premier league men’s professional team sports in the





8. The out-of-town tickets comprise 28 percent of combined total expenditures on
sporting event tickets and would include tickets purchased to playoff tournaments
and college football bowl games.
9. The difference in means is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence
level.
10. The topcoding threshold is now at $1 million annual income.
11. This approach was originally suggested to us by Allen Sanderson of the Univer-
sity of Chicago.
12. There are no football games in the sample because the data were collected during
the spring and early summer of 1997.
13. Corporate marketing guides we obtained from the Baltimore Orioles (baseball)
and Chicago Bears (football) reported income distributions of spectators that
imply 1994 median incomes of $53,587 and $43,436, vis-a-vis the income esti-
mates of $34,063 and $40,225, respectively, derived from the targets of game pro-
gram advertising.  Thus, both teams are touting higher incomes for their
customers than any of our estimates.
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University of Notre Dame
 
In this paper I will present some statistics that attempt to relate col-
legiate athletics to finances and academics.  I will not attempt to delin-
eate the absolute relationship between athletic and financial success.
My goal is more modest.  I will be presenting instead some “data sug-
gestions” that hopefully leave you with more questions than you came
with.
Most of the data that I will present come from information released
under the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA), or the so-called
Gender Equity reports.  Every college that receives federal financial
assistance in any form is now required to provide information relating
to the distribution of a number of athletic variables by gender, includ-
ing the number of athletes, the amount of financial aid, operating
expenses, and implicitly, profits.  These numbers are not without com-
plexities.  Each institution has its own accounting procedures, which
typically are employed to facilitate internal decision making and not to
ensure comparability with other academic institutions.  Some of the
reported numbers are therefore potentially misleading because of these
accounting conventions.  For example, one college might include tele-
phone expenditures by the athletic department as a separate item
charged to the department.  Another might aggregate all telephone
expenditures in a general account and may not explicitly charge the
athletic department for its contribution to the overall bill.  A few col-
leges require alumni to contribute a minimum amount like $100 to the
university’s general fund in order to be eligible to purchase football
tickets.  If 20,000 alumni make this contribution, $2 million per year is




nue. These examples should not lead you to conclude that the Gender
Equity numbers cannot be trusted but rather to conclude that they must
be interpreted with care.
Table 1 contrasts the Big Ten with the Mid-American Conference
(MAC), of which Western Michigan is a member.  The top part of the
table presents a mix of statistics on enrollment, athletes, and some
expenditures.  The table is configured to present the conference aver-
ages, maximum, minimum, and the ratio of the minimum to the maxi-
mum.  The final column presents the MAC average divided by the Big
Ten average.  The ratio of the minimum to the maximum within a con-
ference yields one perspective on the degree of inequality within a con-
ference, the ratio of the MAC to the Big Ten yields a perspective on the
degree of inequality between the two conferences.
In terms of enrollment, the typical Big Ten institution is substan-
tially larger than the typical MAC school; the only exception is North-
western.  The mix of male/female students is roughly similar for the
two conferences.  Big Ten schools typically have somewhat larger ath-
letic programs.  Despite the larger number of male athletes at Big Ten
institutions, the Big Ten comes closer to meeting Title IX gender
equity guidelines.  (An institution can satisfy Title IX if its percentage
of female student-athletes is roughly comparable with its overall per-
centage of females.)  Of Big Ten scholarship athletes, 38.0 percent are
female versus only 33.1 percent of MAC scholarship athletes.  That
puts the percentage of female scholarship athletes 11.2 percent below
the percentage of female students at Big Ten schools versus 19.6 per-
cent at MAC schools.  This comparison is particularly important for an
individual school because it is one way that a school can certify that it
is in compliance with Title IX.
What causes this greater differential in MAC schools?  Certainly
alternative explanations are possible, and I would like to advance two.
First, since Big Ten schools typically are larger, one could argue that
they have access to more students to fill their athletic teams.  Thus,
reaching Title IX compliance may be easier for a larger school.  A fun-
damental problem with this explanation, however, is that most scholar-
ship athletes are recruited before they come to college, not from the
student body.  The second explanation focuses on the schools’ individ-
ual capacities for generating funds to finance Title IX compliance.




Table 1 The Big Ten versus the Mid-American Conference
 
Big Ten MAC MAC avg./
Big 10 avg.Average Maximum Minimum Min/max Average Maximum Minimum Min/max
Enrollment: Male 13,232 18,765 3,734 0.199 8,200 16,708 5,075 0.304 0.620
Female 12.628 18,230 3,870 0.212 8,701 11,470 7,026 0.613 0.689
% Female 49.2 54.4 43.3 0.796 52.8 58.1 34.2 0.589 1.072
Athletes: Male 378 470 230 0.489 294 389 227 0.584 0.780
Female 234 327 148 0.453 148 194 80 0.412 0.632





11.2 18.5 5.9 0.317 19.6 27.8 5.1 0.184 1.756
Student aid: Male $2,180,218 3,511,825 940,226 0.268 1,293,892 1,841,996 962,659 0.523 0.593
Female $1,335,507 2,536,923 506,501 0.200 646,408 823,056 443,458 0.539 0.484





/men’s $480,473 1,301,433 209,106 0.161 134,848 274,546 66,404 0.242 0.281
BB/women’s $250,460 510,255 107,587 0.211 77,130 122,165 58,074 0.475 0.308
Football $1,150,187 2,984,934 337,712 0.113 375,449 679,236 143,629 0.211 0.326
Total op. exp: Men’s $2,345,423 5,068,365 971,449 0.192 716,258 1,164,957 369,786 0.317 0.305
Men’s sports 
excl. football
$1,195,239 2,083,431 633,737 0.304 340,809 485,721 226,157 0.466 0.406










Big 10 avg.Average Maximum Minimum Min/max Average Maximum Minimum
Min/
max
Recruit exp. Men $363,116 490,983 236,941 0.483 97,263 147,180 55,840 0.379 0.268
Women $127,797 176,004 70,505 0.401 32,272 64,995 20,858 0.321 0.253
Salaries Men $69,708 88,896 57,920 0.652 49,710 59,656 41,129 0.689 0.713
Women $47,032 57,467 39,946 0.695 36,231 45,281 28,550 0.631 0.770
Football Revenue $10,763,264 17,840,445 6,132,085 0.344 722,893 931,836 496,989 0.533 0.067
Expense $3,373,603 5,005,180 2,145,986 0.429 1,607,180 1,945,850 1,291,434 0.663 0.476
Net $7,389,661 15,512,024 2,665,632 0.172 (884,286) (493,397) (1,339,009) 2.714 –0.120
Men’s BB Revenue $4,551,187 6,142,915 3,044,999 0.496 268,220 513,208 115,152 0.224 0.059
Expense $1,057,599 1,777,364 683,077 0.384 452,225 594,609 324,109 0.545 0.428
Net $3,493,589 5,459,838 2,226,199 0.408 (184.005) (35,314) (325,524) 9.218 –0.053
Men’s other Revenue $569,884 2,658,212 15,202 0.006 100,668 364,455 — 0.000 0.177
Expense $2,244,463 3,329,909 1,568,489 0.471 884,143 1,411,663 537,871 0.381 0.394
Net ($1,674,579) 246,513 (2,839,902) (11.520) (783,475) (469,230) (1,298,749) 2.768 0.468
Men Revenue $17,530,360 26,017,272 12,143,588 0.467 1,158,998 1,433,468 698,288 0.487 0.066
Expense $7,626,141 12,919,483 4,820,083 0.373 2,979,663 3,437,448 2,205,850 0.642 0.391
Net $9,904,220 19,655,268 3,540,421 0.180 (1,820,666) (1,133,421) (2,328,427) 2.054 –0.184
 
79
Women Revenue $779,356 3,064,266 24,697 0.008 37,915 78,808 780 0.010 0.049
Expense $3,440,546 4,976,973 2,542,494 0.511 1,328,315 1,657,012 846,228 0.511 0.386
Net ($2,661,190) (924,360) (4,685,316) 5.069 (1,290,401) (839,690) (1,586,915) 1.890 0.485
Overall Revenue $22,901,272 35,887,000 13,419,690 0.374 3,961,769 7,641,186 1,313,574 0.172 0.173
Expense $19,448,095 36,302,000 7,391,879 0.204 5,781,812 7,455,973 4,466,822 0.599 0.297
Net $3,413,177 18,730,905 (2,755,305) (0.147) (1,820,043) 185,213 (3,998,809) –21.590 –0.533
Revenue (%) Football 47.6 62.9 37.4 33.4 64.9 6.5
Football + BB 69.7 99.4 53.0 52.6 99.9 12.1
Cost (%) Football 17.3 13.8 29.0 27.8 26.1 28.9




The “average” columns show the difference between the percentage of females enrolled and the percentage of females who are athletes.  The








from its football and men’s basketball programs and the MAC gener-
ates relatively little net revenue from these sports.  Thus, the Big Ten
has a ready source of funds for subsidizing women’s sports and com-
plying with Title IX.  One could argue that it is substantially easier for
the Big Ten to be able to afford to comply with the law.  The data do
not prove that contention, but they certainly appear to suggest it.
Following the statistics on athletes in Table 1 are statistics on stu-
dent aid, operating expenses for three sports (men’s basketball,
women’s basketball, and football), total operating expenses for men’s
and women’s sports, recruitment expenditures, and salaries.  These
numbers suggest two basic conclusions.
Looking at the last column, the MAC average is consistently a
small fraction of the Big Ten average.  The average coach’s salary in
the MAC is about 75 percent of his or her Big Ten counterpart’s.
Recruiting expenses are only 25 percent as high.  Student aid is about
50 percent of the Big Ten average, and total operating expenditures are
roughly 30 percent of the Big Ten average.  Thus, I have a very simple
question.  Does anyone believe that across the board, year-in and year-
out, the MAC can compete with the Big Ten?  The expenditure num-
bers suggest that the playing field is not level and that when MAC
schools play Big Ten schools, you should expect a mismatch.  Now one
might be tempted to argue that the discrepancy in expenses is only in
Big Ten football.  Unfortunately, that is far from the case.  MAC
expenditures for female teams are also only 30 percent of those in the
Big Ten.  You might alternately argue that higher Big Ten expenditures
reflect their greater number of athletes and, therefore, more teams.
That also is far from the case.  On a per athlete basis, MAC expendi-
tures are still less than 50 percent of Big Ten expenditures.
Why do we observe a discrepancy between Big Ten and MAC
expenditures?  There are many hypotheses.  Big Ten institutions may
have more legislative clout.  They typically have more alumni.  They
generally have longer athletic traditions.  They may place greater
emphasis on intercollegiate athletics.  Regardless of these hypotheses,
we will see in the bottom half of Table 1 that Big Ten schools definitely
generate more athletic revenue.  I will leave it to you to postulate which
reasons are more important.
The second half of Table 1 presents revenues and expenses for var-
ious sports and categories, as well as for the overall athletic program.
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Perhaps the most dramatic difference is in terms of football programs.
The typical MAC football program is but a shadow of the typical Big
Ten program.  It is important to note, however, that athletic expendi-
tures at the typical MAC institution are roughly 50 percent of those at a
Big Ten school, but MAC revenues are less than 10 percent of the Big
Ten average.  Why the dramatic difference?  Again, the numbers are
suggestive but not definitive.  One could argue that the marginal expen-
ditures of the Big Ten so elevate their programs that they obtain the
best athletes and coaches and can produce the best product, which is
then marketed for millions of dollars in packed stadiums.  Alterna-
tively, one could argue that the tradition of the Big Ten has elevated the
programs and generated their financial success.  Or one could argue
that the prior financial success of the Big Ten has bred a tradition that
generates further financial and on-the-field success.  In any event, the
bottom line is that Big Ten football is a very lucrative endeavor on
average, while MAC football is not.
Comparing averages in the Big Ten and the MAC, however, masks
one other important difference in the conferences.  There is much
greater variation in the Big Ten than in the MAC in terms of football
profitability.  MAC losses range from $0.5 million to $1.4 million, a
span of less than $1 million.  In contrast, Big Ten profits range from
$15.5 million to $2.7 million.  There are a few teams that dominate Big
Ten football profits: Michigan, Ohio State, and Penn State.  On a year-
in and year-out basis, these same teams are also at the top of the rank-
ings, and one might readily argue that the correlation is not an acci-
dent.  Three schools dominate Big Ten football profits and victories
while no school dominates MAC football profits (or smallest financial
losses) or victories.  It appears then that rough financial parity has pro-
duced approximate on-the-field parity as well.
For men’s basketball, the story is virtually identical to men’s foot-
ball.  The only difference is the magnitude of the numbers.  MAC
expenditures run almost 50 percent of Big Ten expenditures, but reve-
nues are less than 10 percent of the Big Ten’s.  The good news for
MAC basketball is that, on average, MAC schools almost break even.
For other men’s sports (so-called Olympic sports or nonrevenue
sports), the situation changes dramatically.  All schools in the Big Ten
and the MAC lose money on these programs; the only difference is the




what Big Ten schools spend.  The revenues in all cases are trivial com-
pared with the size of the athletic budget.  The good news for the MAC
is that it loses much less money in nonrevenue sports than the Big Ten.
The bad news for the MAC is that it loses less money because it spends
less, and one might reasonably project that spending less means win-
ning less.
Given the substantial financial losses shown in Table 1 for other
men’s sports, one might reasonably ask why schools spend so heavily
on these programs?  One possible answer is that the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association (NCAA) requires a school to offer a mini-
mum number of sports programs to field a Division IA football
program, but that minimum does not appear to be a binding constraint
on schools in the Big Ten or the MAC.  Why, then, do they spend?  If
they lose money and if they are not required to keep at least some of
these programs, why offer them?  The acceptance of financial loss in
these programs suggests that the entertainment value placed on them is
higher.  (One might argue that there is an educational value as well, but
that argument would be more appropriate for intramural activities than
for intercollegiate sports.)
Men’s programs (all sports combined) generally are profitable in
the Big Ten but not in the MAC.  The logic is simple.  In the Big Ten,
football profits in particular make men’s programs in general profit-
able.  In the MAC, no football profits exist to offset other losses.
For women’s sports, the story is similar to that for men’s sports
other than football and men’s basketball.  Expenses are higher in the
Big Ten than in the MAC, and revenues for both are but a fraction of
expenses.  (Women’s revenues, however, are dramatically higher in the
Big Ten.)  Once again, financial losses are lower in the MAC, but that
simply reflects the lower expenses.  Returning to Title IX, Big Ten
schools fit the model frequently advanced that football “pays the bills”
and allows schools to offer a wide-ranging women’s athletics program.
However, MAC schools dramatically contradict that model because
there are no football profits to offset other losses.  In fact, the MAC
schools face even greater difficulties in complying with Title IX.  That
is, total men’s losses average $1.9 million, and total women’s losses
are only $0.8 million.  In the case of schools with roughly 50 percent
female students, an economist might argue that the financial subsidies
to men’s and women’s programs should be approximately equal to
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meet the spirit of Title IX.  The numbers in Table 1 suggest that could
be done in alternative ways, for example, spending $1.1 million more
on women’s sports.  However, all alternatives would impose potentially
severe constraints on MAC schools because they lack financial
resources.
The last four rows in Table 1 show the percentage of total revenues
and expenses stemming from football and from football plus men’s
basketball, the two generally perceived “cash cows” of intercollegiate
athletics.  Institutional vagaries distort the maximums and minimums
here, but the averages are revealing and suggest that football and men’s
basketball do generate the majority of revenues.  However, although
football programs in particular are perceived to be “gold-plated”—get-
ting the most expensive versions of everything—the self-reported
accounting numbers suggest that football does not comprise the major-
ity of costs.  The averages suggest that football and men’s basketball do
generate the majority of revenues, but they are not responsible for a
majority of the expenditures.
Table 2 presents data from a more aggregate perspective.  Rather
than considering only the Big Ten and the MAC, Table 2 presents more




  In general,
the results are consistent with those in Table 1.  Football and men’s
basketball are profitable, but other men’s sports and women’s sports
 










Revenue ($, millions) 6.27 2.40 0.24 0.59
Expense ($, millions) 3.26 1.02 1.28 2.42
Mean profit ($, millions) 3.01 1.38 –1.05 –1.83
Median profit ($, millions) 1.17 0.75 –0.98 –1.68
Division IA schools with a profit
Reporting profit 71 75 3 4
Actual profit 38 61 0 0




are not.  The table reports both mean and median profits, because the
distribution of football profits—and to a lesser extent the distributions
of revenues and expenditures—is not a normal or bell-shaped distribu-
tion.  A few schools make sizable profits like Michigan, Ohio State,
and Penn State in the Big Ten.  However, a small army of schools
either barely break even or lose money, like all schools in the MAC.
The mean profits of $3 million for football gives a misleading picture
of the actual profit position of the typical Division IA institution, for
which the median profit is only about $1.2 million.
Even that last number is misleading.  The EADA reports from
which these statistics are derived refer only to operating costs.  Other
costs such as debt service and administrative overhead can easily run in
excess of $1 million.  Thus, actual profits are likely much closer to zero
than reported profits at the typical institution.  For the Michigans and
Ohio States, subtracting even $2 million in omitted costs only slightly
changes the degree to which the football program is lucrative.  For
schools at the median, however, $1 million in increased costs dramati-
cally changes reported profits.
The last rows in Table 2 indicate the number of programs reporting
profits and the programs actually having profits after making adjust-
ments for accounting peculiarities, debt service, and administrative
overhead.  The EADA reports suggest that about 75 percent of the 99
schools with complete reports make a profit in both football and men’s
basketball, and almost none make a profit in other men’s programs or
in women’s programs.  After adjusting the numbers to reflect all costs,
however, the percentages with a profit drops to less than 50 percent in
football, roughly 60 percent in men’s basketball, and 0 percent in either
other men’s sports or in women’s sports.  The implication?  Institutions
that have large sports programs should receive substantial nonfinancial
utility from those programs to make the expenditures worthwhile, or
should at least believe that those programs and their publicity create
additional student applications and a larger or higher-quality student
body.
Table 2 presents a snapshot in time of the distribution of profits at
Division IA football schools.  How have profits changed over time?
Focusing on football and men’s basketball, the only programs with
profits, the growth rate in average profits from 1983 to 1996 has been
about 7.6 percent per year.  This increase appears to be substantial and
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suggests that profits might improve dramatically even at institutions
now currently suffering substantial losses.  Unfortunately, that growth
in profits has been highly uneven both over time and among institu-
tions.  In some years, profits at Division IA football schools have
grown over 20 percent, and in other years they have actually decreased.
In addition, profits at schools like Michigan have increased substan-
tially while losses at MAC schools have shown no sign of abating.
Table 3 shows mean profits by conference as well as the 11 most
profitable football and men’s basketball programs.  The numbers sug-
gest that the best conferences do very well.  The Southeastern Confer-
ence (SEC) and the Big Ten average profits of $8.6 million and $7.4
million, respectively, in football.  In basketball, the Atlantic Coast Con-
ference (ACC) joins them at the top.  Again, it should be clear that
some conferences—and by extension some schools—do very well,
while others are engaged in a continuing financial struggle.  Given the
caveats mentioned already, it would appear that the Big Ten and the
SEC as a whole are in strong shape.  The ACC, Big East, Big 12, and
Pacific–10 Conference (PAC) are generally surviving while the West-
ern Athletic, USA, and Mid-American conferences are struggling to
stay afloat.  Again, I must note that some schools in almost every con-
ference are doing well while others are not.
Table 4 presents profits of the 11 most profitable collegiate football
and men’s basketball programs.  Arguably, the rankings are suspect
because of institutional accounting inconsistencies.   However, the
results suggest certain points.  First, some schools are very financially
successful.  The table includes representatives of the PAC (1), the SEC
(5), the Big Ten (3), the Big 12 (1), and an independent.  You might
argue that Michigan or Notre Dame or Tennessee deserves to be ranked
much higher, and I would not argue with you.  Nevertheless, the point
is that the most profitable football schools generate substantial reve-
nue—even though their overall net revenues from football are rela-
tively small.  Second, looking at the list of most profitable football
schools, one cannot avoid a comparison with the more traditional top
25 rankings; in particular, every school on the list is a regular in the top
25.  Is that an accident?  I sincerely doubt it.  But the numbers—and
the presumed correlation—cannot indicate causation.  That is, does
winning generate profits?  Or does generating profits allow you to keep


















Big Ten 7.39 3.49
Pacific–10 4.78 1.44
Big 12 3.46 1.26
Big East 3.09 0.81
Atlantic Coast 2.49 2.79
Western Atlantic 0.22 0.48





All calculations are based on all Division IA schools providing usable cost and reve-







1 Washington 20.3 Louisville 6.9
2 Florida 19.8 Arkansas 6.1
3 Auburn 16.8 Indiana 5.5
4 Penn State 15.5 North Carolina 5.4
5 Georgia 14.3 Arizona 5.3
6 Michigan 12.1 Kentucky 4.7
7 Alabama 12.1 Ohio State 4.6
8 Notre Dame 11.6 Iowa 4.1
9 Tennessee 11.3 Nebraska 4.1
10 Texas A&M 10.4 Florida State 3.8




All calculations are based on all Division IA schools providing usable cost and reve-
nue data in compliance with the Higher Education Act.  All data are self-reported.
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The numbers in Table 4 also agree with those in Table 1 and show
that football schools do not compete on a level field.  In fact, no school
from a “mid-major” or lower-rated conference appears on either top
ten list.  (One might argue that Louisville’s ranking at the top of the
men’s basketball list is a contradiction.  However, I would also argue
that Louisville’s ranking is likely boosted by institutional accounting
since its EADA report indicates revenues almost $600,000 more than
Kentucky’s, a similar but potentially richer program, and costs less
than 60 percent of Kentucky’s.)  Can a school other than a traditional
power crack the top 10?  The numbers suggest that it is dramatically
easier for an institution like East Carolina or UNLV to break into the
top echelon on the field than it is to break into the top tier in profits.
Let me next briefly address the question of causation.  Does win-
ning generate profits, for example?  The evidence again must be
viewed as suggestive rather than definitive.  Statistical analysis (regres-
sion) of revenues does not indicate any strong relationship.  In particu-
lar, it appears that winning more football games does not increase
revenue but that a higher poll ranking does marginally improve profits.
While that finding may appear contradictory, it should not be entirely
unexpected.  If Western Michigan and Michigan both win one addi-
tional game, will the win work to increase their revenues?  The statisti-
cal answer is probably no.  However, if Michigan is ranked slightly
higher in the polls, will the elevated ranking increase its revenues?  The
statistical answer is likely yes.  (One should also note that winning
more would mean a higher ranking, so there could be a more indirect
relationship between winning and revenues.)  It might not be possible
for Michigan to sell any additional tickets because they generally play
before a full house.  However, the school may become eligible for a
better bowl or receive additional television revenue.
In terms of causation, what may be the most interesting result is
that revenues appear to be largely driven by expenses.  Based on the
results shown in the previous tables, this interaction should come as no
surprise.  However, the question really should be about the magnitude
of the increase in revenues.  That is, if a school increases expenditures
by $1, should it expect to increase revenues by more or less than $1?
The answer to this question varies dramatically by sport.  For other
men’s and women’s sports, a $1 increase in expenditures increases rev-




wants to spend more money on these programs, it should feel free to do
that, but it should not expect to earn its money back in increased reve-
nues.  For football, a $1 increase in expenditures generates approxi-
mately $1 in additional revenue (Sheehan 2000).  The implication?  If a
school wants to keep throwing money at football, on average it will be
no worse off with revenues increasing with expenditures.  Thus, any
incentive to follow this strategy must be based on a desire to win rather
than a desire to make money.
The most interesting case is men’s basketball, for which each $1
increase in expenditures is expected to produce approximately $2 in
additional revenue (Sheehan 2000).  This result may initially appear
surprising, but I contend it is quite consistent with developments in
Division I basketball.  If schools generally observe that basketball
expenditures are profitable, then they should invest in their basketball
programs.  The NCAA has myriad restrictions limiting institutions
from simply dropping buckets of money into any sports program.
However, the NCAA has few restrictions on schools adding basketball
programs.  The result?  Almost 100 institutions have moved to Division
I in basketball, arguably because they are investing in their basketball
programs.
Finally, in terms of causation, one could ask whether schools use
football revenues to subsidize other sports programs?  (I focus on foot-
ball rather than men’s basketball because few schools generate enough
net revenue from basketball to contribute appreciable subsidies to other
sports programs.)  The results suggest that higher net football revenue
is associated with higher expenses in other men’s and women’s pro-
grams.  For each $1 increase in football net revenue, regression results
suggest that other men’s expenditures rise by about $0.10 and women’s
expenditures rise by about $0.20 (Sheehan 2000).  These numbers have
two implications.  First, although the values sound very small, top pro-
grams like Penn State share substantial additional revenues with
women’s sports.  In fact, its football profits of $15.5 million give Penn
State’s women’s sports about $3 million more to spend.  Of course,
there is also a downside.  For a program like Tulane that lost $3.3 mil-
lion on football, women’s expenditures would be predicted to be down
about $0.6 million.  Second, if for each dollar of football net revenue,
$0.10 goes to other men’s sports and $0.20 goes to women’s sports,
where does the other $0.70 go?  The answer, assuming no increase in




















All students 71.1 58.6 36.0 83.6 53.0 0.745
Athletes 67.7 58.6 40.5 76.4 60.7 0.897 0.999
All students
Black/M 45.4 39.3 18.0 65.8 32.2 0.710
White/M 71.4 57.9 34.0 84.8 51.4 0.720
Total/M 69.7 56.1 32.3 82.7 50.3 0.721
Black/F 52.5 48.1 26.0 69.8 38.4 0.731
White/F 74.5 63.0 41.2 88.0 56.4 0.757
Total/F 72.6 61.1 38.6 84.7 55.1 0.759
Athletes
Black/M 49.4 43.2 23.0 67.8 43.0 0.871 1.099
White/M 66.5 57.7 40.2 75.0 59.7 0.897 0.997
Total/M 62.2 53.3 34.4 74.4 56.6 0.910 0.950
Black/F 66.8 62.5 33.0 92.0 60.3 0.902 1.300
White/F 82.0 70.1 52.4 88.0 69.6 0.849 1.112
Total/F 79.4 68.8 51.2 87.0 68.4 0.862 1.125
Football


















administrative overhead, is that it would go back to the general fund of
the institution.  That is, colleges that have football profits are using
those profits to subsidize the academic enterprise.
To this point I have said very little about academics, despite the
title of this paper, which places academics first.  Table 5 presents some
statistics on graduation rates, which, although far from the only mea-
sure of academic performance, are the only readily available measure.
Table 5 presents Big Ten and MAC average graduation rates as well as
the average rates for all Division IA football schools and for the 10th
and 90th percentiles.  The table presents the graduation rates of the
general student body and of athletes by sex and race.  The last column
shows that athletes—even football players—graduate at roughly the
same rate as other students.  In general, this is good news.  (Basketball
players, however, do not graduate at the same rate as the general stu-
dent population.)  Before any congratulations are handed out to foot-
ball players and other athletes, however, a strong word of caution is in
order.  Athletes toil under substantial additional constraints because
they must spend many hours in training or in sometimes intense com-
petition.  Critics of the current grant-in-aid system label their efforts
“work” rather than athletics.  Offsetting this cost, however, are some
substantial benefits.  In particular, athletes’ grants-in-aid allow them to
be full-time students without the distraction—at least until recently—
of working to fund their tuition or board.  In addition, they frequently
have additional academic advantages, such as tutors who are not avail-
able to or are very expensive for a typical student.  Thus, one might ask
whether we should expect athletes to graduate at a higher rate than the
student body in general.
Another frequently expressed concern is that major athletic pro-
grams place more emphasis on winning than studying and thus the
most stress on student-athletes—or perhaps more accurately, on ath-
lete-students.  The results in Table 5, however, suggest that there is no
support for this concern.  If athletic competition were too stressful, we
should expect to see lower graduation rates in the Big Ten than in the
MAC.  But, although the rates are close, Big Ten athletes have gradua-
tion rates that are slightly higher than those in the MAC.  This result
should not be surprising, however, given the results already presented.
The Big Ten has dramatically more financial resources than the MAC.
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To the extent that Big Ten schools value high graduation rates, they
clearly have the ability to provide the resources to achieve that goal.
In summary, what should you conclude based on these statistics?  I
would argue that there are three general conclusions.  First, athletic
success and financial success are intimately related.  Big-time schools
with tradition and reputation may make money with their athletic pro-
grams; others do not.  Furthermore, a “have-not” school has virtually
no chance of changing (unless it cheats, but that is another story).  Sec-
ond, athletic programs generally cross-subsidize within their cam-
puses.  That is, the schools that make money can and do use those
profits to improve nonrevenue sports as well as the institution’s general
academic program.  However, the many schools with losses in their
athletic programs are effectively using revenue generated from the aca-
demic arena to subsidize sports.  There may well be a sound logic for
this subsidy, but academics should insist that it be justified explicitly.
Third, the academic enterprise is relatively insulated from the athletic
enterprise except for what is often a relatively small financial link.
Anecdotal evidence such as stories of the so-called “Flutie effect,” in
which applications double after a stunning athletic event, also link ath-
letics to academics.  However, the statistical evidence of any link is less
than overwhelming.  That should not imply that academics can safely
ignore the athletic enterprise.  It does, however, suggest that the ath-




1. Table 2 excludes institutions not providing complete information: Boise State,
Boston College, Houston, Michigan State, Pittsburgh, Rice, and Syracuse.  In
addition, it excludes the three service academies because they do not award ath-
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The central problem of any professional team sports league is dif-
ferent from that of a typical industry.  On the one hand, the National
Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL),
the National Hockey League (NHL), Major League Baseball (MLB)
and Major League Soccer (MLS) are each monopolies.  On the other
hand, unlike other monopolies, teams within each league compete on





General Motors and Chrysler, the Boston Red Sox would not benefit if
competition drove the New York Yankees out of business.  In fact,
sports leagues need to cooperate in maintaining a certain level of com-
petitive balance among their teams to preserve and enhance fan inter-
est.  That is, teams must be sufficiently equal in ability to ensure that
the outcome of the games and season are in question.  
The problem that professional sports leagues face in the 21st cen-
tury is how to achieve this competitive balance when some teams repre-
sent cities that are eight times larger than the cities of their competitors,
some teams play in state-of-the-art facilities and others do not, and
some teams are owned by individuals or companies who potentially
benefit from significant synergies between the team and their other
businesses.  While competitive balance is a longstanding problem in
professional sports, it has taken on new dimensions since the advent of
free agency in 1976, the introduction of the modern sports facility of the




year), and the growing penetration of the ranks of team ownership by
major media conglomerates.  
Five strategies can be employed to address the problem of compet-
itive balance:  
1) Artificially restrict the growth of player salaries,
2) Introduce or increase revenue sharing among the teams with
each league, 
3) Further skew the reverse order draft of amateur players to favor









5) Compel league divestiture and engender competition. 
The NBA lockout of 1998–1999 is an example of the first strategy,
but the NBA already had a powerful mechanism to promote competi-
tive balance in their league and the owners tried to eliminate it both in
1995 and in 1998.  Thus, as I shall argue, contrary to the basketball
owners’ rhetoric about their concern for financially weak teams, their
lockout was really just a bold attempt to boost profit margins. 
 
BACKGROUND TO THE NBA LOCKOUT
 
In 1983, when free agency in professional sports was not yet a
decade old, NBA Commissioner David Stern convinced NBA players’
union director Larry Fleisher that NBA franchises were financially
fragile and needed a salary cap to be economically viable.  The cap was
defined as 53 percent of defined gross revenues (DGR), which included
only television, radio, and gate revenues.  Both sides, however, agreed
that the 53 percent should not be a hard cap and established certain
exceptions that would allow teams to spend above the cap limit.  
One such exception is called the “Larry Bird exception.”  This
exception allows a team to re-sign one of its own players at any salary,
regardless of whether the team has room under its salary cap to do so.
For example, if the Chicago Bulls had spent $28 million on its first 11
players for 1998–1999 and Michael Jordan had changed his mind and
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decided to come back, even with the 1998–1999 team salary cap at $30





the exception, the Bulls could only pay Jordan the salary left under the
cap, or $2 million.  
Three characteristics of the Bird exception appealed to owners.
First, giving teams an advantage in re-signing their own players meant
that the roster would be more stable, and the owners believed that this
stability would strengthen fan identification with the team.  Second,
together with the reverse-order draft (wherein teams at the bottom of
the standings have earlier picks in the amateur draft each year), the
Bird exception provided a hefty fillip to league competitive balance.
Because the original signing team has a substantial advantage in
re-signing its own free agents, superstar players signed out of college
generally remain with their first team throughout their professional
careers.  In 1997–1998, 7 of the 11 top-paid players in the NBA still
played for their original teams.  Thus, if Michael Jordan had originally
signed with Milwaukee or Utah instead of Chicago, he probably would
have played in those cities throughout his career.  The Bird exception,
then, is a powerful force preventing the rich teams from accumulating
all the best players.  
This observation is reinforced by the weak statistical correlation
between team salaries and team win percentage in the NBA since the
introduction of the salary cap.  Using annual data for 1984–1985
through 1997–1998, the coefficient of determination between these
two variables is between 0.30 and 0.40 in only 2 of the 14 years,
between 0.20 and 0.30 in 5 of the years, between 0.10 and 0.20 in 5





Third, the Bird exception with the salary cap still provides a break
on superstar salaries relative to a more open system of free agency.
This is because most teams will not have enough room under their cap
to bid effectively for a superstar.  The star player, then, generally will
not receive competitive bids for his services and will not necessarily
end up where his marginal revenue product is the highest.  If the Bird
exception was the price the owners had to pay to get the union to agree
to a cap system, then it was a price well worth paying.  
Both sides agreed that the Bird exception was an ingenious and
productive institution for the NBA until the 1995 negotiations, when




aries at $1.44 million and with Simon Gourdine installed as the play-
ers’ union (NBPA) director, the owners saw an opportunity to slow
down salary growth.  Gourdine, oddly enough, had worked as an exec-
utive in the NBA’s central office between 1970 and 1981, the last seven
of those years as deputy commissioner.  Gourdine acceded to major
concessions proposed by Commissioner Stern, only to provoke a
player movement to decertify the union.  Eventually, the players
accepted a deal that gave the owners a three-year rookie salary scale, as
well as new restrictions on free agents, and eliminated a middle-range
salary exception.  The Bird exception was preserved, albeit somewhat
weakened.  The decertification drive had badly divided the players, the
agents, and the union.  When it was all over, the player representatives
to the union voted to oust Gourdine in February 1996.  Several months
later he was replaced by Billy Hunter.  
In spite of these changes, league revenues and player salaries grew
handsomely in the ensuing three years.  With payrolls growing faster,




 rose from 53 per-





  This growth, of course, was acceptable to the players, but they




in the 1995 agreement, salaries were becoming too stratified.  Despite




between 1995–1996 and 1997–1998, the number of players earning the
minimum salary almost doubled to 60 and the number earning less
than $1 million grew to 151.  
The owners’ concerns were different.  Individual salaries were hit-
ting unprecedented peaks, and some young stars who had scarcely
demonstrated their potential value were receiving long-term, mega-sal-
ary contracts.  As a consequence, the players’ salary share was increas-
ing and the owners saw no end to this growth.   Further, the owners
knew that a) the union still had some scars from its bitter internal bat-
tles in 1995; b) the union had a new director who had no direct experi-
ence in collective bargaining; c) growing salary stratification could
further undermine union solidarity; and d) strong, ongoing revenue
growth allowed the owners to offer the players absolute salary growth
even with a decreasing share of the total pie.  The owners again saw an
opportunity to restrain salary growth and they seized it.  On July 1,
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1998, the owners imposed a lockout.  One of the owners’ demands was
that the Bird exception be eliminated. 
 
ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE LOCKOUT
 
The owners claimed that the league had become unprofitable and
that more than half the teams lost money in 1997–1998.  However, the
players were never given detailed team financial statements for 1997–
1998 to allow them to confirm this extravagant claim.  But they did
receive this information for 1996–1997 and previous years.  The union
hired Stanford economist Roger Noll to decode the books.  Based on
Noll’s work, the union concluded that no more than four or five teams
out of 29 actually lost money in 1996–1997.  
To understand the union’s suspicion about ownership accounting
practices, it is instructive to review some collective bargaining history
in the NBA. Following the 1988 collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), which defined DGR as revenues derived from, related to or
arising out of the performance of players in NBA basketball “games,” a





ers divided luxury suite revenue into two parts: the rental payment for
the comfort and convenience of the suite and the ticket price for watch-
ing the game.  The owners claimed that the latter belonged to DGR and
the former did not.  This and similar issues led the players to bring an
arbitration complaint against the owners, which they eventually won in
1992 for a settlement of some $60 million.  
When the 1995 CBA was signed, DGR was changed to BRI and the
players accepted a lower share (48.04 percent) in return for a broader
definition of revenues applicable to the cap.  The 1995 BRI included all
basketball income except naming rights, 60 percent of signage and lux-
ury box revenues, certain property income, and part of related-party
income.  
The 1995 CBA took 11 pages to define BRI, and it was still subject
to regular disputation.  Suppose you are an owner negotiating an arena
lease and are given a choice: pay $2 million in rent and receive 50 per-
cent of a projected $4 million in signage income or pay no rent and




but since the CBA gives 40 percent of signage income to the players,
the owner would do better with the second option of no rent/no sign-
age.  Lease agreements offer manifold opportunities for such juggling,
especially when the arena and team are owned by the same person or
entity.  
Related-party transactions are a central component of the finances
for most teams.  If the owner of the team also owns the arena, the arena
management company, the concessionaire rights, a local TV or radio
station, Web pages, local real estate, law, or consulting firms that do
business with the team, then the owner has tremendous latitude about
where to make his or her profits appear.  Abe Pollin, for example, owns
the new MCI Center in Washington, D.C., where both his NBA and
NHL teams, the Washington Wizards and Capitals, play.  He can retain
arena revenue from naming rights, premium seats, signage, catering,
and theme activities in his arena corporation, thereby reducing the rev-
enues earned by his teams by tens of millions of dollars annually.
Almost half of all NBA team owners also own their facilities while
several others own companies that have management contracts for their
arenas.  
Owners can also pay themselves exorbitant salaries and consulting
fees as well as receive extensive perquisites.  They can choose to capi-
talize their franchises through owner loans rather than paid-in capital
and take their returns in the form of interest income (which shows up
as costs on the team ledgers) rather than profits.  Thus, Wayne Hui-
zenga, owner of the Marlins (until February 1999), Dolphins, Panthers,
Pro Player Stadium, Sports Channel Florida, and arena management
and concessionaire ventures, could rechannel his teams’ revenues to
his other related businesses, making the 1997 world champion Marlins





In leagues where there is a salary cap, such accounting legerde-
main comes in handy to reduce player payrolls.  Where there is no cap,
owners have still preferred to hide profits to reduce revenue-sharing
payments or to argue for larger public stadium subsidies, collective
bargaining concessions or special treatment under the law.  
So, when the NBPA reviewed the teams’ pre-1997 financial
records, it could not discover a basis for the owners’ claims of declin-
ing profits.  The few teams that lost money in 1996–1997 generally did
not have losses in prior years.  Moreover, each of these teams would
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have a new arena to play in within two years.  New arenas usually raise
a team’s revenues by $20–$30 million a year.  Moreover, the NBA had
signed a new four-year television contract with NBC and Turner that
would begin with the 1998–1999 season and increase the average
annual payout per team from a guaranteed $9.5 million to a guaranteed
$22.8 million.  Thus, even if four or five teams had true financial diffi-
culties in 1996–1997, it seemed that new arenas and television money
would wash away their problems.  
The NBPA also wondered why the owners were so alarmed that
player salaries had increased to 57 percent of BRI.  By comparison, the
NFL was using a different, narrower revenue concept and setting its
salary cap at 63 percent of defined revenues.  But the NFL cap also had
loopholes, albeit fewer than the NBA’s, and its salaries frequently rose
to 70 percent of defined revenues.  If the NFL’s defined revenue con-
cept were converted to the NBA’s BRI, the salary share in the NFL
would have hovered around 60 percent in recent years.  In Major
League Baseball (MLB), the comparable player share was also around
60 percent, excluding the additional 12 percent that the teams spend on
their player development systems.  (For the NBA, the latter is an




Furthermore, an NBA team played half the number of games as an
MLB team, had half the number of players for whom it has to pay for
travel, lodging and meals, has fewer coaches, smaller facilities and less
equipment.  Therefore, could not NBA teams still be profitable with
player shares around 60 percent?  
Other facts as well undermine the owners’ claim to dwindling
profits.  The NBA lavishes alluring sums on its coaches and front office
personnel.  In 1997–1998, Commissioner David Stern reportedly
earned $8 million a year, far in excess of his counterparts in the other
sports.  The salaries of head coaches and general managers more than
tripled between 1994–1995 and 1997–1998.  Fourteen head coaches
received over $2.8 million a year, with one coach’s salary reaching up
to $8 million.  In contrast, the three highest paid coaches in the NFL
each earned under $2.5 million a year, although each had won a Super
Bowl.  Asked to comment about the astronomical increases in NBA
coaches’ salaries, David Stern commented to the Web site Sportsline
USA: “If the owners spend all that money on coaches, that means they




Consider what would happen to NBA profitability if the players





 magazine estimated that the average NBA team




  To be conservative,
let us take half of this figure and round down and, thus, assume that
the average profits were only $3 million.  The average team, then,
would have financial results that looked something like this in 1997–
1998: 
Team revenues = $60 million
Player salaries = $34 million
Other costs = $23 million
Profit = $3 million
Now assume, as the NBA did in its projections, that revenues grow
at 12 percent annually.  For player salaries to retain their 57 percent
share, they would also have to grow at 12 percent.   
The owners had long argued to the players that they needed artifi-
cial constraints on salary growth because they were unable to behave
rationally given the pressure they are under from the fans and the
media to sign the best players.  That is, they need protection from
themselves when it comes to player salaries.  Granting the owners this
dubious premise, it certainly cannot also apply to their other expenses.
Costs like plane travel, hotels, arena maintenance, front office person-
nel, and coaching staff should more or less follow the underlying rate
of inflation.  Let us generously assume that the “other costs” category
will grow at 5 percent annually, approximately two times the current
rate of inflation.  Now, consider what would happen to profits under
this scenario.  As the share of player salaries stays the same, the share
of other costs falls rapidly and, hence, the share of profits rises.  As the
share of profits in revenue grows, and revenues grow at 12 percent,
absolute profits exhibit explosive growth.  By the year 2002–2003, the
average team would have these results: 
Team revenues = $105.8 million
Player salaries = $59.9 million
Other costs = $29.3 million
Profits = $16.6 million
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That is, profits would grow more than fivefold over the period; the
annual growth rate of profits would be 40.8 percent! 
Would $16.6 million represent a fair return for a team owner?  On
revenues of $105.8, this is a 15.7 percent return.  This is approximately
three times the average, pretax rate of return on revenues in the leisure-





   Even if we assumed that in 1997–1998 the average NBA team
earned zero profits (instead of $3 million) and other costs were $26
million (instead of $23 million), at the assumed rates of growth, aver-
age team profits in 2002–2003 would be $12.6 million, or 11.9 percent
of revenues. 
It is, of course, theoretically possible that even with such strong
average profits, the distribution of profits might be so unequal as to
leave a handful of teams in financial difficulty.  However, with the new
arenas projected for the bottom teams and the nearly two-and-a-half
fold increase in the national television contract, which is divided
equally among all teams, it is likely that even the financial bottom
dwellers would have acceptable rates of return.
 If some teams had true financial problems, then the players’ asso-
ciation believed that they should have been addressed through addi-
tional revenue sharing among the owners rather than through new
artificial restraints on salaries.   Unlike the NFL or MLB, the NBA
does not share any local revenues.  The NFL teams share net gate reve-




  They also
share permanent seat license and club seat revenue under certain cir-
cumstances.  Baseball introduced a new revenue sharing system in
1996 wherein the top revenue team would be transferring approxi-
mately $18 million to the bottom team in 1999.  Finally, it is important
to recall that a significant part of the return from owning a sports team
may not show up in the profit and loss statement.  Apart from their abil-
ity to manipulate related-party transactions, owners reap substantial tax
sheltering benefits from player amortization schemes.  They also bene-
fit from capital gains, psychic income, ability to aid their other busi-
nesses, political access, and perquisites. 
It is the total economic return that buyers consider when they con-
template owning a sports team.  The definitive measure of this total
economic return is the franchise value, which is determined in the mar-




rises.  And here the numbers speak loudly and clearly: expansion fees
for an NBA franchise were $32.5 million in 1988 and $125 million in
1994.  In November 1998, the New Jersey Nets sold for $150 million.
The Nets were ranked by Forbes as the fourteenth most valuable NBA





  Based on these figures, NBA franchises have increased in
value nearly fivefold over the last ten years.  This would not have hap-
pened if there were not a substantial and growing economic return to
ownership.  
 
ASSESSING THE NEW COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT
 
Some sportswriters, player agents, and even the guru of sports
union leaders, Marvin Miller, have questioned the efficacy of union
leadership during the recent NBA lockout.  While the final 1998–1999
CBA makes some significant concessions from the players’ perspec-
tive, the deal also contains some important gains for the union.  More-
over, both the structure of the deal and the union’s accrued experience
from the process augur well for the next confrontation in 2005–2006.
The critics are right when they argue that Billy Hunter and Patrick
Ewing, the union president, may have made some mistakes.  They are
wrong if they believe that Hunter and Ewing did not do a superlative
job under the circumstances. 
The two significant concessions made by the union were accepting
a near hard cap at 55 percent of defined revenues during years four




 and accepting a limit on individual
player salaries.  Marvin Miller critiqued the deal, asserting that the role
of unions is to set minimum not maximum wages.  Fair enough, but
Miller leaves out the following facts: a) the NBA has had a salary cap,
albeit porous, since 1983; b) the union was coming off a near devastat-
ing bargaining process in 1995 which sharply divided the players and
resulted in greater salary stratification; c) the NBA players had no prior
experience with work stoppages; d) the economic conditions of the
1990s are far different than those that prevailed in baseball when
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Miller’s players’ union cut its teeth; and e) the NBA owners conducted
a very controlled, deliberate, and sophisticated lockout.  
Under the new deal, the salary cap remains at 48.04 percent of
defined revenues, and it remains subject to various exceptions.  These
exceptions will allow team payrolls to go up to 55 percent of defined
revenues without any additional restraint.  If aggregate payrolls go
above this percentage, however, the players will reimburse the owners
dollar for dollar of any overage up to 60.5 percent of revenues.  If pay-
rolls go above this latter level, then the owners whose teams’ payrolls
exceed the 60.5 percent threshold will pay a 100 percent tax on every
dollar of salary above this level.  Thus, there are strong constraints built
into the system to keep player compensation expenses at 55 percent of
defined revenues in net terms, but there is certainly some wiggle room.
The point here is that the current deal has evolved out of the existing
salary cap institution. It was not created out of thin air.   
What is new, even to basketball, is the acceptance of an absolute
limit on individual salaries.  For 1999, the limits are $9 million for
players with less than 7 years of service, $11 million for players with
between 7 and 9 years, and $14 million for players with 10 or more
years.  These limits will rise in step with NBA revenues and no existing
player will be forced to take a cut thanks to a grandfathering provision
that allows any salary to grow by 5 percent over its previous level.  Fur-
ther, these limits apply to the first year of a contract, but contracts for
Bird free agents can extend for seven years and grow at 12 percent of
the base salary per year.  If these limits had been in place during the
last CBA, only three players would have been affected directly.  The
potential problem here is not whether Patrick Ewing makes $20 mil-
lion or $14 million (Ewing forfeited $8 million of his 1998–1999 sal-
ary from the lockout), it is that historically the star players were the
salary trailblazers for the entire league.  
The owners stand to reap some handsome profits from these limita-





under the assumptions in the new profit model, an average owner’s
profits would grow to $18.7 million in 2002–2003 on revenues of
$105.8 million.  Because of the wiggle room in the system, however, it
is likely that some owners will go through the 60.5 percent trigger and




One problem that basketball has had for many years and that was
exacerbated by the 1995 CBA is that the cap system, without sufficient
exceptions for mid-range players, generated a sharp class system
among the players.  Rather than pulling up all salaries, the superstars
were forcing the salaries of most other players downward by occupy-
ing increasing amounts of cap room.  This created not only a problem
of equity but also a problem for union solidarity that did not go unno-
ticed by the owners.  
The new CBA scores appreciable gains for the players in recreat-
ing a middle-range salary scale.  For instance, a new “middle class”
exception was added at $1.75 million for 1999, rising to the league
average salary in 2003.  Teams can sign one player per year to one six-
year contract under this exception, even if the team has reached its 48
percent cap.  Thus, by year six of the deal, some teams may have 6 of
its 12 players paid the league average salary.  The union also scored
significant gains in minimum salaries, which now range from $287,500
to $1 million, depending on years of service, and substantial improve-
ments in player retirement benefits.  
Price regulation always creates strange outcomes.  In the case of
the NBA cap, we are already seeing that some excellent (but not super-
star quality) players have had their salaries shoot up to the maximum.
That is, instead of having, say, a Patrick Ewing at $18 million and a
Latrell Sprewell at $10 million, we might find them both at $14 mil-
lion.  And other players whose salaries are effectively constrained by
the maximum may find that the owners will give them a seven-year
deal at the maximum, instead of what, absent the new limits, might
have been a five-year deal at a few million more per year.  This possi-
bility will be especially beneficial to older veterans.  In other words,
the owners will find a way to pay the players.  
It is apparent that in the short run, a majority of players will either
gain from or be unaffected by this new CBA.  The 55 percent threshold
is essentially the 57 percent the players attained in 1998 without
Michael Jordan’s salary.  This is the key to understanding the union’s
dilemma and the eventual outcome.  
In the early and mid 1970s, when Marvin Miller fashioned the
impressive solidarity and militance among baseball players, the mini-
mum salary in baseball was $16,000 (in 1975) and the average salary
was $44,676 (in 1975).  An average baseball player who sat out a
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whole season in 1975 would then lose less than one-fiftieth of what an
average NBA player in 1998–1999 would lose.  Moreover, the poten-
tial gains in 1975 for the baseball players were astronomical if they
could move from the reserve system to a system of free agency.  
Union director Billy Hunter did not have these advantages in 1998.
Nor did he have the advantage of a union with any history of struggle




 Armen Keteyian, Harvey
Araton, and Martin Dardis said this about the state of union politics in
1994: [Charlie] Grantham (then union director) knew his players were
not about to strike or tolerate being locked out.  Worse still, Hunter
inherited a union that was bitterly divided over a failed decertification
vote in 1995 and highly unequal salary distributions.  
The absence of a history of collective bargaining struggle is not
just the absence of an abstract notion of solidarity.  Collective bargain-
ing involves establishing practices of cohesion and strategic communi-
cation.  Hunter faced strong criticism for being both too authoritarian
and too democratic.  On the owners’ side, democracy was not an issue.
Commissioner David Stern called the shots and spoke for the 29 own-
ers.  Hunter needed to lead, but he could not get too far out in front of
his 400 players.  
In October 1998, Hunter called a meeting for all union members in
Las Vegas.  The issues and positions were exhaustively debated in
small and large groups.  The meetings were open only to players and
union staff, but it was clear within days that David Stern knew what
was discussed and decided upon in Las Vegas.  Indeed, individuals
from the Commissioner’s office have suggested that they had infor-
mants all along and knew about every move the union made.  
Hunter was also accused of being David Falk’s puppet and, some-
times, Arn Tellum’s.  Large parts of the media uncritically regurgitated
these claims.  Yet anyone involved in the process, who spent time in the
union office or knew the deep integrity of Billy Hunter, knew that these
charges were utter nonsense.  To be sure, the willingness of the union
staff initially to discuss and then accept limits on high-end salaries ran
diametrically counter to the interests of the big-time agents.  
On the other hand, Hunter developed a wonderful rapport with the
players and his staff.  He fashioned a strong unity out of division, and
he held the players together for several months of the lockout—itself a




the union wanted, they were a very long way from the owners’ original
demands and even from the owners’ position when they supposedly
made their last offer in late December. What is remarkable about both
the process and the outcome is that under the circumstances Billy
Hunter and the union accomplished as much as they did.  
In the future, the union will have this negotiating experience under
its belt and player salaries will be more compressed because of the
mid-range exemptions.  Both changes augur well for union solidarity
and strength.  Most important, the vast majority of NBA players are
pleased with the present deal and, therefore, with their union experi-
ence.  
The first salary results from the new CBA are already in, and so far
it looks good for the players.  They have increased their share in
defined revenues to approximately 59 percent (on a nonprorated basis),
even without Michael Jordan’s salary, which took up about 2 percent-
age points.   The average player salary jumped to $2.8 million in 1998–
1999.  Moreover, the players clearly have resurrected the middle-salary
range.  On a nonprorated basis, the median player salary rose by more
than 20 percent from $1.4 million to $1.7 million.  In 1998–1999, 13
players signed for the mid-level exception and 20 veteran players
signed for the new veteran minimum salary of $1 million.  All told, in
1998–1999 there were 120 players with salaries between $1 million
and $2 million, compared with only 74 in the category in 1997–1998.
Further, the number of players with salaries below $1 million fell from
151 in 1997–1998 to 101 in 1999, and the number below $500,000 fell




  Of course, the more problem-
atic years four through six of the new CBA (when the escrow tax kicks
in for player shares above 55 percent) are yet to come, but most players






THE NBA DEAL AND THE Y2K PROBLEM
 
Not surprisingly, the NBA’s new salary constraints and strong
profit expectations caught the attention of baseball and hockey owners.
For instance, Carl Pohlad, owner of the Minnesota Twins, praised the
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salary control aspects of the NBA deal and asserted: “We’ve got to





Can we expect to find NBA-type changes in 2002 and 2003 when
the new MLB and NHL deals are negotiated?  More generally, how
does the NBA deal fit into the changing landscape of professional
sports?  
It is by now a cliche to note that the ownership of professional
team sports is changing.  By one estimate, in early 1998, 66 public cor-
porations had direct or indirect ownership interests in sports teams: 31
in MLB, 30 in the NHL, and 20 in the NBA.  A large share of these
public companies are in the media business.   Media-business-owned
teams often have a different objective than other teams; namely, the
team itself is not necessarily viewed as a profit center, but rather as
“software” or programming to promote the larger media empire.  For
example, when FOX decided to pay the 33-year-old Kevin Brown $105
million over seven years beginning with the 1999 season, part of the
expected payoff was that Brown’s stature would help promote the FOX
network in the United States and abroad.  CBS’ gargantuan contract
with the NFL is buying football along with its ratings as well as expo-
sure and status for its other programming.  In the fall of 1998, CBS led
the networks in prime time ratings.  It is the first time CBS has topped
the charts this deep in the season since 1993, which was the last time





Fifteen million dollars a year for a 40-year-old pitcher seven years
into the future is a lot of money and probably would not make sense
viewed from the perspective of a single baseball team.  However,
Rupert Murdoch thinks Brown is worth at least $105 million to his
News Corporation, and he likely is right; but it is questionable whether
Brown would have been worth this much to the Los Angeles Dodgers
baseball team alone.  
In early 1998, the 30 owners of MLB teams were debating whether
to allow Murdoch and his News Corporation to buy the Dodgers.  After
their reported unanimous vote to allow the purchase, I asked one owner
if the baseball community didn’t have some serious reservations about
this sale.  His reply was, “We didn’t have a choice.”  He was referring
to the fact that the FOX regional sports network already had local con-
tracts to televise 24 of baseball’s 30 teams.  But there was another ele-




far the highest purchase price for a team in baseball’s history.   Base-
ball’s owners were happy to have Murdoch push up the value of their
teams, but now when Murdoch also breaks the salary scale, the owners
cry that he is upsetting competitive balance. 
The media-company-as-team-owner phenomenon is just the latest
irritant to the competitive balance mixture in professional team sports.
Owners have long argued that teams from larger cities had an advan-
tage over those from smaller cities; and, especially in the 1990s, teams
with new facilities generating tens of millions of dollars in additional
revenues were seen as having a competitive edge over teams playing in
older facilities.  That is, a team from a large city or with a new facility
or owned by a media conglomerate would be able and willing to outbid
other teams to procure top player talent.  
In theory, this argument always made some economic sense.  In
practice, however, the advantaged teams were not dominating their
leagues (save in baseball during the pre–free agency, predraft era).
Indeed, some even argued that it would have been in the leagues’ best
financial interests if the big city teams did dominate because having
those teams in the playoffs would raise aggregate fan interest along
with television ratings.  
Beginning in the mid 1990s, however, the big-city/new-facility/
media-owned teams in baseball began to monopolize the postseason
landscape.   During the 1998–1999 offseason, many of the other teams
publicly gave up and waived a white handkerchief before the season





, decided that maintaining a payroll in the $25–$45
million range would not allow them to win their divisions.  Therefore,
their profit-maximizing strategy is to minimize their payrolls to $10–
$15 million.  Pohlad now follows the ignominious example of his fel-
low owner Wayne Huizenga.  Each attempted to punish his fans for not






While the revenue disparity between the richest and poorest base-
ball team was around $30 million in 1989, by 1998 it was close to $120
million.  To this volatility, add the presence of new franchise owners
who also own international communications networks and who value
their ballplayers not only by what they do on the field but what they do
for their networks.  Further, baseball’s expansion by four teams in the
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1990s, while adding excitement to the game, diluted the talent pool and
made the star players stand out more and, thereby, made it easier to buy
a winning team.  
Baseball tried to address these inequalities in the last collective
bargaining agreement.  However, it is now clear that the agreement’s
plan to share revenue among the teams (wherein in 1999 the top team
with revenues around $200 million would transfer approximately $18
million to the bottom team with revenues around $40 million) and the
luxury payroll tax (wherein the top five payroll teams in 1999 would
pay a 34 percent tax on that portion of team salaries above approxi-
mately $76 million) did not go nearly far enough toward leveling the
imbalances.  
Consider these statistics.  In 1998, of the 8 teams that made the
playoffs, all were among the top 12 teams in payroll.  Further, of these
top 12 teams, all had winning percentages above 0.500, save the Balti-
more Orioles who finished at 0.488.  Of the bottom 18 teams in pay-
roll, only 2 teams finished above 0.500.  Of the bottom ten teams in
payroll, none finished above 0.475.  Put differently, in 1998 no team
made the playoffs without spending at least $47 million on payroll, and
no team spending less than $38 million had a winning record.  
Some of these results, no doubt, are from poor management or
owner machinations.  But others have to do with the underlying institu-
tions and incentives of ownership in Major League Baseball.  
With varying degrees of success, the NFL, the NHL, and the NBA
have avoided the pitfall of advantaged-team domination.  The NFL for-
mula is simple: extensive revenue sharing among the owners, reverse
order draft, unbalanced schedule, prohibition against corporate owner-
ship, and a fungible salary cap set at 63 percent of league-defined gross
revenues.  The NHL formula entails curtailing unrestricted free agency
until a player reaches 31 years of age, limitations on player sales, and a
reverse order draft.  The NBA, as we have seen, albeit dominated in
recent years by the big-city Chicago Bulls, owes the strength of many
of its small-city teams, such as the Utah Jazz, to the Larry Bird excep-
tion to its salary cap.
If and when competitive balance problems manifest themselves in
other sports, as they appear to be doing now in baseball, affected
leagues would do well to study the NFL example of revenue sharing.




(an average of $2.2 billion a year over the next eight years) and
national licensing, splitting the net gate 60/40, as well as sharing other
revenue sources, the NFL has attained unprecedented balance.  Though
arguably the NFL’s system should be modified because the league
offers owners little or no profit incentive to win.  
The NBA response to revenue inequality among its teams has been
to attempt to lower the player share in league revenue and to turn the
soft cap into a hard cap.  That is, the NBA has made the players bear
the burden of revenue inequality among the owners.  Baseball owners
attempted a similar solution in 1994–1995.  In both cases the outcome
was predictable—a lengthy work stoppage.  At the very least, the bur-
den of dealing with inequalities needs to be shared.  Players should
accept some additional restraints, but owners need to do additional rev-
enue sharing.  Further, to guard against free riding, teams should be
required to meet certain payroll standards (e.g., 80 percent of average
league payroll) to qualify as a beneficiary of revenue sharing.  
In January 1999, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig, seemingly
inspired by the new NBA and the lofty contract for Kevin Brown,
formed a committee to study the issue of competitive balance in base-
ball.  Selig appointed several luminaries to the committee, including
former Federal Reserve head Paul Volcker and former U.S. Senator
George Mitchell, along with several owners.  Although some technical
questions exist within the issue of competitive balance, the more
important and less tractable problems are political.  Without union rep-
resentatives, Selig’s committee risks generating solutions that appeal to
only one side. 
 In 1994, the baseball owners, after studying competitive balance,
convinced themselves that a salary cap was needed, but they never con-
vinced the players.  The result was a strike and no World Series that
year.  Even if baseball owners eventually decide that the solution is
more revenue sharing among themselves rather than new artificial con-
straints on salaries, the nature of the sharing is something that the
union must ratify.  
Of course, it is far from simple to convince advantaged owners to
increase revenue sharing by voluntarily taxing themselves.  These own-
ers would argue that they paid more for their advantaged franchise and
that additional taxation amounts to a form of asset confiscation.  How-
ever, unbalanced competition and work stoppages will also lower the
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value of their asset—and possibly by more than additional revenue
sharing.  
It is a stretch to think that the new NBA deal is easily transferable
to baseball or hockey, which have never operated with a salary cap.
Indeed, both the NFL and NBA caps were around in 1994–1995 during




  The MLB and NHL
owners were emboldened, but so were the players.  
If owners and players are unable to resolve the problem of compet-
itive balance on their own, then it will be up to Washington politicians
to awaken from their long-standing sports slumber.  The natural eco-
nomic solution for professional sports is competition.  With two
leagues in each sport, monopoly teams in big cities will soon find
another team from the competing league in their territory.   The artifi-
cial shortage of teams will evaporate and deserving cities will no
longer have to compete against each other through public subsidies to
get teams.  This will erode the competitive imbalance problems from
new facilities and larger cities.  
 The public policy solution is straightforward: pass legislation that




1. In reality, teams in these leagues both cooperate and compete as businesses, but it
is their cooperation in certain areas that distinguishes them from other businesses. 
2. For instance, in a league with 30 teams, the first 15 picks could be given to the
bottom 15 clubs in reverse order to finish in the previous season.  The next 15
picks could go to the 15 clubs with the lowest revenue or rent (potential revenue
from site).  The third 15 picks could go to the top 15 clubs in reverse order of their
finish, etc.  “Rent” refers to potential revenue given the characteristics of the city
and site.  Internationalizing the draft along with our rule changes would also ben-
efit competitive balance.
3. Although this strategy has been employed in all leagues (though not in baseball
since 1972), the NFL experience shows it can be problematic.  In particular, it can
create political problems in the abandoned city and eventually force the league to
add an expansion team in order to restore a team to the city.  Should this occur, the
league loses some control over its output and, hence, some of its monopoly power. 
4. Actually, under the new agreement Jordan’s salary could not increase by more
than 5 percent.  Because his salary last year was $33 million, the Bulls could have
paid Jordan $34.65 million in 1998–1999 (prorated for the number of games
played in the shortened season). 
 
112 Zimbalist
5. The correlation is even weaker when team salary was lagged a year and when
MSA population was controlled.  Quirk and Fort (1999) present rank correlation
statistics that show this relationship is stronger in the NBA than the other leagues
in the 1990s.  It is likely that this tighter correlation in the NBA can be explained
entirely by the Bulls’ exceptional success and high payroll due to the presence of
Michael Jordan.  
6. See definition in text, p. 97.
7. Data from the NBPA.
8. The middle-salary exception allows for a team to pay a player a mid-range salary
even if it puts the team over the top.
9. The average salary in 1997–1998 is sometimes represented as $2.6 million.  The
$2.6 million figure includes only full-time roster players.  The $2.4 million
includes all players under contract. 
10. The author served as a consultant to NBPA during 1998–1999.
11. See my elaboration of this point in “A Miami Fish Story,” 
 
The New York Times
Magazine
 
, October 18, 1998.
12. Since it does not have a minor league system, the NBA’s player development
expenses principally consist of scouting and come to no more than 1 or 2 percent
of the average team’s expenses.  On the economics of college basketball, see Zim-
balist (1999).
13. This estimate was performed by Michael Ozanian, who had done similar esti-
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, various issues. 
15. The actual system in football is to share the gate 60/40 after the home team has
deducted 15 percent of the gross gate for theoretical stadium costs.  Thus, the
actual distribution of the gross is roughly 66/34. 




, December 14, 1998, p. 127. 
17. Year seven of the deal is at the owners’ option.  If they exercise the option, the 55
percent threshold rises to 57 percent in the seventh year. 
18. The agreement actually calls for the introduction of a new revenue concept, Core
Basketball Revenues or CBR.  CBR will consist of gate receipts, all broadcasting
revenue, luxury suite receipts, NBA properties revenue and certain other revenue
to be determined.  CBR will come into effect in the 1999–2000 season, and the
BRI percentages will all be converted to a CBR basis. 
19. For 1998–1999 the maximum player salary only affected two veteran players, Rik
Smits in the senior category and Jayson Williams in the middle category (7–9
years of service).  Ten players in the junior category, however, were affected with
an average salary of around $12 million in the group over the lives of their con-
tracts.  These players were Shareef Abdur-Rahim, Ray Allen, Kobe Bryant,
Zydrunas Ilgauskus, Allen Iverson, Stephon Marbury, Antonio McDyess, Arvydas
Sabonis, Damon Stoudamire, and Antoine Walker. 
20. Data are preliminary from National Basketball Players’ Association. 
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, February 11, 1999. 
22. I do not mean to suggest that the only cause of CBS’ rating rise was its NFL con-
tract, only that it helped.  To be sure, it could not have hurt CBS when the Seinfeld
show went off NBC after the 1997–1998 season. 
23. A kind of reverse strategy was employed by the Seattle Mariners in 1997 and the
San Diego Padres in 1998.  In order to arouse public support for new stadiums,
these teams fielded championship teams, only to dismantle them after their refer-
enda for publicly funded new facilities had passed. 
24. To be sure, it is likely that the NFL constraints on the salaries of franchise players
are more severe than the $14 million cap (in 1998–1999) on veteran free agents in
the NBA.  Each NFL team can designate a franchise player.  The services of this
player can be automatically retained by the team if the player is offered compen-
sation at the average of the top five paid players at his position in the NFL or 120
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A Level Playing Field?  






Economists and the public at large have become increasingly inter-
ested in the issue of discrimination in sports.  The public perceives that
to some degree the sports business is an oasis of equal economic
opportunity for minorities, who in this setting are judged and compen-
sated solely on the basis of their performance.  This impression is
underscored by the high level of minority representation in our major
team sports.  As of the mid 1990s, Major League Baseball (MBL) was
about 30 percent black, the National Football League (NFL) was 65
percent black, and black players made up 80 percent of the National
Basketball Association’s (NBA’s) ranks (Staudohar 1996).  Further,
some of the highest paid athletes are black: some multiyear NBA con-
tracts for black players top $100 million; in baseball, a majority of the
players who made at least $8 million in 1998 were black, despite the
30 percent black representation in the MLB; and in the NFL, while
most of the highest paid players in 1997 were quarterbacks (a dispro-
portionately white position, as I will discuss later), there were many
prominent, highly paid black players as well.
Despite this evidence of economic achievement, there is an omi-
nous undercurrent in the treatment of black professional athletes.  Until
the 1940s, of course, black players were excluded from professional
team sports.  And while African Americans are well-represented as
players in the 1990s, they are much less likely to be coaches, manag-
ers, or executives for sports teams.  Anecdotal accounts of team sports
identify many instances in which African-American players perceived
quotas against them, even in basketball, which as noted, is overwhelm-




team executive claimed that black athletes did not have the qualities
necessary to become managers or executives, and in 1988 a well-
known broadcaster was fired for making racist comments (Staudohar
1996).  Several players in the 1998 NBA lockout viewed the league’s
hostility as racially based (Samuels 1998).   And golf and tennis, after
years of being almost completely white sports at the professional level,
still have few black players on tour.  In many instances, tournaments in
these sports have been played at clubs that do not accept African Amer-
icans as members.
Public attention focuses on issues of race and sports in part
because of the celebrity of the players involved.  Moreover, the history
of racial integration in sports, beginning with the hiring of Jackie Rob-
inson by the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947 and soon continuing in football
and basketball leagues has been an especially dramatic story.  The pro-
cess of racial integration in sports assumed national importance
because it took place against the background of African Americans’
struggle in the 1950s and 1960s for civil rights. 
In this talk, I survey evidence economists have gathered on the
extent of discrimination in sports.  As I will show, discrimination can
take on several forms, each of which has been the subject of economic
research.  Although the anecdotal evidence mentioned earlier is sug-
gestive of the mistreatment of black players, we need to know what the
anecdotes add up to.  Are they isolated incidents, or are they symptom-
atic of general patterns and trends in professional sports?  These ques-
tions can only be answered by studies that use statistical evidence.  In
this vein, I will talk about economic research on discrimination in
sports with respect to salaries, hiring, retention, positional segregation,
and customer prejudice.
 
ECONOMIC ISSUES IN ANALYZING DISCRIMINATION 
IN SPORTS
 
Before discussing evidence on discrimination in sports, it will be
useful to make clear what I mean by “discrimination” and what eco-
nomics has to say in general about the issue.   Beginning with the sem-
inal contribution of Gary Becker (1957), economists have usually
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defined labor market discrimination as the unequal treatment of
equally qualified workers. Becker (1957) identified three forms of dis-
crimination: employer, co-worker, and customer.  As we will see, each
of these forms has occurred in the sports business.  
In the Becker model under competition, assuming profit-maximi-
zation by at least one firm and constant returns to scale, we expect
entry and exit to eliminate employer and co-worker discrimination.
Discriminating employers will be driven out of business by the nondis-
criminator(s).  As analyzed in Chapter 4 of Becker (1957), if there is
co-worker discrimination, then in equilibrium we expect equally com-
petitive segregated firms with equal pay for equal work.  However, cus-
tomer discrimination is different in that an employer who pays more
money to workers whom customers prefer to deal with is likely to be
rewarded by the market relative to one who does not make such dis-
tinctions.  While workers not preferred by customers may be able to
find work in the noncustomer sector, in a general equilibrium context,
there is no guarantee that their incomes will not be hurt by the exist-
ence of customer discrimination (Kahn 1991a).  And if these nonpre-
ferred workers have a comparative advantage in the customer sector,
then they may still choose to stay there even if they face the effects of
customer discrimination. 
These features of the economics of customer discrimination sug-
gest that competitive forces are less likely by themselves to eliminate
this form of discrimination than discrimination based on employer or
co-worker prejudice.  The sports industry is perhaps the most promi-
nent example of a customer-based service sector.  Further, because
sports leagues are monopolies, they may not face the kind of free entry
that might serve to discipline discriminating employers.  Thus, we
expect that the economic forces tending to eliminate discrimination in
sports are perhaps weaker than in other industries.  
A common difficulty labor economists have faced in testing for the
existence of labor market discrimination is suggested by the definition
I just explained.  Namely, while it may be easy in many cases to tell
who is paid more money, discerning if there is unequal pay for equally
qualified workers can be a major problem.   This difficulty has affected
discrimination research on the labor force at large because databases
such as those from the census can only tell us how many years of




what crude measures of where he/she works.  For example, based on
the census, the “productivity” of a 25-year-old minor league hockey
player who played two years of college hockey is indistinguishable
from that of a 25-year-old NBA star such as Magic Johnson, who
turned pro after his sophomore year, and who in 1984 had already been
the NBA finals’ most valuable player (MVP) in 1980 and 1982.  Is any
pay gap between these two individuals evidence of unequal pay for
equal work?  In contrast to the census, in sports we have excellent con-





.   The sports industry provides us with an excellent
opportunity to study discrimination because data on player race, com-
pensation, and performance are so readily available. 
 
EVIDENCE ON DISCRIMINATION IN SPORTS
 
In the early days of baseball integration, there was considerable evi-
dence to support Becker’s (1957) notions of employer, customer, and
co-worker discrimination.  First, employers discriminate if they treat
the output of, for example, black workers, as less valuable than the
identical output of white workers.  If all employers have the same tastes
for discrimination, then a common “discrimination coefficient” that
describes this discount in dollar terms for the pay of black workers will
result.  A nondiscriminating employer can earn more money than a dis-
criminator by hiring the most productive workers at the lowest cost pos-
sible, regardless of race, an opportunity that discriminators forgo.  This
prediction has been tested in the context of MLB’s integration.  Specif-
ically, some teams, particularly those in the National League in the late
1940s and 1950s, were more active in bringing black players onto their
rosters than were teams in the American League (Gwartney and
Haworth 1974; Hanssen 1998).  Teams that were more willing to use
black players had significantly more success on the playing field than
those that were not, an outcome predicted by Becker’s (1957) model.
Second, there was some evidence of co-worker prejudice in the
early days of baseball integration when the St. Louis Cardinals threat-




Further, at least one Dodger player asked for a trade rather than play
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alongside Robinson, illustrating the tendency toward segregation, as
predicted by Becker (1957).   Third, there were many instances of cus-
tomer prejudice, including death threats against Robinson in his early
years with the Dodgers.
The labor market manifestation of these forms of discrimination
can include salary discrimination (unequal pay for equal work), hiring
discrimination, retention discrimination, and positional segregation.  A





  Salary discrimination is probably the most studied







































 is a vector of performance indica-
tors, team characteristics, and market characteristics, WHITE is a




 is an error term.
This setup is similar to much work in labor economics that attempts to









  What differs about sports is both the accuracy of the com-
pensation data (that may in many cases come directly from the relevant
players’ union, which keeps copies of the actual player contracts) and
the very detailed set of performance indicators available on athletes.  
A major difficulty in conducting labor market research on discrim-
ination using models like Eq. 1 is that WHITE may be correlated with





so, then its estimated coefficient will be biased.  In sports, we have
much better controls than in labor market data in general.  For exam-
ple, a widely used data source such as the Michigan Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) allows one to control for years of schooling,
type of degree, length of labor market experience, firm seniority, union





 and other baseball data sources
allow one to control for batting average, stolen bases, home runs,
career length, team success, and a variety of other performance indica-
tors.  In addition, “occupation” in baseball is one’s position, a far more




by the PSID.  All players at the major or minor league level in all sports
would get the same three-digit occupation (“athletes”) and industry
(“entertainment and recreation services”) in the census classification.
Because of far better controls for individual performance, occupation,









, is much less severe in sports than in more general labor
market data bases.
Analyses of equations like Eq. 1 have produced the most evidence
of salary discrimination in professional basketball.  In the mid 1980s,
controlling for various performance and market-related statistics, there
were statistically significant black salary shortfalls of 11–25 percent,




  The apparent discrimination
was especially noteworthy because, as Table 1 shows, for the 1985–
1986 season, black players on average earned $407,000, while whites
earned $397,000.  However, Table 1 also shows that black players out-
did whites in major performance categories such as playing time, scor-
ing, and rebounding.  In fact, using a regression like Eq. 1, which
controlled for performance and market-related variables, Kahn and




 WHITE effect to be 21–25 per-
cent, and this was highly statistically significant.  This combination of
results shows how important it can be to control for productivity, which
 
Table 1 Pay and Career Performance in the NBA
 
Year Black players White players
1985–1986










SOURCE: Kahn and Sherer (1988); Hamilton (1997).
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in this case was higher for black players, in assessing the extent of dis-





 white salary advantage, reverse regres-
sion tests (which can under some restricted circumstances take account
of such problems [Goldberger 1984]), showed even larger apparent
discrimination coefficients (Kahn and Sherer 1988).   
By the mid 1990s, there was evidence of unexplained black salary
shortfalls only among the elite players in the NBA.  Table 1 shows that,
overall, blacks in 1994–1995 now outearned whites by about $240,000
and continued to outperform whites.  Hamilton (1997) found for the
1994–1995 season that, all else equal, there were no overall significant
racial salary differentials in the NBA.  The point estimate in an ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) regression like Eq. 1 was 0.010 for WHITE




  However, Table 2 shows that salary
differentials were not uniform across the distribution.  In particular,
black players outearned whites through the 75th percentile, while
among players near the top (the 90th percentile), whites were paid a
slight $16,000 more than blacks.  White stars did better relative to
black stars than whites did among the journeymen.  To examine the
question of unequal pay for equal performance across the distribution































































 are quantile regression coefficients.  In
 
Table 2 Black and White NBA Salaries by Distribution Percentile, 
1994–1995 ($)
 
















 tells us the WHITE log salary advantage for players at
the 90th percentile of the conditional distribution of log salary.   
Regressions such as Eq. 2 can be run for any distribution quantile,
and the associated WHITE coefficients provide estimates of the unex-
plained salary premia for white players across the distribution.  When
Hamilton (1997) estimated models like Eq. 2, he found no significant
racial salary differentials at the 10th, 25th, and 50th percentiles but
positive and significant WHITE pay effects (at the 5.6 percent and 12
percent levels in two-tailed tests) at the 75th and 90th percentiles




  These results suggest that while
there was no significant unexplained black salary shortfall on average
in the NBA in the 1994–1995 season, for star or near-star players (i.e.,
those at the 75th percentile and above in the conditional wage distribu-
tion), there may have been substantial discrimination in favor of
whites.  Again, the importance of controlling for performance is under-
scored because these white salary advantages are not apparent in Table
2, which, of course, does not control for performance.





, in the NBA, similar OLS analyses of salaries in baseball and foot-
ball have not found much evidence of racial salary discrimination
against minorities.  For example, in baseball, these analyses never find
that being white has a positive effect.  Among nonpitchers, in fact, sig-
nificantly negative effects of being white were found in 1977 and 1987
(Christiano 1986 and 1988) and during the 1985–1991 period (Irani
1996).  On the other hand, Kahn’s (1993) analysis of 1987 data, using
the same wage sample as Christiano (1988), found that these negative
effects of being white disappeared when a longer list of productivity





 salary premia discrimination coefficients in favor of whites of
only 1–4 percent, and these were usually not statistically significant.
Kahn (1992) did find, however, that in the NFL, nonwhite players did
better in areas with a larger relative nonwhite population than with a
small relative nonwhite population; and whites did better in more white
metropolitan areas.  These findings suggest the influence of customers,
but they did not add up to large overall racial salary differences in the
NFL.
It is perhaps noteworthy that the one sport with the most evidence
of racial salary discrimination, basketball, was the sport with the larg-
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est black representation as of the mid 1990s at 80 percent, in contrast




   These differences
in racial representation suggest that customer preferences may have
something to do with the racial pay gap we observed in basketball.
And there is indeed evidence from the 1980s consistent with the exist-
ence of such preferences. For example, Kahn and Sherer (1988) found
that, all else equal, during the 1980–1986 period each white player
generated 5,700 to 13,000 additional fans per year.  The dollar value of




And other researchers found a close match between the racial makeup
of NBA teams in the 1980s and the areas where they were located,
again suggesting the importance of customer preferences (Brown,
Spiro, and Keenan 1991; Burdekin and Idson 1991; Hoang and
Rascher 1999).  
However, by the 1990s, customer preferences for white players
were less evident.  Dey (1997), for example, found that, all else equal,
white players added a statistically insignificant and economically rela-
tively unimportant 60 fans apiece per season during the 1987–1993
period.  This evidence is consistent with the decline in the NBA’s over-
all, unexplained white salary premium from the 1980s to the 1990s,
although Hamilton’s (1997) finding for whites near the top of the dis-
tribution still suggests fan preferences for big name white players.  It is
possible that white stars add fans even if the average white player does
not.
Customer discrimination has also been found for baseball.  For
example, Hanssen (1998) found that white players added baseball fans,
all else equal, for the 1954–1972 period, and Irani (1996) obtained a
similar finding in baseball for 1972–1991.  Moreover, Nardinelli and
Simon (1990) found that, controlling for performance, in 1989, base-
ball cards for white players sold at a significantly higher price than
those of black players, providing further evidence of fan prejudice.
The lack of a white salary premium in baseball in the face of these cus-
tomer preferences remains a puzzle.  Perhaps the positional segrega-
tion and apparent retention discrimination in baseball (see the
following paragraphs) are the ways in which such preferences affect
the baseball labor market.
Other possible types of racial discrimination in sports involve hir-




unequal probabilities of being drafted or retained, as well as positional
segregation.  First, regarding the draft, Kahn and Sherer (1988) found
that there were small, insignificant racial differences actually favoring
black players in draft order among NBA players on rosters in 1985,
conditional on college performance.  This suggested the absence of hir-
ing discrimination in the NBA, but we had no information on those not
drafted or not on rosters.  In the NFL, Conlin and Emerson (1998)
found indirect evidence that black players were drafted later than
whites of equal playing ability during the 1986–1991 period.  Again,
without information on those not drafted or not making the roster, we
have incomplete evidence on hiring discrimination.  But Conlin and
Emerson’s (1998) results suggest barriers to black players in the NFL.
Second, regarding retention, Jiobu (1988) found that from 1971 to
1985 in Major League Baseball, black players had a significantly
higher exit rate than whites, controlling for performance, position, and
age at entry.  Because baseball is likely to be virtually all major league
players’ best career opportunity, a reasonable interpretation of these
exit hazard differences is that they reflect team decisions not to offer
players a new contract.  And Hoang and Rascher (1999) found a simi-
lar result for the NBA: Other things equal, during the 1980–1991
period, white players had about two additional years of career length
(36 percent) than black players, again suggesting retention discrimina-
tion.  Whether this disparity will hold up in the 1990s or whether, like
the overall effects of race on attendance and NBA salaries, it will dwin-
dle, is an interesting question for future researchers.
Third, positional segregation by race has been noted in baseball
and football.  Christiano (1988), for example, found that black baseball
players in 1987 were overrepresented in the outfield and underrepre-
sented at infield and catcher.  Kahn (1992) found that in the NFL in
1989, nonwhite players were overrepresented at running back, wide
receiver, and defensive back and underrepresented at quarterback,
kicker, punter and offensive line (see Figure 1).  Whether this segrega-
tion represents current discrimination, past discrimination by high
school or college coaches, or self-selection is an open question, and
there is lively but inconclusive debate about these issues (Kahn 1991b).
Regardless of the cause of segregation, it appears to have some modest
consequences toward a slight salary gap favoring white football play-




Figure 1 Percent Nonwhite by Position, NFL 1989
 




is greater than it is for most of the NFL positions (the three positions
where whites outearn blacks account for only 33 percent of the league).
In fact, if nonwhites had the white representation at each position but
kept their own position-specific salary levels, then they would outearn
whites by an average of about $88,000.  With their actual positional
representation, nonwhites earned $13,000 less than whites.  In base-
ball, segregation has future consequences to the extent that managers
are drawn from the middle infield positions, which have been dispro-






On the surface, it looks as though professional sports have come a
long way since the 1940s when black players were banned from partic-
ipating.  As of the 1990s, African Americans are much more than pro-
 
Table 3 White/Nonwhite Salary Ratio by Position, NFL 1989
 
Position






Offensive line 24.5 1.07
Defensive line 61.8 1.04
Tight end 47.3 0.99
Placekicker 14.3 0.96
Defensive back 91.6 0.94
Linebacker 64.0 0.91
Running back 91.0 0.69




SOURCE: Data from Kahn (1992).
 
The Economics of Sports 127
 
portionately represented at the major league level and earn on average
millions of dollars in baseball and basketball.  Further, pure salary dis-
crimination, which may have been extensive in the 1980s in the NBA,
appears to have declined by the 1990s and may currently be limited to
white stars; and there is no evidence of salary discrimination in base-
ball and little in football.  On the basis of these facts, one is tempted to
conclude that discrimination in sports is a nonproblem.
Yet there is evidence that fans have or have had racial preferences
in basketball, football, and baseball.  Do these preferences have any
consequences, as predicted by the economic theory of discrimination?
The answer is that while overt salary discrimination is not a major out-
come of these preferences (other than for the NBA in the 1980s or
white NBA stars in the 1990s), there is some evidence that reflects hir-
ing discrimination, positional segregation, and retention discrimina-
tion.   With customer preferences continuing in many instances for
white players and with evidence for these alternative forms of discrim-
ination, professional sports and society at large have some distance to




1. This discussion of race and baseball is based on Okrent and Wulf (1989) and
Tygiel (1983).
2. For a survey of this evidence through the 1980s, see Kahn (1991b).
3. In some instances, researchers have used separate regressions for white and non-
white players, reflecting or testing the possibility that performance is rewarded
differently by race.
4. See for example, Kahn and Sherer (1988), Koch and Vander Hill (1988), Wallace
(1988), and Brown, Spiro, and Keenan (1991).









 racial salary differentials.  See Dey (1997) and Bodvarsson and Brastow
(1998).
6. The WHITE results for the lower percentiles were –0.184 (asymptotic standard
error 0.291) for the 10th percentile, –0.209 (0.183) for the 25th percentile, and
–0.005 (0.152) for the 50th percentile.
7. These figures were very similar in the 1980s as well.  See Staudohar (1996).
8. Hoang and Rascher (1999) also examined NBA attendance during the 1980–1991
period and found that, other things equal, larger values of (percent white on the
team/percent white in the city) were significantly positively associated with atten-




9. A lively literature has developed on the issue of discrimination against French
Canadians in the National Hockey League.  Some authors have found apparent
discrimination against this group in Canadian cities outside Quebec province, a
pattern consistent with the notion of customer discrimination (Jones and Walsh
1988; Longley 1995).  Yet others have disputed this interpretation and the findings
as well (Krashinsky and Krashinsky 1997).  There is also a debate over whether
French Canadians face entry barriers into the NHL, with some authors alleging
that French Canadians need to have a higher performance level to be drafted as




Becker, Gary S.  1957.  
 
The Economics of Discrimination
 
.  Chicago, Illinois:
University of Chicago Press.
Bodvarsson, Örn, and Raymond T. Brastow.  1998.  “Do Employers Pay for





Bradley, Bill.  1976.  
 
Life on the Run
 
.  New York: Quadrangle/New York
Times Book Co.
Brown, Eleanor, Richard Spiro, and Diane Keenan.  1991.  “Wage and Non-
wage Discrimination in Professional Basketball: Do Fans Affect It?”
 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology
 
 50(3): 333–345.
Burdekin, Richard C.K., and Todd L. Idson.  1991.  “Customer Preferences,




 23(1, Part B): 179–186.
Christiano, Kevin J.  1986.  “Salary Discrimination in Major League Baseball:
The Effect of Race.”  
 
Sociology of Sport Journal
 
 3(2): 144–153.
Christiano, Kevin J.  1988.  “Salaries and Race in Professional Baseball: Dis-
crimination 10 Years Later.”  
 
Sociology of Sport Journal
 
 5(2): 136–149.
Conlin, Mike, and Patrick M. Emerson.  1998.  
 
Racial Discrimination and
Organizational Form: A Study of the National Football League
 
.  Working
paper, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
Dey, Matthew S.  1997.  “Racial Differences in National Basketball Associa-






Goldberger, Arthur S.  1984.  “Reverse Regression and Salary Discrimina-
tion.”  
 




The Economics of Sports 129
 
Gwartney, James, and Charles Haworth.  1974.  “Employer Costs and Dis-
crimination: The Case of Baseball.” 
 




Halberstam, David.  1981.  
 
The Breaks of the Game
 
.  New York: Alfred A.
Knopf.
Hamilton, Barton Hughes.  1997.  “Racial Discrimination and Professional











Hoang, Ha, and Dan Rascher.  1999.  “The NBA, Exit Discrimination, and





Irani, Daraius.  1996.  “Estimating Customer Discrimination in Baseball
Using Panel Data.”  In 
 
Baseball Economics: Current Research
 
, John Fizel,
Elizabeth Gustafson, and Lawrence Hadley, eds.  Westport, Connecticut:
Praeger, pp. 47–61.
Jiobu, Robert M.  1988.  “Racial Inequality in a Public Arena: The Case of





Jones, J.C.H., and William D. Walsh.  1988.  “Salary Determination in the
National Hockey League: The Effects of Skills, Franchise Characteristics,
and Discrimination.”  
 










______.  1991b.  “Discrimination in Professional Sports: A Survey of the Lit-
erature.”  
 
Industrial & Labor Relations Review
 
 44(3): 395–418.
______.  1992.  “The Effects of Race on Professional Football Players’ Com-
pensation.”  
 
Industrial & Labor Relations Review
 
 45(2) 295–310.
______.  1993.  “Managerial Quality, Team Success and Individual Player
Performance in Major League Baseball.” 
 




Kahn, Lawrence M., and Peter D. Sherer.  1988.  “Racial Differences in Pro-
fessional Basketball Players’ Compensation.” 
 
Journal of Labor Economics
 
6(1): 40–61.
Koch, James V., and C. Warren Vander Hill.  1988.  “Is There Discrimination





Krashinsky, Michael, and Harry A. Krashinsky.  1997.  “Do English Canadian
Hockey Teams Discriminate against French Canadian Players?” 
 
Canadian
Public Policy–Analyse de Politiques
 
 23(2): 212–216.
Lavoie, Marc, Gilles Grenier, and Serge Coulombe.  1992.  “Performance Dif-










Longley, Neil.  1995.  “Salary Discrimination in the National Hockey League:
The Effects of Team Location.”  
 




Nardinelli, Clark, and Curtis Simon.  1990.  “Customer Racial Discrimination















.  1990.  Eighth edition, New York: Macmillan.









 Web site www.newsweek.com.
Scully, Gerald W.  1989.  
 
The Business of Major League Baseball.
 
  Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Staudohar, Paul D.  1996.  
 
Playing for Dollars: Labor Relations and the
Sports Business
 
.  Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.




.  New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Wallace, Michael.  1988.  “Labor Market Structure and Salary Determination






Walsh, William D.  1992.  “The Entry Problem of Francophones in the
National Hockey League: A Systemic Interpretation.”  
 
Canadian Public


















 following a page number means the cited name is in a figure, note, or 
table, respectively, on that page.
Araton, Harvey, 105, 113
Austrian, Ziona, 26, 49
Baade, Robert A., 25, 26, 49, 53, 72






Bradley, Bill, 115, 128










Burdekin, Richard C., 123, 128
Byers, W.B., 26, 28, 49
Christiano, Kevin J., 122, 124, 128
Clotfelter, Charles T., 55, 72
Coats, Dennis, 58, 72
Conlin, Mike, 124, 128
Conway, R.S., 26, 28, 49






Dardis, Martin, 105, 113





Emerson, Patrick M., 124, 128





Goldberger, Arthur S., 121, 128






Gwartney, James, 118, 128
Halberstam, David, 115, 129










Hamilton, Bruce W., 26, 49
Hanssen, Andrew, 118, 123, 129
Haworth, Charles, 118, 128





Horowitz, Ira, 9, 18
Humphreys, Brad R., 58, 72
Idson, Todd L., 123, 128
Irani, Daraius, 122, 123, 129






Kafka, Peter, 56, 73























Kahn, Peter, 26, 49





Keteyian, Armen, 105, 113

























Lowry, Philip J., 22, 49
McElroy, Katherine M., 55, 61, 73
Nardinelli, Clark, 123, 130
Neale, Walter, 12, 18
Neelakantan, Shailaja, 56, 73























Pechman, Joseph A., 54, 73










Rosentraub, Mark S., 26, 49, 52, 58, 73
Rottenberg, Simon, 17, 19
Samuels, Allison, 116, 130
Sanderson, Allen R., 26, 49
Scully, Gerald W., 126, 130
Sheehan, Richard G., 88, 91










Shils, Edward, 46, 49
Siegfried, John J., 55, 61, 73
Simon, Curtis, 123, 130
































































 following a page number means the subject information is in a figure,
note, or table, respectively, on that page.
















 Tickets for sports 
events
Advertising
in event programs, 64, 68
stadium revenues from, 56
using targeted ads to estimate fans’ 
income, 62–70
















 American Football League




 Black coaches 
and managers; Black players; 
Black student athletes
Alcohol tax subsidies for stadiums, 55
American Basketball Association (ABA) 
merger with the National Basketball 
Association (NBA), 15
American Football Conference (AFC), 
16
American League (baseball), 16
employer discrimination in, 118
American Football League (AFL)




baseball’s exemption from, 8, 11






Assignment (positional) discrimination 





 College athletes; Players






effect on stadiums, 23, 29
negative effects on stadium 
neighborhoods, 22, 32, 39, 41–42




















Bars, near stadiums, 40
Baseball
competitive balance in, 107–109
Far Side cartoon about, 7




, 68, 69, 70
racial discrimination, 118–119, 122, 
124–126
revenue sharing system, 101, 109
salary caps, 111
1994 strike, 110





 Major League Baseball
Baseball cards, 123
Baseball Encyclopedia, The, 118, 119
Basketball
ABA–NBA merger, 15




, 68, 69, 70
National Basketball Association 
1998–1999 lockout, 93–113













 Men’s college basketball; 
National Basketball Association; 
National Basketball Players’ 
Association
Basketball players
arbitration complaint against owners, 
97
movement to decertify their union, 
96




acceptance of absolute limit on, 103
after settlement of the lockout, 106
differential, 96
divisive effect of differential, 104




restriction on growth of, 100
union acceptance of restriction on, 
103




Big Ten college sports programs, 76
differences from MAC college 
programs, 81–83
expenditures, 80






















Black coaches and managers, 115–116
Black players, 115–116
different kinds of racial 
discrimination against, 117, 119, 
123–124
discrimination against in basketball, 
120–122




































 Collective bargaining 
agreement in basketball
CBS contract with the National Football 
League, 107





CES (Consumer Expenditure Survey), 
60–61, 64
topcoding of income, 62






Chicago White Sox, 68
Cities
allowing team movement among, 94
claim that stadiums are investments, 
28
economic impact of stadiums on, 
24–27, 43
external benefits from stadiums, 58
influence of pro sports on, 22
strategies for dealing with urban 
economic malaise, 21
subsidies for stadiums, 24, 34, 52
subsidizing of pro sports, 14
Cleveland, Ohio, downtown 
revitalization, 24
Coaches and managers
effect of competition on quality of, 
17
in pro sports who are African-
American, 115–116, 126
racial disparity of managers’ salaries 
in baseball, 126
salaries of (Big Ten versus MAC 
colleges), 80
salaries of (NBA), 99
























stress placed on, 90
College football
correlation between profits and 
winning, 81, 87





effect of economic competition on, 
17
most profitable college teams, 85, 86t
profits from (Big Ten versus MAC 
colleges), 81, 84
relationship between revenues and 
expenses, 87–88
revenues and expenditures, 83, 84
subsidies of other programs, 82, 88, 
90
College sports, 63, 75–91
importance to colleges, 91
interaction between revenues and 
expenses, 87–88
subsidies to, 91




 College football; Men’s 
college basketball; Men’s 
nonrevenue college sports; 
Women’s college sports
College sports conferences, 76
differences among, 81














committee to study baseball’s, 110
media ownership of pro sports teams 
and, 108
problems in baseball with, 109
strategies for addressing the problem 
of, 94
Congress
hearings on pro sports, 9
support for monopoly status of pro 
sports, 11, 15
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), 
60–61, 64
topcoding of income, 62
Consumer Price Index, 60
Corporate income tax subsidies for 
stadiums, 55
Corporate ownership of pro sports 
teams, 94, 107
Co-worker discrimination in pro sports, 
117, 118–119
Customer prejudice, 117, 127
in baseball, 119, 123
and NFL salaries, 122
and salary discrimination in 
basketball, 123
Detroit Red Wings, 68, 69







discrimination in pro sports; 
Black players
Division IA colleges






football profits, 83t, 84–85
relationship between basketball 
revenues and expenses, 88
Downtowns, attempts to revitalize, 24, 
44
Draft
effect of more competition on, 13
hiring discrimination and, 124


















 Players’ salaries; 
Revenues
Economic competition
external support needed for, 15
impediments to, 14–15
as a remedy for pro sports problems, 
12
Economic impact studies
commissioned for new stadiums, 28
of neighborhoods around stadiums, 
32–33
of pro sports, 25–27
of public projects, 53
Economics of sports, 1–2
current issues in, 2–7
term coined for, 12
Economic transactions versus economic 
gains, 34
Elasticity of spending on pro sports 
events, 25, 54
Employer discrimination in pro sports, 
117, 118
Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act 
(EADA), 75–76
Expenditures
calculating and estimating pro 
sports’, 25–26, 61
on college football and men’s college 
basketball, 83–84




























as change agents for pro sports, 18
complaints about pro sports, 8
consumer surplus received by, 57–58











identification with pro teams, 14, 16
income levels, 51–72
of particular sports, 63–68





 Customer prejudice; 





 decision of 1922 
(antitrust exemption), 8, 11
Federal government tax subsidies for 
stadiums, 52, 55









 Women’s college sports
Fenway Park, 22







for Seattle, King County, and 
Washington state, 26









merger of the AFL and NFL, 15








Franchise value of pro teams, 101–102
Free agency, 93
Bird free agents, 103
Charles Finley’s response to player 
demands for, 13





 Pro sports events




 Tickets for sports events
Gateway Complex, 24











 Congress; Local/state 
government










Gross economic impact, of stadiums on 
neighborhoods, 26–27






Gross versus net financial inflows, 33





 (Fort and Quirk), 8
Hiring discrimination in pro sports, 
123–124, 127
Hockey




, 68, 69, 70
salary caps, 111
team owners’ reaction to NBA 
settlement, 106





 National Hockey League
Holmes, Justice Oliver Wendell, 11
Hotel and motel tax subsidies for 
stadiums, 54–55
Hotels, located near stadiums, 42
Huizenga, Wayne, 108
Hunter, Billy, 105–106















CES’ top-coded level of, 62
of fans of particular sports, 63–68














 Players’ salaries; Revenues
Indiana Pacers, 68
Internet, effect on pro sports, 18
Invariance principle, 17
Jobs, claims that stadiums create new, 28
Joint venture sale of TV rights, 9, 11
Jordan, Michael, 94–95, 104, 106
King County, Washington, impact of pro 
sports on, 26
Kingdome
economic impact on Pioneer Square, 
29–35








team owners’ dissatisfaction with, 
27–28
Larry Bird exception, 94–95
owners’ call for elimination of, 
96–97
Leagues
average owners’ assets and player’s 
salaries in 1998, 56
breaking up of existing, 16, 94, 111
cooperation among team owners, 12, 
93
creating economically competitive, 
12–18, 94




monopoly profit earned by, 9–10
monopoly rights, 10–11
special legal treatment of, 8, 11
start-up costs for new, 15





 Pro teams; Revenue
 
138
Legal and legislative actions concerning 
sports





 decision of 1922, 8
local blackout laws, 11
Title IX gender equity guidelines, 76, 
80, 82–83
Local businesses
displacement by stadiums, 33
economic impact of suburban 
stadiums on, 23






questionnaire about the effects of the 
Kingdome on, 47–48




 Neighborhoods with 
stadiums
Local/state government
need for studies of tax revenues from 
pro sports, 15
sources for tax subsidies for 
stadiums, 55
stadium dilemmas of, 15
Los Angeles Dodgers, 69, 107–108
sale of, 11
Luxury box seating, 28, 51, 63, 97





 Mid-American Conference 
Major League Baseball (MLB)
antitrust exemption, 8, 11, 15
approval of News Corporation 
purchase of the Dodgers, 107
average player salaries in 1998, 56
cartel management of American and 
National leagues, 15
employer discrimination in early 
days of, 118
exit rates of black players, 124
and free agency, 13
1994 revenues, 7
1994 strike, 18
number of black players, 115
revenue disparity between richest and 
poorest teams, 108
revenue sharing among teams, 56
Market power, 7–19
as cause of problems in pro sports, 8, 
9–12
effect of competition on, 12
limits of economic competition as an 
antidote to, 14–15
Media
impact on pro sports, 9
ownership of pro teams, 94, 107
pro sports monopoly effect on, 12
Men’s college basketball
Big Ten versus MAC colleges’ profits 
from, 81, 84





importance to the NBA, 99
relationship between revenues and 
expenses, 88
revenues and expenditures, 83
Men’s nonrevenue college sports
Big Ten versus MAC college 
financial losses for, 81–82
college football subsidies to, 88
non-economic utility of, 82, 84











Michigan Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), 119
Michigan University football team, 81
Mid-American Conference (college) 
sports programs
deviation from Title IX guidelines, 
76, 80, 82–83
differences from Big Ten programs, 
81–83
expenditures, 80
football financial losses, 81
































 (Keteyian, Araton, and 
Dardis), 105
Monopoly in pro sports
and actual prices of team franchises, 
56–57
consequences of movement away 
from, 12–15, 17




pro team owners’, 10, 11
Municipal bonds, 52, 55
Murdoch, Rupert, 107–108
National Basketball Association (NBA)
average player salaries in 1998, 56
avoidance of advantaged-team 
domination, 109
effects of a breakup into competing 
leagues, 16
exit rates of black players, 124
merger with the ABA, 15





as the place to first implement 
economic competition, 18
response to revenue inequality 
among its teams, 110
revenue sharing, 101, 109
National Basketball Association 
franchises, 101–102
National Basketball Association lockout
background to, 94–97
charged with being racially 
motivated, 116
economic issues in, 97–102
settlement of, 106–111
National Basketball Association teams
profits during 1997–1998, 100
projected growth of profits if players’ 
salaries are restricted, 100, 103
National Basketball Players’ Association 
(NBPA)
handling of the NBA lockout, 102
investigation of NBA owners’ claims 
of declining profits, 97, 98–99
lack of collective bargaining 
experience, 105
reduction of large disparities in 
player salaries, 104–106
National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) requirements, 82
National Football Conference (NFC), 16
National Football League (NFL)
average player salaries in 1998, 56
avoidance of advantaged-team 
domination, 109
cartel management of the AFC and 
NFC, 16
contract with CBS, 107
franchise players, 113
merger with American Football 
League (AFL), 15
number of black players, 115









revenue sharing, 56, 109–110










view of economic competition, 12
National Hockey League (NHL)
average player salaries in 1998, 56
avoidance of advantaged-team 
domination, 109





 World Hockey Association 



















 National Collegiate Athletic 
Association
Neighborhoods with stadiums, 21–50
economic development claims for, 
28, 32–33, 43–44
economic development that differs 
from that of the surrounding city, 
22
financial leakages from, 33, 34
remedies proposed for economic 
decline of, 44



























 National Hockey League
Oakland Athletics, 13
Oakland Raiders, 69
Ohio State University football team, 81




 Men’s nonrevenue 
college sports





problems in stadium neighborhoods, 
22, 32, 39, 41–42





Pay-per-view televised games, 10, 57
benefits that accrue to viewers of, 57, 
59
Penn State University football team, 81, 
88
Personal income tax subsidies for 
stadiums, 55
Personal seat license, 61
Philadelphia Phillies, 68
Pioneer Square neighborhood (Seattle)
boundaries and description of, 29
businesses located in, 29, 36, 40



















parking problems caused by 
stadiums, 40–42






background to National Basketball 
Association’s, 97–102
monopoly as a cause of, 13
Players
development systems, 99
effect of competition on quality of, 
17
residences outside of cities played in, 
33, 34
split of sports’ profit with team 








 Basketball players; Black 
players; Draft; Players’ salaries; 
Superstar players
Players’ salaries, 10
averages in 1998, 56
baseball versus basketball minimum, 
104–105
effect of economic competition on, 
13
effect of unions on, 9
geographic neighborhood 
distribution of, 33
new stadiums and, 34
restriction on growth of, 13, 94
unequal distribution of, 13
 
See also Basketball players’ salaries; 
Salary discrimination; Team 
salaries
Pohlad, Carl, 106, 108
141
Policy.  See Public policy
Politicians and politics
impediments to economic 
competition, 15, 17–18
and pro sports monopoly, 10–11, 
17–18
Seattle referendum on building a new 
stadium for the Mariners, 28
Positional discrimination in pro sports, 
123, 124–126, 127
Pro sports
competitive balance in, 93–113
economic competition and the 
quality of, 17
economic impact studies about,
 25–26
economic revolution of, 23
economic uniqueness of this industry, 
7–8, 93
evidence of discrimination in, 
118–126
lessons of the environmental 
movement for, 18
market power, 7–19
median income levels of fans of, 67t
relative economic unimportance of, 
7, 26
special privilege granted to, 9
See also Fans; name of specific sport; 
Players; Pro teams; Stadiums; 
Team owners
Pro sports event programs, ads in, 64, 68
Pro sports events
elasticity of spending on, 25, 54
local versus global economic impact 
of, 27, 34–36
See also Television; Tickets for sports 
events; Winning
Pro sports leagues.  See Leagues
Pro teams
benefits from new stadiums, 34
distribution among cities, 13–14
economic impact on cities, 25–27, 43
how to increase the number of, 12, 
13–14
joint venture sale of TV rights, 9, 11
local economic impact of wins or 
losses by, 40
price discrimination schemes, 57
relocation and threats of relocation 
by, 11, 13–14
restrictions on the number of, 11
revenues from stadiums, 55–56
revenue sharing, 56, 94, 101, 
110–111
total economic return to owners of, 
101
See also Fans; National Basketball 
Association teams; Stadiums; 
Team owners; Team salaries
PSID.  See Michigan Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics
Public policy
implications of the Kingdome study 
for, 43–45
pro sports leagues, 15
solution to competitive balance, 111
stadiums, 15, 53
Public projects, economic taxonomy for 
evaluating, 53
Public transit, 41–42
Racial discrimination in pro sports, 
115–130
advantages of doing research on, 118, 
119
data used for economic research, 
117–118, 119–120
economists’ definitions of, 116–117
evidence of, 118–126
labor market manifestations of, 119
Rent, definition of, 111n2
Restaurants near stadiums, 40
Retention discrimination in pro sports, 
123, 124, 127
Revenues
Big Ten versus MAC colleges’, 76, 
80, 81




of businesses located near stadiums, 
39t, 40, 42–43, 47–48
CBR (core basketball revenues), 
112n18
cities’ claims that stadiums will 
generate, 28, 43
from college football, 82, 83t, 84
committed to cities by teams for 
stadium construction, 36
defined gross revenues (basketball), 
94, 97
geographic distribution of stadium, 
33–35, 43
importance of stadiums to pro 
teams’, 55–56
importance of stadiums to team 
owners’, 51
Major League Baseball’s 1994, 7
player shares of NBA, 99
recipients of pro team’s incremental, 
56–57
from related-party transactions, 97, 
98
relationship with expenses in college 
sports, 87–88
sports at Division IA schools, 83t, 
84–85
sports leagues in 1994, 25
from tickets for men’s pro sports in 
1996, 72n7
from women’s college sports, 82, 83t
See also Expenditures; Income
Revenue sharing among pro teams, 56, 
94, 101
advantages to owners, 110–111
in the NFL, 109–110
Reverse-order draft, 94, 95
Robinson, Jackie, 116, 118, 119
Rookie draft, 13
reverse-order, 94, 95
Salaries.  See Coaches and managers; 
Players’ salaries; Team salaries
Salary caps
in baseball and hockey, 111
baseball players’ rejection of, 110
in basketball, 94–95
basketball union agreement to, 102, 
103
versus free agency, 95
National Football League, 99
Salary discrimination, 119–127
among superstar players, 122–123
in basketball, 120–121
from positional discrimination in 
football, 124–126
Sales taxes
collected from pro sports, 54
use for subsidizing stadiums, 55
Sanderson, Allen, 72n11
San Diego Padres, 113n23
Seattle
economic impact of the Mariners on, 
26
neighborhoods (map), 31f
net versus gross economic impact of 
pro sports on, 26
survey of the effects of the Kingdome 
on commercial activity in, 47–48
why study stadium-building in,
27–29
Seattle Mariners, 26, 113n23
See also Kingdome
Seattle Seahawks, 68
SEC.  See Southeastern Conference
Selig, Bud, 110
Southeastern Conference (SEC), 85, 86t
Spending.  See Expenditures
Sports.  See College sports; Pro sports
Sports agents and the NBA lockout, 105
Sports bars near stadiums, 41
Sports economics, 1–2
current issues in, 2–7
term coined for, 12
Sports events.  See Pro sports events
Sports fans.  See Fans
Sports league economics, 12
143
Stadium parking, 29–30, 45n2
Kingdome, 40–41
overflow into surrounding 
neighborhoods, 22, 32, 39, 41–42
Stadiums
advertising revenues from, 56
arguments for new, 28, 34
beliefs about the benefits of, 58, 60
claim by cities that they are 
investments, 28, 53
competitive edge of teams with new, 
108
costs to local neighborhoods, 35, 
42–43
displacement of local businesses, 33
effect on local businesses, 23
equity issues concerning, 53–54
establishing a market rental rate on, 
14
external benefits and costs from, 
58–59
historical place of in cities, 22–33
identifying who pays the subsidy for, 
54–55
land-use decisions concerning, 45
lease agreements for, 36, 97–98
lucrativeness of new, 93–94
luxury seating in, 28, 51, 63
with malls, 34, 44
multipurpose circular “ashtray,” 23
owners’ definition of inadequate, 51
policy implications of the Kingdome 
study, 43–45
relocation from the suburbs to city 
centers, 20–21, 22, 24
strategies used by teams to obtain 
new, 108, 113n23
See also Neighborhoods with 
stadiums 
Stadium signs, using to estimate income 
of pro sports fans, 69
Stadium subsidies, 52–53
lack of effect on ticket prices, 59
owner’s reaction to getting or not 
getting, 108, 113n23
as public projects, 53
redistributional effects of, 71
taxpayer financing of, 54
who benefits directly from, 55–58
who benefits indirectly from, 58–59
Star athletes.  See Superstar players
State government.  See Local/state 
government
Stern, David (NBA Commissioner), 105
concessions demanded of players, 96
earnings in 1997–1998, 99
Suburbs.  See Cities
Superstar players
customer preferences for white 
basketball, 123
discrimination against black 
basketball, 121–122
Michael Jordan, 94–95, 104, 106
net revenues of, 57
salary differential from other players, 
13, 104, 118
use of by corporate media owners of 
teams, 107
Survey, effects of the Kingdome on 
commercial activity in Seattle, 
47–48
Tagliabue, Paul (NFL Commissioner), 
12
Tampa Bay Buccaneers stadium, 26
Tampa Bay Lightning, 68
Taxes, types used to subsidize stadiums, 
54–55
Taxpayers
claims that stadiums will aid, 28, 35
effect of economic competition on, 
14
financing of stadiums, 52, 54–55
Team owners
ability to make profitable teams 
appear to lose money, 98
call for elimination of the Bird 
exception, 95–96
concerns of basketball, 96–97
144
Team owners (cont.)
dollar value of rights possessed by 
specific, 11
fair return on profits, 101
income and worth, 56
major media conglomerates which 
are, 94, 107
monopoly rights of, 10, 11
revenues from stadiums, 51–52
split of sports profit with players,
 9–10, 57, 74n4
tax sheltering benefits received by, 
101
threats to relocate teams, 52
See also Leagues; Player-owner 
strife; Pro teams; Stadiums
Team salaries, 103
baseball, 108
luxury payroll tax on basketball, 109
owners’ strategies to reduce total 
paid for, 98
and team win percentage in the NBA, 
95
See also Players’ salaries
Television
Congress’ exemption of sports 
contracts from antitrust laws, 15
effect on pro sports, 9
how to increase the number of pro 
games shown on, 12
incomes of viewers of pro sports 
events on, 70
joint venture sale of TV rights, 9, 11
local blackout laws, 11
TV network ownership of pro sports 
teams, 107
using advertising on to estimate fans’ 
incomes, 64, 69–70
See also Pay-per-view televised 
games
Tennis, 116
Tickets for sports events
benefits that accrue to buyers of, 57, 
59
buyers’ income versus television 
viewers’ income, 70
demand for, 57
finding data about buyers of, 59–60
high prices of, 9–11
how to lower prices for, 12
income levels of buyers of, 61–63, 
62t
income levels of buyers of particular 
sports event, 63–68
lack of effect of stadium subsidies 
on, 59
purchased by businesses, 60, 63
sales taxes on, 54
sports with the cheapest and most 
expensive prices for, 69, 72n14
Tiger Stadium, 22
Title IX gender equity guidelines, 76, 
80, 82–83
TV.  See Television
Unions
effect of economic competition in pro 
sports on, 13
effect on pro sports, 9–10
and free agency, 13
handling of NBA lockout, 102
negotiations with owners, 9–10
player movement to decertify NBPA, 
96
role in maintaining competitive 
balance in baseball, 110
See also National Basketball Players’ 
Association
University of Louisville’s men’s 
basketball, 87
Urban areas.  See Cities
USA Conference, 85, 86t
Washington (state), impact of pro sports 
on, 26
Western Athletic Conference, 85, 86t
Western Michigan University, 76
145
WHA. See World Hockey Association
Winning
correlation between college football 
team’s profits and, 81, 87
correlation with NBA team salaries, 
95
correlation with team payroll in 
baseball, 109
local economic impact from a pro 
team’s, 41
Women’s college sports, 80
Big Ten versus MAC college 
financial losses, 82
college football subsidies to, 88
female student athletes, 76, 77t, 89t
revenues and expenditures, 83t
See also Men’s nonrevenue college 
sports
World Hockey Association (WHA), 16








The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit
research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to
employment-related problems at the national, state, and local levels.  It is an
activity of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was
established in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn,
founder of The Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of
employment income during economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn
Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of
publications.  Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a
research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social
scientists; 2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements
the internal research program by providing financial support to researchers
outside the Institute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major
vehicle for disseminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other
selected works in the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services
division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment and
training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication
programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of
public and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make
knowledge and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit
of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes,
consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and
income maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work
arrangements; family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional
economic development and local labor markets.

